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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the growth of the concept of a ’’New 
Nationality" as it became the ideology of a nation, and the means by 
which an ethnic group was "Canadianized". The main sources are the 
articles and speeches of Irish Catholic journalists as published in 
newspapers which represent a cross-section of political and geographical 
areas, showing the struggle for a new nationality as it was worked out 
in the Irish Catholic press. 
The concept of a new nationality did not originate in British 
North America; its roots lay in early nineteenth century Ireland and 
it was brought to British America by an Irish Catholic journalist. The 
audience he and other journalists addressed was made up in large part 
of Irish Catholics only recently arrived in the New World, still bearing 
their memories, history, culture and prejudices. Between 1858, when the 
first proposals for Confederation were introduced in the Canadian 
Assembly, andil870, when the new Dominion consolidated its acquisition 
of the West, the new nationality was central to the scheme of Confeder- 
ation. In the 1860's especially, Irish Catholics were faced with painful 
choices as they settled into a new land. The role of Irish Catholic 
journalists is important in this period, not just to the general applic- 
ation of the new nationality, but more particularly in the process of 
assimilation experienced by the Irish Catholic community. In that struggle 
the concept of a new nationality played a major part. For Irish Catholic 
immigrants, their leaders were their journalists; -and it was in the pages 
of their newspapers that the new nationality was debated and preached. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
»'A NATION ONCE AGAIN" 
The concept of a new nationality in North America was central 
to the scheme of Confederation of the British North American Provinces. 
It formed the ideological basis for a union that would otherwise have 
been difficult to rationalize, given the divergent histories, attitudes 
and perspectives of the various Provinces. Instead of being merely a 
political merger based on economic or military considerations. Confederat- 
ion achieved the stature of grandeur, a constitutional experiment in 
nation-building through an emphasis on the creation of a New Nationality. 
The concept, even the phrase "new nationality", as used in the 
campaign for Confederation, was, however, an imported one. It came, not 
from British Americans, but from an Irish Catholic journalist who arrived 
in Canada in 1857. As an ideology for Confederation, the new nationality 
owed much to the publicity given to it through the pages of Irish Catholic 
newspapers from 1857 to 1870 in the British American Provinces. As Irish 
immigrants arrived-in the Provinces in increasing.numbers^during the first 
half of the century, they became an important component in the population. 
They came with their baggage of history. And as they groped to define their 
ne.wi>.identity as immigrants in the strange New World, their spokesmen in 
their press sought to give guidance and direction. The decade of the 1860's 
so important in the history of Confederation, saw Srish CathoTics in partic 
ul^r faced withggrave crises of loyalty as they were forced to choose 
between the old and the new nationality. This struggle, paralleting 
that of the Provinces to find a new formula for expressing their corn- 
mop links and separateness from the United States, supplied the idea 
of a new nationality for British America with a context, a forum and 
a willing audience. 
The new nationality was a product of Ireland. It had its genesis 
in attempts by Irish nationalists to create a nationality that could 
embrace people from all backgrounds and traditions in the Irish context. 
The question of nationality in Ireland had always been a complicated 
one. In the centuries of English rule, many groups had settled on the 
island, blending, to varying degrees, with the native Irish Celts to 
produce a bewildering array of Gaels, Old English, Anglo-Irish and S 
Scots-Irish. Until the Glorious Revolution of 1688-90, Ireland had 
retained much of its Gaelic identity intact, a result of a very uneven 
British conquest.that had left much of the country in the hands of the 
old Gaelic system of tribal control. There was no 'national' identity, 
or even a common defense against the foreign invasion. As a result, as 
the eighteenth century saw the traditional system almost completely 
destroyed by a series of Penal Laws against Catholics and Dissenters 
that broke the power of the Gaelic chiefs and replaced them with a 
Protestant elite. Political power went to the Anglican Establishment, 
who took over the Parliament of Ireland and began the reign of a Prot- 
estant Ascendancy in Ireland. 
In 1782, inspired by the American Revolution, this Ascendancy 
demanded, by threats of rebellion, legislative independence for the 
Irish Parliament. This was granted in a limited form which left a 
veto in the hands of British officials in London. Still, many of 
the members of the Irish Commons hoped that this would be the first 
step in the evolution of an Irish Protestant nation, linked to England, 
but independent in its local affairs. However, in spite of the fact 
that many of the Penal Laws had either been repealed or become dead 
letters over the years, Irish Catholics still had no right to sit in 
Parliament. They had received the vote in the 1790's and many of the 
Protestant leaders in the Irish Parliament hoped to see further steps 
taken towards the emancipation of Catholics. They were, however, in a 
minority, for the nation .that most Irish'Anglicans wanted to build was 
a Protestant one British rather than Irish in its nature and struct- 
ures . To allow for Catholic emancipation would ensure Catholic domin- 
ance in the Parliament of Ireland and.that they were not prepared to 
accept. Total union with Britain was preferable, and to this solution 
many Anglicans .moved by the end of the century. 
The impossibility of ruling Ireland through a Protestant elite 
was emphasized by the rise of a new organization dedicated to unite 
Irishmen of. all classes and denominations: the United Irishmen. Founded 
in? .1791, its aim was to sever the links between Britain and Ireland and 
form a separate Republic on the model of the Thirteen Colonies or that' 
of the French Revolutionaries. It was a mainly bourgeois organization 
of intellectuals, but it was the first of a long series of Irish, 
republican revolutionary societies dedicated to the total independence 
of Ireland and the unity of all Irishmen. Th.e United Irishmen had their 
opportunity for revolution in 1798, when various parts.of the country 
were disturbed by often bloody and savage uprisings quickly put down 
by the authorities with equally savage efficiency. The north of the 
country, where the.United Irishmen were founded and where they had 
most of their support, never rose at all. This was as a result of a 
great failure of the organization: the rifts between Catholics and 
Protestants were too.great to hold the organization together for very 
long. Traditional fears and suspicions were too strong. 
The Irish Parliament failed to live up to the expectations of 
its members. An Irish Protestant nation did not seem possible in the. 
face of British vetoes and Irish Catholic rebellion. The integrity of 
the Parliament was often questioned even.by its members: 
Who out of Ireland-ever hears of Ireland? Who respects us? 
Where are our ambassadors? What treaties do we enter into? 
With what nation do we make peace or war? Are we not a mere 
cipher in all these, and are not these what give a nation 
consequence and fame?...True, we are^an independent kingdom; 
we have an imperial crown distinct from England; but it is 
a metaphysical distinction, a mere sport for speculative 
men. 1 
Irish Protestants were compelled to realize that they could not form 
a nation separate from England without involving the Catholics and 
such involvement would alter the nature of the nation they wanted. It 
seemed to many that the only viable alternative for them was to become 
one with Britain and'to acceptasl|Brit*sh3?subjects. To that 
end, and in-the aftermath of the 1798 rebellion which showed them how 
Sir Lawrence Parsons in the Irish House of Commons, 1790; quoted in 
Kee, Robert, The Green Flag, (London, 1972), p. 37. 
uncertain was their security, they submitted to British pressure and 
voted themselves out o£ existence. The Irish Parliament was absorbed 
into that of Britain. It was the end of the attempt to form a dis- 
tinctly Protestant nation in Ireland. 
The United Irishmen had also failed. Their republican ideas 
had not managed to overcome the traditional sectarian divisions on 
the island. It would appear that whatever support they had garbered 
had stemmed more from grievances among the people than from any 
ideological convictions. During the trial of one of the United Irishmen 
leaders, Thomas Emmett, he was asked whether the object next the hearts 
of the Irish Catholics was not a separation from England and a republic. 
He replied: "Pardon me, the object next their hearts was a redress of 
their grievances." He added that if that could be achieved without 
violence, "they would prefer it infinitely to a revolution and a repub- 
2 
lie." Although Emmett's views may be open to question as a single 
source, it seems likely from the events of the 1798 rising that he had 
an accurate grasp of the attitudes of Irish Catholics at the time. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing feeling in England at the time, as well as 
among Irish Anglicans, was that Irish Catholics were disloyal and very 
violent in their desire to see the two islands separated. The signif- 
icance of Emmett's judgement was not recognized at the time, nor for 
many years after. it was to be understood in British North America 
only after many trials and testings for the Irish Catholics theiaselves. 
^Ibid., p. 126. 
By 1800 two attempts to create an Irish nation had failed. The 
United Irishmen had been unable to unite Irishmen.of different relig- 
ious traditions, and the Irish Parliament had failed to form a polit- 
ical nation based on Anglican Ascendancy. Irish society was as splint- 
ered and sectionalised as ever, with Catholic and Protestant secret 
societies terrorizing each other on a local basis throughout the island. 
The most powerful of these groups was'the Orange Order, founded in 
Belfast in 1795. It looked back to the Glorious Revolution and the 
defeat of the Papist James II at the battle of the Boyne in 1690 as the 
great inspiration of Loyalist Protestant Britain. It was a rabidly 
anti-Catholic organization completely dedicated to the link with the 
British Parliament and a Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. It^was in 
many ways mirrored by Catholic organizations in Ireland, although none 
of these achieved the same prominence and importance as the Orangemen. 
Following the failure of the United Irishmen in 1798, the two main 
religious factions in.Ireland became polarized. There was no organization 
to bring Catholic and Protestant together. 
The tremendous political upheavals of the last years of the eight- 
eenth century in Ireland were followed by decades of social disturbances. 
The economic and social life of the country was to.be revolutionized 
in the.first half of the nineteenth century in ways which would forever 
change the nature of Irish affairs. In 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars in Europe, Ireland had a population of about six million people, 
3 
at least‘90% of wliom depended on th.e land for their very existence. By 
3 
AdamSj W.F., -Ireland and Irish Emigration to the New World, CNew York, 
1932), p.3,6. 
1821 Ireland had the highest density of population of any country in 
Europe 
Europe, and by 1845 the population had risen to eight million. As a 
result of high prices paid to farmers during the European wars, rents 
on Irish property had risen sharply before 1815. Then, in the post-war 
slump, the pressure on peasants to pay their rents grew. Sub-letting 
was the way to meet the rent and soon families were being forced to 
live on holdings of 1/4 acre. However, with the post-war change from 
tillage to grazing which characterized that period, the number of ten- 
ants on holdings was reduced.by landlords, and many were evicted from 
their landst Many Catholics moved to the northern.counties where they 
were prepared to pay higher rents than their Protestant counterparts, 
mostly by living on less, and the Protestants were evicted. These, for 
the most part, constituted .the'-'main-wave of Irish migration to North 
America from 1815 .to 1830? Displaced by.Irish Catholics, these migrants 
carried with them a dislike and suspicion of Catholicism in all forms. 
By the mid-1820's.the situation.in Ireland was already desperate.- 
Two outside obsei*vers reported on the plight of Irish peasants in that 
decade. A resident magistrate in Cork said in 1824: 
I have seen several countries, and I never saw any 
peasantry so badly off. 6 
The following year, the novelist Sir Walter Scott,- visited Ireland and 
reported that the poverty of the Irish. Catholic peasants was "on the 
7 
extreme edge of human misery." 
^Ibid.-, p. 10-11. 
^Ibid.i map facing p. 1. 
^Kee, p. 170. ^Ibid. 
This was the Ireland in which the Irish Catholic journalists 
who were to play such an important role in the new nationality were 
born and raised. And it was,in the midst of this misery and degradation 
that a new movement grew up which was to give Irish Catholics a new 
confidence and experience in political life. In 1823 a young lawyer 
from County Kerry called Daniel O’Connell began to campaign for Catholic 
emancipation. As a Catholic, O’Connell had been partly educated ont'the 
continent and resented the fact that Catholics could vote but not sit 
in Parliament, nor take any public office. To give his campaign broad 
support, O’Connell enlisted the help of the Catholic peasantry. Working 
through many of the agrarian groups that.had sprung up in the previous 
half-century to protect tenants, a countrywide movement under a Catholic 
leader mobilized-the Irish Catholics to fight for their rights in a 
constitutional manner. This was the first time such a thing had been 
attempted in Irish history. The Protestant elite, still in control of 
Irish political life even under the Act of Union, were faced with a 
popular mass movement. The level of support for O’Connell can be gauged 
by the success of what he termed ’the Catholic Rent’, a membership fee 
of just one penny a week. This financed the emancipation campaign and 
8 
often amounted to as much as a thousand pounds a week. This was at a 
time when the country was facing near-catastrophic conditions. Faced 
with new tactics and mass support for O’Connell, the British authorities 
granted Catholic emancipation in-1829, at the same.time disenfranchising 
the majority of Irish Catholics by raising the property requirements. 
This success, Iiowever limited, was crucial in-two ways, It sliowed the 
the Irish Catholics that they could gain redress of their grievances 
peacefully through weight of numbers and by uniting. But it also was 
the start of a growing rift between moderate Catholics and Protestants, 
since the emancipation campaign, on O'Connell's orders, was confined 
almost entirely to Catholics. When he moved on in the following decade 
to campaign for a repeal of the Act of Union of 1801, the "Liberator", 
as he was known, found it hard to shed the ways of the past and include 
Protestants in his Repeal organization. Moderate Protestants joined the 
campaign, but found themselves as outsiders in the mainly Catholic 
Repeal Clubs. Thus, the dawning of Irish Catholic political awareness 
and power coincided with agrowing belief that Irish nationalism was a 
predominantly Catholic concern. 
It was at this point in the development of Irish nationalist 
thinking that a small group of men established a newspaper in Dublin in 
an attempt to encourage a new nationality in Ireland that would include 
Irishmen of all traditions and religions. Significantly, they called 
their newspaper, founded in 1842, the Nation. Its founders were Thomas 
Davis, John Blake Dillon and Charles Cavan Duffy, and they represented 
the two main religious and racial factions in Ireland. Davis was the 
main philosopher of the group who grew up around the Nation and who came 
to be known as "Young Ireland". Davis had a vision of a new nationality 
for Ireland, "a nationality of the spirit as well as of the letter.. 
which would establish internal unity and external independence." It 
would be a nationality that would include all religious groups, those of 
9i 
Thomas Davis, Essays and Poems, (Dublin, 1945), quoted in Lyons, F.S.L., 
Ireland Since the Famine, (London, 1971), p. 34. 
10. 
Celtic and Anglo-Saxon backgrounds alike, in a common nationality based 
not primarily on political unity, but on a shared language, literature 
and history. The Young Irelanders believed that the cultivation of such 
a sense of nationality was essential to the survival of an Ireland 
which they feared was fast becoming anglicized by centuries of British 
domination. The pages of the Nation were filled with editorials and 
articles, poems and stories, preaching a common Irishrnationality. The 
newspaper sought to inspire Irish men and women with memories of the 
great Celtic past which was the common heritage of all, regardless of 
religion or racial origin. The era of "the Island of Saints and Scholars", 
as Ireland was once called, was the inspiration for a new nationality 
based on a glorious past. Thomas Davis took on the mantle of poet of 
Young Ireland's new nationality, and expressed his vision in a song that 
is still popular today: 
When boyhood's fire was in my blood, 
I read of ancient freemen; 
Of Greece and Rome who bravely stood. 
Three hundred men and three men. 
And then I prayed I yet might ^see 
Her fetters rent in twain: 
And Ireland, long a province, be 
A Nation once again. 
The Young Irelanders thrived on such fare and sought to inspire their 
fellow-countrymen with a vision of an Irish nation that had room for all. 
On a practical level, the Nation proposed a new history of Ireland, and 
divided the work among a number of their writers and contributors. The 
main thrust of the movement was that the elitist Protestant nation of 
the eighteenth century had failed, as had the separatist republicanism 
of the United Irishmen, to unite the Irish in any way which mattered. 
Only the creation of a new sense of Irish nationality could unite the 
Irish of all backgrounds and prepare the way for political unity and 
religious toleration. That was to be the mission of Young Ireland. 
The winning of an Irish Parliament, free of the restrictions 
and corruption that had characterized the pre-Union assembly, was seen 
as a desirable goal by Young Ireland and they willingly gave their 
support to the O'Connell Repeal campaign. But by 1846, differences had 
divided the two movements. Young Ireland considered O'Connell's reliance 
on Catholics a step away from their idea of nationality. They wanted 
Repeal to reach the landlord class and the Protestants of the north, as 
well as the Catholic peasant who was the backbone of the movement. But 
Daniel O'Connell was simply too much of a Catholic to accept Young Ire- 
land's ideas, and his followers were soon leveling sectarian accusations 
of disloyalty against the Young Ireland movement and their newspaper. 
The sudden death of Thomas Davis in 1845 was a bad blow to any hope of 
reconciliation, the cornerstone of Young Ireland's ideology. Davis was 
the one Young Ire lander O'Connell respected and consulted. Without him, 
the rift between the two movements widened. Young Ireland had a very 
different idea of Ireland's future than O'Connell, now old and impatient 
with the young men who questioned the great Liberator of Ireland. Sur- 
rounded by sycophants and too aware of his own-great achievements, 
O'Connell did little to keep the sympathy and support of Young Ireland 
after Davis' death. 
From 1845, famine stalked Ireland, growing more terrible each 
year. By 1848 over a million people had died of starvation and disease, 
another million at least had fled the country. The Great Famine brought 
political affairs in Ireland to a crisis point. The Union was blamed 
for the shocking state of the Irish economy and the extent of the 
suffering and death brought by the seventh famine since 1800^^ As 
Young Ireland moved away from the narrow sectionalism of the Repeal 
movement, it began to experience internal division also. A section of 
the movement had come under the influence of James Pintan Lalor, a 
young radical who saw the land issue as the vital concern that had to 
be dealt with in Ireland. Believing that the ownership of the land was 
vested in the Irish people, he demanded major land reforms to benefit 
the peasantry and alleviate the constant poverty of the Irish Catholic 
tenantry. Under the guidance of John Mitchel, a fiery Ulster Presbyter- 
ian,who had joined Young Ireland after Davis’ death, a section of the 
movement moved to a radical, republican position, not unlike that of 
the United Irishmen. The more moderate element, led by Charles Gavan 
Duffy, rejected the extreme views of the Mitchel faction who sought to 
impose their ideas by violent revolution if need be. Although Duffy and 
the moderates were prepared to consider violent resistance in an extreme 
emergency, they were not in agreement with Mitchel who claimed that the 
emergency had arrived with the Famine. In May 1847 O'Connell died and 
the Repeal movement carried on its conflict* with Young Ireland free of 
whatever moderating control the Liberator had retained. 
Young Ireland had by now become almost completely involved in 
politics to the exclusion of their literary and cultural cause, and in 
January 1847 had set up a rival organization to the Repeal movement. It 
was called the Irish Confederation and in it, Mitchel carried on with 
10 
Kee, p.l73; Adams, p. 183. 
13. 
his attempts to turn Young Irelanders into United Irishmen. By December, 
Duffy and the moderates had had enough and Mitchel and his followers 
were expelled from the Confederation. January 1848 saw the passing of 
a resolution in the Confederation supporting constitutional means to 
redress Ireland's wrongs. But things changed quickly in this "Year of 
Revolutions". In February, the French monarchy was overthrown and from 
that time on even the moderates like Duffy spoke with a new vehemence 
about the responsibility of England for the situation in Ireland, where 
thousands of men, women and children were dying throughout the country. 
It would have been very difficult not to have been radicalized by the 
experience. In March, two Young Ireland leaders were arrested for making 
seditious speeches, but were acquitted at their trials. Under a new Act, 
however, Mitchel was convicted of Treason-Felony and sent into exile. 
In spite of an upsurge in revolutionary fervour among their supporters. 
Young Ireland's leadership were still reluctant to resort to violence, 
and they chose not to move in Mitchel's support. July was the critical 
month. Duffy was arrested along with the Secretary of the Confederation, 
Thomas D'Arcy McGee, although McGee's case was dismissed when the jury 
refused to indict him. The British authorities, convinced that rebellion 
was inevitable, suspended the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland on July 25. 
Young Ireland saw this as a declaration of war. Either they submitted 
to imprisonment and exile, or they had to fight. They chose the latter 
course at a secret meeting of their Directory in Dublin. 
In the event, the long-awaited rebellion was sadly disappointing 
to the revolutionaries. There was little or no public support for such a 
move, and the country was in no state to rise after three years of famine. 
The middle-class background of the rebel leaders made it difficult for 
them to successfully organize and execute a revolution and the attempt 
petered out in a few days. The leaders were arrested and tried. Some were 
imprisoned. Others evaded capture and fled, either to France or to the 
United States. The quest for a new nationality for Ireland was rudely 
interrupted. In the long-term, Davis was to inspire all future Irish 
nationalists, whether constitutional or republien, throughhhis writings 
in the Nation.The concept of a broadly=based nationalism in Ireland 
was to receive further study in later generations. But from 1848 the 
centre of Irish revolutionary nationalism shifted, to North America. The 
Fenians were to claim descent from Young Ireland’s radical wing. But it 
was to be in British North America..that the Young Ireland ideal of a new 
nationality was to bear fruit first. Because of the peculiar conditions 
existing in-that area in the middle of the nineteenth century, Irish 
Catholics would give a new nation a new ideology a new nationality. 
11 
Lyons, p. 101. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE EXILED GAELS 
Long before leaving Ireland, Irish Protestants had embraced Brit- 
ish nationality as their own. The decision to accept the Act of Union of 
1801 had determined their future loyalty and caused them no major problems 
in adapting to the new life in British North America. It was not so easy 
for Irish Catholics. Their nationality was that of the old country, not 
the new. The attempt by Young Ireland to creat a broad nationality for all 
Irish people had been aborted by the events of,1848, and Irish Catholic 
immigrants arrived in British America,unsure of how to settle into the new 
circumstances of life in a Protestant, British land. The old ideas of loy- 
alty would be challenged and examined critically by the non-Irish population. 
What the Irish Catholics needed was iBadership that would give direction 
and guidance in the search for a new context in which to find an identity. 
That role fell almost entirely to the Irish Catholic journalists who, from 
the earliest days of Irish Catholic immigration to British America, had been 
publishing journals, inspired by O'Connell, designed to give the new arriv- 
als a link with each other and with Ireland. 
It is impossible to differentiate in census and immigration stat- 
istics between-Irish Catholics and Protestants, so the term ,."Irish"Cishused 
in this chapter to identify all those of Irish birth, regardless of creed. 
Both groups suffered from the experience of emigration,.though the trauma 
was, perhaps, greater for the Irish Catholics, given their view of home and 
change. 
I. The Emigrants 
The Irish did not have a tradition of emigration', other than 
for seasonal work in England and Scotland for the. men. Every year, they 
made the journey across the Irish Sea to help with the planting and 
harvesting. This was an essential part of their economy since their 
own land could never provide them with even the basics of life. But 
it was only with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe after 1815 
that emigration from the island began in earnest, and forrthe next 
twenty years the majority of those emigrating to North America were 
Protestants from northern Ireland who had been displaced by Catholics 
willing to pay higher rents. After 1828, when laws governing ships 
involved in transporting emigrants were changed, more Irish Catholics 
started to make the journey. Between 1828 and 1848, more than 814,000 
people left Ireland for North America, a little more than half going 
to British North America^ 
There were a number of attempts made to organize emigration of 
the Irish on a large scale, mostly by private commercial companies. 
These efforts met with major problems as the colonies entered a period 
of economic stagnation in the 1830’s. The most successful settlement 
was one financed-by the British Government in 1825. Peter Robinson of 
Upper Canada was commissioned to bring almost two thousand Irish Cath- 
olics to what became the Peterborough area of the Province. By the end 
of that year, 1,878 settlers had arrived in the area, mostly from the 
^Adams, W.F., Ireland and Irish Emigration to the New World from 1815 
to the Famine, CNew York, 1932j , p. 413-4. Data derived from charts. 
2 
Cork area. Families and individuals continued to make the journey 
across the Atlantic, encouraged by the success o£, and financially helped 
by, earlier emigrants. By the early 1840’s, the Irish accounted for 
3 
over 10% of the population of the United Provinces of Canada. In the 
Census figures for 1842, there were 82,728 people of Irish birth in 
4 
Upper Canada, while Lower Canada in 1844 had 43,982 of Irish birth. 
By 1851, the Irish-born were the largest ethnic group in 31 of the 
42 counties of Upper Canada, as well as in each of the five major 
urban areas of Toronto, Hamilton, Kingston, Bytown and London. The 
176,267 Irish were at least 10%, and often as high as 25% of the pop- 
ulation of these counties. In the cities they accounted for as much 
as a third of the citizens^ 
The situation in Lower Canada was somewhat different. Whereas 
in Upper Canada 87% of the Irish lived in rural areas, in Lower Canada 
35% lived in Montreal and Quebec. The.»rest- were scattered through the 
counties of the Province, generally numbering less than 7% of the pop- 
ulation. In 13 of the 36 counties, they were less than 1%, and only in 
Ottawa county did they rise above 14%. Only in Montreal did the Irish 
Catholics live in sufficient concentration to ensure representation of 
2 
Pammett, H.T., "Assisted Emigration from Ireland to Upper Canada under 
Peter Robinson", Ontario History, Vol. 31, 1936, p. 180. 
^Nolte, William, "The Irish In Canada, 1815-1867", (PhD thesis, Maryland), 
1975, p. 26. 
"^Census of Canada, 1851-52, (John Lovell, Quebec), 1853, Vol. l,p.xxi-xxii. 
r; 
^Ibid., data derived from Appendix I. 
Ibid., data derived from Appendix III. 
their interests in the Assembly. This Census year of 1851 was to be 
a turning-point in Irish migration to British America, since after 
that year the majority of immigrants from the British Isles were 
either English or Scots, rather than Irish. The Census of 1861 reflec- 
ted the changes. By that year the Irish-born as a percentage of the 
population had fallen from 18.5% to 13.6% in Upper Canada, and from 
7 
5.8% to 4.5% in Lower Canada. By the time of Confederation, Irish 
Catholics accounted for less than 20% of the population in Upper Can- 
g 
ada. In Lower Canada, the Irish remained the largest ethnic group 
after the French-Canadians, although their numbers were falling in 
comparison to English and Scots. In the two main centres of population 
in the United Provinces, Toronto and M6ntreal^j\ Irish Catholics accounted 
9 
for about a quarter of the citizens in each city. 
The Maritime Provinces also had their share of Irish Catholic 
immigration. The Irish outnumbered the English and Scots in Prince 
Edward Island after 1841. In Nova Scotia, half the population in 1827 
were Irish, though mostly Protestant.Immigration had almost ceased 
^Census of Canada, 1860-1, (S.B. Foote, Quebec), 1863, Vol.l, p. 43, 78. 
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Careless, J.M.S., ied), The Pre-Confederat&on Premiers, (Toronto,1980), 
p. 18. 
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CM.A. thesis. University of British Columbia), 1976, p. 2. 
^^Davin, Nicholas Flood, The Irishman in Canada, CToronto, .1877), p. 151. 
by the 1850's, however, and in 1860 89% of the population were native- 
born.^^ In New Brunswickiy, the Irish formed an important part of the 
community. Although immigration here too had practically ceased by the 
12 
late 1850*s, (in 1857 the majority were native-born ), in 1871 the 
Census showed that the Irish accounted for 100,634 of the 285,594 
13 
inhabitants of the Province. 
The Irish Catholics who settled in New Brunswick were by no 
means all poverty-stricken and diseased, as the later stereotype might 
suggest. They included men like Robert Cooney of Dublin, who arrived in 
the Province in 1824. In 1828 he was asked to use his influence with 
the Irish Catholic> efetliorate to ensure the election of a candidate for 
the Assembly. This he did and the man was elected, an indication of the 
influence educated Irishmen could have over their illiterate countrymen, 
14 
and of the power of the Irish Catholic vote as early as the late 1820's. 
By 1850 an Irish Catholic from Donegal, Francis McPhelim, was elected to 
the Assembly and he became the first Catholic appointed to the Executive 
Council of the Province. 
Irish Catholicsiin the Canadas were also S^espect^ble members of 
^^MacNutt, W.S., The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of a Colonial 
Society, 1712-1857, C^oronto, 1965), p. 258. 
^^Ibid. 
^^Census of Canada, 1870-1, Taylor, Ottawa), 1873, Vol.l, p. 333, 424. 
^^Halpenny, F.G. ^ Hamelin, J., Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
1976), Vol. IX, p. 154-5. 
^^Ibid., p. 527-8. 
20. 
society and some, like Dominick Daly, reached positions o£ political 
power unimaginable at that period in Ireland itself. Daly was known as 
the "permanent secretary" of the Provinces of Canada owing to the 
length of time he held public office. Bom in Ardfry, Daly served under 
various Governors and Governments from 1823 until 1848, when he was 
finally dismissed. He went on to become Lieutenant-Governor of Prince 
Edward Island in 1854, where he remained until 1859. He was always a 
popular and able official and did much to remove the stigma of disloyalty 
from the Irish Catholic population.This was the main focus of the 
many attacks made on Irish Catholics in British America. The Protestant 
Irish had made their decision on nationality with the Act of Union in 
Ireland in 1801. They had chosen British nationality in preference to 
a Catholic-dominated Irish nation. The Catholics, who were suspected of 
disloyalty because they had not made the same decision, were attacked 
by various bodies, most noticeably the Loyal Orange Lodges. 
The Orange .Order had reached British North America within five 
years of its founding in Ireland in 1795. Soldiers in Montreal formed 
the first lodge in 1800 and the first civilian group organized in the 
17 
Ottawa Valley in 1803. In 1818 there was an Orange march in York on 
July 12. That same year, soldiers started a lodge in St. John, New 
Brunswick that operated until at least 1831, when the first civilian 
18 
lodge in that city was founded. By the mid-1820’s. Upper Canada and 
^^Ibid., p. 189-92. 
^^Houston, C.J.,^ Smythe,' W.J., The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical 
Geography of the Orange Order in Canada, CToronto, 1980), p. 16-18. 
^^Ibid., p. 69. 
New Brunswick were the two main centres of Orangeism in the Provinces. 
For ofevious reasons, the Order never gained the same strength in Lower 
Canada that it knew in the western Province; nor did the other Maritime 
Provinces supply the fertile breeding-ground for the Order that New 
Brunswick did, until after Confederation. It may well be that the main 
reason for the success of the Order in the two areas was the traditional 
loyalism which was a hallmark of the two Provinces. 
The Order was not without its opponents in the days of its growth. 
The Anglican population saw it as a low-church, low-class, particularly 
Irish organization. And, of course, there was the opposition of the 
Catholic Church. The Order itself was very loosely organized until the 
arrival of Ogle Cowan in 1829. Cowan was from Wexford in Ireland and he 
had been involved in the Orange Order since 1818. When he arrived in 
Upper Canada he immediately set about a proper structuring of the basic- 
ally autonomous lodges already existing there. However, a split within 
the Orange ranks restricted growth for fifteen years, and it was not 
19 
until the 1850’s that the number of new lodges grew significantly. 
Between 1854 and 1860, almost a third of all the new lodges authorized 
in the nineteenth century came into being. From an average number of 
ten new lodges per year in the early 1850’s, the number peaked at almost 
20 
130 in 1858. It is clear that the Order in British America shared the 
anti-Catholicism of its Irish parent. In the 1830’s Orange gangs terror- 
19 
^ Ibid., p. 25. 
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ized Catholic settlers in the Peterborough area, burning buildings 
and shooting at Catholics to intimidate them into leaving the area. 
This kind of open aggression changed over the years as the Order 
attempted, with much success, to attract more respectable people of 
influence into their ranks. The aiiti-Catholic attitudes of the Order 
were primarily based on political convictions, since they believed 
that Catholics could never be loyal to the Crown as long as they held 
an allegiance to a foreign power - the Papacy. That allegiance made 
Catholics disloyal and a threat to the British Protestant nature of 
British North America. 
The Catholics, for their part, always felt under threat from 
the Orangemen. There was even a fear in not knowing exactly how many 
Orangemen there were. Gowan claimed in 1833 that there were 11,243 
members of the Order. The following year, he claimed 12,853. After that 
year it is almost impossible to be sure of exact membership figures, 
but various Orange leaders were not slow to exaggerate greatly, claiming 
21 
up to a quarter of a million members in Canada alone. This uncertainty 
exacerbated Irish Catholic fears of their Protestant neighbours. These, 
in turn, helped to perpetuate the Protestant idea of the Catholic as a 
disloyal, factious creature they had always supposed him to be. In the 
violence of the lumber camps, the many election riots, St. Patrick*s 
Day riots and in the misery and destitution of the Irish Catholic ghettoes 
of Montreal, the Protestant claimed to find the true Catholic, full of 
superstition, violence, drink and rebellion. In many ways, the real 
21 
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seriousness o£ this image was not understood until after the immigrat- 
ion of the Famine years. Even during the terrible cholera epidemic of 
1832, when immigrant-borne fever decimated not only the immigrants, 
but also the populations of Montreal and Quebec, the antagonism gener- 
ated was directed at the authorities in England and the landlords in 
Ireland rather than at the immigrants themselves. 
The 1840’s saw the terrible exodus of the Irish fleeing from the 
horrors of the Great Famine, which lasted from 1845-48. Emigration, 
which had been proceeding slowly since 1815, and which had actually 
declined in volume in the first years of the decade, suddenly became a 
flood that North America was hardly prepared for. British America 
received large numbers of poverty-stricken and diseased men, women and 
children at the ports of Montreal and QuebeCj'; _Thp„ ii^^ there 
were not designed to take care of the numbers which poured into them 
in the last half of the decade. In the twenty years from 1828 to 1845 
22 
more than 700,000 people left Ireland for North America. In the 
23 
decade from 1845 that number was over two million. Canada had been 
able to absorb the immigrants before this flood arrived, sooner or 
later they had found jobs or else had moved on to the United States. 
But the Famine years in Ireland coincided'with,_the .end "of the 'Uiiftitless 
land" myth of Canada. Farmers could not afford to employ immigrants 
as in the past and there was no land left to give to the newcomers. 
^^Adams, p. 413-4. 
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This coincidence of events resulted in thousands of Irish Catholics 
being unable to work and hanging around the cities looking for food 
and shelter. To many British Americans, it seemed as though they were 
simply not interested in working. As one historian has said: 
Before the massive influx of 1847 Canadians were prepared 
to greet all immigrants from the British Isles as country- 
men and asserted that initial poverty was no bar to 
success in the province... .Assming that farmers were eager 
for labourers in the countryside and land was available for 
those who savdd a small sum as labourers, observers in 
Canada West concluded that the poor who hung around the 
cities must be idlers who lacked the initiative to seek out 
ready opportunities. Since the entering poor were predomin- 
ant. antlyv Irish, it seemed that a disproportionate number of 
the Irish were idlers In the wake of the famine migration, 
the faith in the alchemy ‘ the New World could work on the 
downtrodden of the Old was muted by a suspicion that some 
people would be poor and deservedly remain so even in the 
New World and that poverty might at times be legitimately 
identified with nationality, 24 
This growing tendancy to identify indolence and lack of initiative 
with the Irish Catholic immigrants was one which the newcomers would 
have to come to terms with. Greatly complicating their situation was 
the fact that lack of initiative was actually a characteristic of the 
Irish Catholics, especially those who emigrated in the nineteenth cent- 
ury. 
The most important fact in the Irish Catholic immigrant's mind 
was that he was an emigrant. He was someone with a past, a country, 
family and traditions left forever behind. The Irish have a natural 
tendency to consider all those away from Ireland as exiles, whatever 
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the reason for the absence. This idea was embodied in their lang- 
uage. There was no word in the Irish language for "traveller”; the 
Irish equivalents were "deorai", "dibeartach" and "direabhach", which 
respectively mean, "exile", "one who is banished" and "one who is 
homeless". When the emigrant spoke of his departure from Ireland, he 
would use the phrase "Dob eigean dom imeacht", or "I had to leave". He 
could have used a more neutral phrase, like "Chuaigh me thar lar", or 
"I went abroad"; but what he was saying was that his departure was not 
of his own will, it was forced on him by fate or circumstances, hence 
it was exile. This attitude was true of Irish Catholic immigrants no 
matter what reason they may have had for leaving Ireland, and it is 
found among immigrants throughout the nineteenth century. 
This sense of exile was independent of language and was a char- 
acteristic of Irish Catholics in British America. A fine example of 
this is found in the words of an Irishman in 1855. He was before a 
judge in Toronto, who asked him, "have you no home?", to which the man 
sadly replied, "Sure and I live in the county Kerry, your honor, when 
I'm home". Such a concept was further promoted by the Irish Catholic 
religious world view. Catholicism emphasized communal identity rather 
than individualism, submission to authority rather than personal res- 
ponsibility, and the value of tradition and custom rather than innovat- 
ion and initiative. Such a view of life suited the Celtic temperament 
^The main work in this area is; Miller, K.A., Boling, B. § Doyle, D.N., 
"Emigrants and Exiles: Irish cultures and Irish emigration to North 
America, 1790-1922", Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 22, 1980, pp. 97-125. 
^^Leader, (.Toronto), 19 June 1855. 
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perfectly. These two factors alone can explain the apparent apathy 
and indifference shown by Irish Catholics in the face of disease, 
unemployment and rejection. All these things were to be borne as the 
will of God, according to Catholic teaching. Irish Catholics used a 
prayer to Mary in which they said: 
To thee do we cry, poor banished children of Eve. To thee 
do we send up our sighs, mourning and weeping in this 
valley of tears....And after this, our exile, show us... 
Jesus. 
For the Catholic, this very life was an exile, a valley of tears where 
all suffering was to be expected and borne, since it was the will of 
God and one^s reward depended on how one submitted to that will without 
resistance. After the Famine, the Irish Catholic immigrants saw that 
catastrophe as the will of God, sending them out as' exiles to bring the 
light of Catholicism to the benighted Protestants of British North 
27 
America. Even this was but an echo of an older Irish tradition that 
saw the Irish monks of the tenth century who went to Scotland and 
28 
mainland Europe as "exiles for Christ". 
The effect of this view of life and suffering on the Irish Cath- 
olic psyche was a source of dismay to Irish leaders, lay and clerical 
alike. Daniel O’Connell, the great Liberator himself, described the 
29 
Irish Catholic peasants as "crawling slaves". An Irish priest said in 
1848 of the Irish Catholic immigrants: "our people have, and will, for 
30 
a long time, have many of the vices of slaves". Thus it was that the 
^^Miller, p. 102. 
^^Ibid., p. 107. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 99. 
Famine Irish were found to lack initiative or ambition: 
The emigrant infected in body and degraded in mind... 
has not the heart, has not the will, to exert himself. 
The Irish Catholics, especially those of the Great Famine migration, 
had experienced an event that most Canadians and Maritimers could not 
hope to comprehend. These people had seen their wives, children and 
friends die of starvation in Ireland and on the coffin ships. Even 
after landing in British America, the death rate was very high, as 
many as 30%, or 20,000 of those who landed at Quebec in 1847 died 
within a year. The rest were faced with "No Irish Need Apply" in the 
new land of opportunity. Most of the Famine Irish, those who would be 
central to the events of the 1860*s, were from areas of high rural 
crime, where agrarian violence against landlords and figures of author- 
ity was a tradition going back generations. In the new land, these 
activities were to be a feature of the early settlers, as well as of 
the navvies in the lumber camps. The conservative Catholicism of the 
Irish resisted change strongly and when faced with inevitable and over- 
whelming change in a new country, were bound to find it difficult to 
adjust. 
One result of the exile concept was an added bitterness against 
the perceived cause of their exile, and for many that cause was England. 
For if exile was compulsive, then someone was to blame. Although the 
landlords were a chief focus of hatred, England was a useful scape-goat 
31 
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and a focus for the hurt and impotent rage many must have felt in 
the face of so much suffering and loss. The high crime rate and the 
raucous attitude of Irish labourers can be explained just as easily 
by the sense of alienation and loss they experienced on leaving 
Ireland as by dissatisfaction they may have had with forms of goverh- 
ment, or disloyalty. In British North America, Irish Catholics were 
forced to come to terms with living under the British Crown in a land 
where their former grievances were no longer valid. Irish Catholics in 
British America had civil and religious liberty, and their main concern 
was to find a way to settle into the new society with as little upset 
and loss of identity as possible. This they did by adapting many of the 
social structures of Ireland to the new surroundings of British North 
America. In general, the Catholics tended to concentrate in the cities, 
rather than in rural areas. This had many causes: a lack of familiarity 
with North American agricultural methods; a rejection of life on the 
land in the wake of the Famine trauma; a willingness to work for wages 
on the railways and in the lumber camps, gained from the trips to 
England and Scotland in the old days. But one of the main reasons for the 
rise of Irish Catholic ghettoes was the need for social contact among 
the Irish immigrants. In Ireland, they had lived in villages from whence 
33 
they went out to work on the lapd, often working together in groups. 
That was impossible in the conditions of rural life in British America, 
where the farm holdings were widely separated and social contact was 
minimal. The loneliness of such a life was completely contrary to the 
29. 
Irish character. Instead, they made the city ghetto mirror the life 
of an Irish village, a community living in close proximity to each 
other for the purpose of social contact. This was very much in keep- 
ing with the Irish Catholic psyche that distrusted change of any kind 
and looked for the familiar as security in an insecure world. Rather 
than being a repudiation of traditional values, the shift to the towns 
of British America by Irish Catholic immigrants was in fact an attempt 
to retain those values in a new form. 
II. Irish Catholic Journalists 
Leadership in the Irish Catholic communilSy in British North 
America wasssupplied mainly by journalists. They were the educated among 
the Irish, the traditional spokesmen for the Catholics since the days 
of the Nation in Dublin. Indeed, Irish Catholic journalists had been a 
part of British American life from the" early days of O'Connell's eman- 
cipation campaign. It was the Liberator who had given Irish Catholics 
the inspiration to speak out and organize; and it was through the news- 
papers that this was done. In British America, the Irish Catholics, 
especially after the Famine migration, were in need of sympathetic and 
articulate leaders. They found themselves in an alien culture, among a 
predominantly Protestant population. Although the immigrants avoided 
much of the discrimination suffered by their countrymen in the United 
States, where nativist activity was a constant source of anxiety among 
Irish Catholic immigrants, and where competition for jobs focused a 
30. 
great deal of attention and resentment on the newcomers, Irish Catholics 
still t^had difficulties in British America. They had to find a context 
fnrwhich they could find an identity in the new land. They generally 
found little discrimination against them on economic grounds, since 
34 
there was little competition for the jobs they found. But in many 
ways the absence of severe discrimination made it harder to find the 
necessary context. In Ireland, their main sense of identity lay in 
being a persecuted and deprived group in their own land. This was very 
much a function of the Celtic-Catholic psyche discussed above, where 
suffering and hardship could actually be a source of identity and 
security. But in British America they quickly found that the old way 
of seeing themselves was no longer valid, and^apart from an occasional 
Orange-Green clash, they had little of the traditional conflicts by 
which to build up a sense of identity. The Irish Catholic newspapers 
played an important role here. They had to show the immigrants that 
they were not alone in the new world; they educated the immigrants in 
the day-to-day realities of British America. 
From the early 1820's, the Irish Catholic community had its own 
newspapers to read. These journals were their link with Ireland, con- 
taining news and stories from home, as well as poetry and fiction on 
Irish subjects. They also catered to an increasingly aware political 
electorate. The rise of Irish Catholicsjournals in North America 
paralleled O'Connell’s rise in Ireland. Throughout the IpSriod from 1820 
to 1850, the Irish Catholic newspapers gave'their support to the various 
reform movements in the British American Provinces, primarity as an 
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extension of their support for O’Connell’s campaigns for political 
reform in Ireland. 
The other main subject of Irish Catholic editorials concerned 
relations with the Orange Order. It was the frequent Orange-Green 
clashes that perpetuated the feuds of the old country in the new, and 
kept alive the accusations of Irish Catholic disloyalty. Although the 
clashes were often bloody, their cause was not always religious. The 
conditions under which the Irish labourers worked were often extremely 
brutal, and violence was an escape from the hardship and drudgery of 
the lumber camps and railway sites. What at first seemed to be merely 
a continuation of old conflicts, however, soon became a native British 
American issue, as Irish Catholics, encouraged by their new experience 
of political activism under O’Connell, began to speak out for their 
rights. Their press went along completely with this development. The 
press educated the immigrants into a sense of awareness, following the 
example of O’Connell. This was the really valuable work of the press in 
the first half of the nineteenth century: creating a sense of self- 
consciousness among Irish Catholics. They did not consider themselves 
as having a British nationality, and yet the new freedoms enjoyed in 
British America made much of their traditional national self-conscious- 
ness redundant, since it was based on a struggle and conflict that was 
apparently unnecessary in the British American Provinces. What was needed, 
and what the Irish Catholic journalists ultimately had to supply, was a 
new sense of nationality for Irish Catholics in British North America. 
In Lower CSnada, one of the earliest journals catering to Irish 
Catholics was the Irish Vindicator, published by Dr. Daniel Tracey. 
32. 
Tracey allied himself with the French-Canadian radicals under Louis- 
Joseph Papineau; and, as the radicals moved closer to republicanism 
in the early 1830's, Tracey tried to convince the Irish Catholics to 
support them. In 1832 he was elected to the Assembly for Montreal 
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West, but died of cholera before he could take his seat. His place 
as editor of the Vindicator was taken by another Irish Catholic, 
Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, who continued the alliance with Papineau 
through the rebellion of 1837. Although O'Callaghan was a firm supporter 
of the rebellion, it does not appear that he had much support among 
the Irish Catholics, who were conspicuous by their absence from the 
'Zfi 
conflict. Preferring to follow the moderate leaders of the reform 
movement, the Irish Catholics of Upper and Lower Canada demonstrated 
that they had, indeed, been prepared to remain loyal once their 
grievances were addressed in the new world. 
Their spokesman in Upper Canada was Francis Collins, who, in 
1821 began to publish the Canadian Freeman in York. He was a strong 
supporter of the reform movement in that Province and part of Collins' 
motivation in rejecting the extreme ideas of the radicals may have 
been the character of the radical leader, William Lyon Mackenzie, a 
Scots Presbyterian who had very little that was good to say about Irish 
Catholics. Indeed, he had resisted the Peterborough settlement of 1825 
^^Nolte, pp. 188, 198-200. 
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because the settlers were "disloyal" Irish Catholics. As Mackenzie 
himself moved away from constitutional methods and became increasingly 
republican in his thinking, Collins remained committed to moderation 
in the winning of reforms. In 1832 the Canadian Freeman organized a 
petition of loyalty from Irish Catholics of the city of York in oppos- 
ition to Mackenzie, who was ejected from a public meeting that same 
38 
year by "200 persons of the Roman Church". Like Daniel Tracey, 
Collins was imprisoned for his criticism of the Upper Canada adminis- 
tration. He was stringent in his attacks on the oligarchic nature of 
the government of the Province and seemed set to make a long career 
in journalism, and possibly in politics, when, again like Tracey, he 
39 
was stricken by cholera and died in 1834. 
With Collins dead, the leadership of the Irish Catholics in Upper 
Canada fell to Charles Donleavy of Toronto. In 1837 Donleavy had been 
in agreement with the aims of the reformers, but deprecated the use of 
force. In this he was probably closer to expressing the general sym- 
pathies of Irish Catholics than either Tracey or O'Callaghan. Donleavy 
was a keen follower of Daniel O'Connell and saw the campaign for res- 
ponsible government as a natural area for Irish Catholic involvement. 
Throughout the 1830's and 1840's, he was the leading spokeman for 
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Irish Catholic opinion in Canada; but after the granting of responsible 
40 
government in 1848, his political influence waned. It was not until 
a new generation of Irish Catholic journalists came on the scene in the 
late 1850's that the Irish Catholic community found a distinctly Irish 
expression of their views and asperations. Ten years earlier, a sharp 
division between Catholic and Protestant had developed in the Canadian 
press, ironically led, not by Irishmen, but by two Scots: George Brown 
of the Toronto Globe, and George Clerk, a Catholic convert, of the 
Montreal True Witness. These men carried on a bitter sectarian feud 
throughout the 1840's and 1850's, calling on the vilest of sectarian 
invective in their assaults on the other's religion and on decency. 
During these years. Clerk was the mouthpiece of the Catholic hierarchy 
in Canada, wielding considerable influence with Irish Catholics. Brown 
was the arch-fiend, the incarnation of Protestant bigotry and menace 
for the Catholics of Canada. His position within the reform movement 
greatly upset the Irish Catholics who were loyal to that cause, in the 
O'Connell tradition. He was the prime reason for Irish withdrawal from 
the reform camp after 1848. 
In the Maritimes, two Irish Catholic journalists made their mark 
in the 1840's and 1850's. Edward Whelan, bom in Ballina, County Mayo, 
went to Nova Scotia in 1831 where he was apprenticed to Joseph Howe, 
foremost politician-journalist of his day. In 1842 he founded a new 
journal for Irish Catholics in Halifax, the Register, which supported 
the cause of repeal in Ireland. The next year he was in Charlottetown, 
^^Walker, Franklin A., "The Political Opinions of Upper Canadian 
Catholics", Canadian Historical Association Reports, 1955, p. 81-2. 
Prince Edward Island, where he founded the Palladium, dedicated to 
the cause at the centre of Island politics: the fight of the tenants 
against the absentee landlords. It was a cause that Whelan and the 
Irish Catholics could well understand. The paper was strongly anti- 
English in tone, which may have limited its readership, and it ceased 
publication in 1845, In 1846 Whelan was elected to the Assembly, a 
clear opponent of the Island's ruling oligarchy. In August 1847 he 
started yet another newspaper, the Examiner, in which he refrained 
from any comment on Ireland and Irish affairs, except during the period 
of the Young Ireland rebellion in 1848, which he supported. This may 
account for the fact that the Examiner was closed down by the author- 
ities for just a year, from February 1849 until January 1850. After it 
reopened, Whelan again concentrated on Island affairs, especially the 
campaign for responsible government, which was finally granted in 1851. 
Whelan was appointed to the Executive Council in that year, as well as 
being appointed Queen's Printer. While he held this position, the 
Examiner ceased publication; and when it resumed in 1854, it dealt with 
internal provincial affairs almost exclusively until the other British 
41 
Provinces intruded in the Confederation campaign of 1864. 
The second major Irish Catholic journalist in the Maritimes 
before 1858 was Timothy Warren Anglin of County Cork in Ireland. He 
arrived in St. John, New Brunswick in the summer of 1849 and within a 
matter of weeks had begun to publish a newspaper for Irish Catholics of 
the Province, the Morning Freeman. It was said that Anglin had been a 
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Young Irelander himself before coming to New Brunswick, and he did 
imply an involvement without ever stating clearly what the nature of 
his involvement had been. However, whatever his background, Anglin 
traded off his reputation as a Young Ireland rebel to gather support 
for his newspaper among the Irish Catholics of St. John. It has been 
suggested that Anglin was actually brought to the Province to start 
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the Morning Freeman, sponsored by the Catholic community of St. John. 
That, too, is unclear, although the speed with which the paper was 
founded does suggest a base of support not normal for a newly-arrived 
immigrant. 
The importance of Anglin's Morning News was that it was the 
only newspaper in the Province catering to the needs of the Irish 
Catholics, and therefore Anglin's influence on their political affil- 
iations and sense of identity in the new land was profound. Anglin was 
to guide the Irish Catholics of New Brunswick throughout the quarter 
century following his arrival there. His main concerns during the 
first decade of the paper's life was to establish himself as the spokes- 
man for his fellow-countrymen, and to decide what stand to take on the 
important issues facing New Brunswick in the 1850's. Anglin was, like 
most Irish Catholics, a conservative by nature, and he was impressed 
only by practical arguments and projects. His primary goal was the 
economic growth of the Province, and especially St. John. In the current 




middle-class fashion, Anglin believed in laisse-faire economics, and 
vigorousIv opposed any form of tariff or interference with free trade, 
whether between individuals or countries. The Reciprocity Treaty of 
1854 between the United States and British North America was warmly 
44 
welcomed by Anglin. Coupled with this economic goal was the devel- 
opment of the railways in New Brunswick. Like many others, Anglin saw 
that railways were vital to economic growth, and he campaigned for both 
an Intercolonial railway linking New Brunswick with Canada, and a rail 
link between his Province and Maine to take advantage of the trade 
with.ithe United States created and supported by the Reciprocity Treaty. 
In 1850 he had been one of the founding members of a committee organized 
to promote this latter railway route, named the European and North 
American Railway, and it was his pet project for over a decade. In a 
choice between the Intercolonial and the E.^N.A.R., Anglin preferred the 
latter, since lie thought it far more important to maintain trading links 
45 
with the Americans than with the far-off Canadians. 
Still, for all his middle-class ideas, Anglin was a true Irish 
Catholic, believing that every aspect of life, including politics and 
journalism, ought to be governed by one's religion: 
The great vital principle that should ever guide, govern, 
actuate, and controul man in his family, in the workshop, 
the market place, the court of justice, the public meeting. 
44 
* Ibid., p.29. 
"^^Ibid., p. 30. 
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and the place of amusement...causing him to refer every 
thought/’wofd, and deed of his whole life to God. 46 
He also shared that characteristic of the Irish Catholic which we have 
noted earlier, a belief in the essential-misery of life on this earth 
and the inability of man to overcome it: 
The belief underlying the Irish Catholic view of the 
cause of social evils is that man, due to original sin, 
is fallen; as a result^ he has many frailties and suffers 
grave hardships not susceptible of great transformation 
by mere mortal efforts. 47 
Anglin's general attitude to his poorer co-religionists was patronising 
in a manner typical of the Victorian middle-class, and of the general 
type of Irish Catholic journalists then operating in British America. 
He saw it as his duty to lead them away from error and political evil; 
a duty imposed on him by his education and position in society. A good 
example of this patronising attitude is Anglin's opinion on the "agrarian 
myth". He firmly believed that life "on the land" was the healthiest, 
physically, morally and spiritually. Nothing shows his basic middle- 
class background and lack of comprehension of lower-class Irish Catholic 
thought than his inability to understand why labouring classes would 
not embrace the rural life, something Anglin himself would never have 
dreamed of doing: 
With an infatuation that can scarcely be accounted for, 
thousands of men cling to the wretched life of towns and 
cities...as if the free air of the .country were poison, 
and labour in the woods and fields were the greatest 
slavery. 48 
46 
Morning Freeman, (St. John), 16 Mr. 1869. 
^^Quoted in Baker, p. 22. 
"^^Moming Freeman, 2 Feb. 1860. 
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Like the majority of editors of his day, Anglin also indulged, 
whatever his Catholic ideals may have been, in the most insulting and 
scurrilous language in attacking other editors or opposing politicians. 
The style of the day was for sectarian and party conflicts to be aired 
in the pages of the newspapers, which took a totally partisan role on 
every conceivable issue. This was the situation as the 1850's drew to 
an end. Anglin was secure in his leadership of the Irish Catholics of 
New Brunswick, at home in the most-venomous joumalistic and political 
circles. Whatever his true background in Young Ireland may have been, 
that was long behind him and seemed destined to stay in the past. But 
in 1857 another Irish Catholic journalist joined the ranks in British 
North America: one whose involvement in Young Ireland was no secret 
and whose qualifications to lead Irish Catholics were even more 
impressive than Anglin’s. In that year, Thomas D’Arcy McGee arrived in 
Montreal to, however unknowingly, start a revolution in the thinking 
and character of Irish Catholics throughout British America, as well as 
in the political structures of the Provinces themselves. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A NEW NATIONALITY 
The arrival of Thomas D'Arcy McGee in Montreal in 1857 marked 
the beginning of a decade that would see British North America move 
slowly toward a new political structure that would revolutionize the 
constitutional status of the British Provinces and their relations 
with the Empire and the United States. And in that revolution, the 
role of Irish Catholic journalists would be of major significance, not 
least for the dmpact they were to have on Irish Catholic reaction and 
acceptance of Confederation. Timothy Warren Anglin and Edward Whelan 
were just two of the journalists that would direct the Irish Catholic 
communities in the Provinces in their approach to the new ideas. Others, 
like James Moylan and Patrick Boyle of Toronto would arrive on the scene 
in the 1860’s and have a vital part to play in the political events of 
the period. But one man would set the tone for the others. He would not 
only lead the way for Irish Catholics, but would share a vision of a 
new nationality for British Americans regardless of their ethnic or 
religious background. The Young Irelander, Thomas D'Arcy McGee was des- 
tined to span the decade, almost completely absorbed with the idea of 
new nationality and determined to lead his countrymen into a fresh and 
broadly-based national identity. 
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I. Thomas D*Arcy McGee 
McGee had an eventful career even before he arrived in Montreal. 
As a boy of seventeen, he had been editor of the leading Irish Catholic 
newspaper in New England, the Boston Pilot. He had been the Parliamentary 
correspondent for the prestigious Freeman * s Journal of Dublin, having 
been recommended by O’Connell himself who had been aware of McGee’s work 
on the Pilot. But it was to Young Ireland that McGee committed himself 
in 1846, when he joined the staff of the Nation.. From his earliest days 
in Strangford, County Down, he had been taught to love the ancient Irish 
culture of the Celts by his mother and first teachers. His time in the 
United States and England had not done anything to diminish that love 
and he soon became rndispensabde to the Nation and to Young Ireland’s 
literary endeavours. He wrote one volume of the History of Ireland that 
Davis and Duffy had planned.^ As Young Ireland became more involved in 
political affairs, McGee rose to the position of Secretary of the Irish 
Confederation, in which post he campaigned against the militancy of the 
republican wing under Mitchel. Ironically, he was one of the members of 
the Directory which decided on armed revolt in July 1848, regarding such 
action as inevitable given the provocation offered by the British auth- 
2 
orities in suspending Habeas Corpus. He was sent to Scotland to raise 
^Material on McGee’s life is available in the main biographies: Slattery, 
T.P., The Assassination of D’Arcy McGee, CToronto, 1968); Skelton, 
Isabel, Life of Thomas D’Arcy McGe^ [Gardenvale, 1925); Phelan, Joseph- 
ine, The Ardent Exile, (Toronto, 1951); and Burns, Robin, "Thomas D’Arcy 
McGee: A Biography", (Unpublished PhD thesis, McGill, 1976). 
^Kee, Robert, The Green Flag, (London, 1972), p. 277. 
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men and money for the fight, but returned when word reached him of the 
fiasco overtaking the rising. For a few weeks he travelled through Mayo 
trying to raise the agrarian societies there, but the cause was hope- 
less and he finally took ship for the United States, leaving his young 
wife behind. 
His first months in the United States were full of anger and loss. 
He had believed firmly in Davis' vision of a new nationality for Irishmen 
■which had been destroyed in the rising. Even that had been a disaster. 
For this he blamed the Catholic Church in Ireland since it ' had condemned 
the rebellion and doomed it to failure by taking away the supporters 
among the Catholic peasantry upon whoin success depended. Whether this had 
really made any significant difference to the outcome is doubtful, but 
McGee saw only the treachery of the Church and was not slow to express 
his feelings. He immediately established a new newspaper in New York 
which he defiantly named the Nation. In it he fulminated against England, 
the Church and everything to do with the British Empire: 
To rend the British flag - to blast the British name - 
to wreck the British edifice of power from Cornerstone to 
Cornice is our mission among the sons of men. 3 
This was written only a few weeks after his arrival in the United States 
and indicates the state of his mind at the time. It was not in character 
with his opinions or actions in Young Ireland's moderate wing, where he 
had often condemned such sentiments in others. It .was the outpourings 
of a young man of twenty-three who had experienced the Famine, the dash- 
^Nation, CNew York), 11 Nov. 1848. 
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ing of the Young Ireland vision of a new nationality, as well as the 
separation from his wife and family. His wife had a child shortly 
after he fled Ireland, and they did not reach him in New York until 
August 1849. By then his former passions had begun to cool and he was 
seeing things from a clearer perspective again. By late 1848 he was 
again coming under the influence of Charles Gavan Duffy, his mentor for 
many years, who corrected him on many issues. Duffy had been in prison 
during the rising and, after his release, set about restoring the Nation 
in Dublin. Concerned by McGee's anti-clericalism, Duffy wrote to warn 
him: 
You do not act wisely in attacking the bishops and priests 
in that style....You are angry and therefore unreasonable. 4 
But by then the damage had been done. McGee's outspoken anti-clericalism 
had brought down on him the wrath of the Bishop of New York, who was not 
slow to use his influence to reduce McGee's readership. The Nation soon 
folded. 
McGee remained in the United States for nine years, during which 
he gradually returned to his natural moderate outlook and a renewed and 
long-lasting eoimiitinent to the Catholic Church. He involved himself in 
the welfare of Irish Catholic immigrants in New York, Buffalo and Boston, 
setting up night-schools and even planning a mass-migration of Irish 
settlers to western States where they could form an Irish enclave away 
from the immorality, degradation and misery of the slums in which they 
lived in the cities of the eastern seaboard. His comniitment'to the 
^Duffy to McGee, Dublin, 18 Aug., 14 Oct. 1849. Quoted in Skelton, p. 167. 
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well-being o£ the Irish Catholics was marked and appreciated by the 
Catholic Church with whom he had a complete reconciliation. In an open 
letter to a fellow-Young Irelander arriving in America, McGee had laid 
out the development of his own thinking on the matter of the Church in 
the time following his flight from Ireland. After examining each of his 
beliefs, he said, he had discovered certain vital facts: 
1. There is a Christendom. 
2. That this Christendom exists by and for the Catholic 
Church.... 
5. That is the highest-duty^ of a Catholic man to go over 
cheerfully, heartily, and at,once,.to the side of Christen- 
dom - to the Catholic side, and to resist, with all his 
might, the conspirators who, under the stolen name of Liberty, 
make war upon all Christians. 5 
TJis commitment : to the Catholic Church lasted for the rest of his life, 
and it may well be that the process of alienation and return to faith 
may have been partly responsible for McGee's strong belief in religious 
toleration in his time in Canada. 
His life in the United States was not a happy time for McGee. 
From the time of his arrival, he had failed to become acclimatized to the 
country. During his years there, he never applied for citizenship, nor 
made any move to fit into the political or social affairs of the cities 
in which he lived. Confining himself entirely to Irish Catholic affairs 
in the eastern cities, he refrained from comment on American politics 
except when they were of immediate relevance to his chosen constituency. 
^McGee to Thomas Francis Meagher, The American Celt, (New York), Aug. 1852, 
quoted in Skelton, p. 196. 
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His was a restless time in America, moving from New York to Boston to 
Buffalo and back to New York within ten years; starting two newspapers, 
both of which failed; lecturing to make enoughtto live on. Above all, 
what made his time in the United States so unpleasant were the almost 
constant attacks he suffered from his former radical colleagues of 
Young Ireland. From as early as 1849, McGee came under attack from Irish 
republicans of the John Mitchel camp. Just as McGee, in the bitterness 
of exile, had denounced the Church's actions in 1848, the Irish repub- 
licans blamed defeat on moderates'like McGee and Duffy, who they felt 
had not been responsible in their approach to, and prosecution of, the 
rising. McGee himself had quickly got over his burst of extreme rhetoric 
Under the influence of fiis wife and-Duffy, he soon regained his natural 
sense of perspective. Unfortunately, he had damaged his reputation with 
the moderate Irish Catholic Americans, and found himself attacked by 
them for being anti-clerical. They were not quick to forgive and McGee 
was held in suspicion by them until his departure for Canada. Attacked 
on one side for being too moderate, and on the other for being radical, 
McGee struggled to continue publishing his newspapers and books. Then, 
in 1850, McGee met a man who was to have a profound effect on his future 
James George Moylan of Guelph, Upper Canada, invited McGee to Canada to 
lecture in the major cities of his Province. Moylan was an Irishman who 
had once worked in the Chilean legation in Washington and was now a 
schoolteacher in Guelph, a respected member of the Irish Catholic com- 
munity in Canada. 
McGee toured the United Provinces of Canada in 1850 and was very 
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impressed by what he found. The Know-Nothing Party was then influential 
in the United States, stirring up hatred and sectarian discrimination 
against Catholics, and McGee found the absence of any such political 
movement in Canada a welcome and refreshing change from New York and 
Boston. His continued association with Moylan and Canada in the 1850's 
furthered the split with the radical Irish in the United States. When 
he visited Ireland in 1855, McGee actually recommended Canada as a 
destination for Irish Catholic emigrants, which angered and baffled his 
friends and enemies in the United States. But McGee had no trouble in 
advocating a British Province to Irish Catholic consideration. He had 
seen how much freedom the Irish Catholics of Canada had, not just pol- 
itically, but religiously and socially too. As his fortunes in America 
worsened, it came as a welcome departure when he was invited by promin- 
ent Irish Canadian Catholics to move to Montreal to start a newspaper 
there for the benefit of Irish Catholics. Understood in the invitation 
was the promise of political election for McGee in the near future. Fore- 
most among the names of the delegation inviting McGee to Canada was that 
7 
of James G. Moylan of Guelph. 
McGee made it clear in the first issue of his new Montreal paper 
g 
that it was not to be seen simply as a Catholic journal. There was 
already published in Montreal the most influential Catholic journal in 
^Burns, p. 282. 
^New Era, (Montreal), 25 May 1857. 
^Ibid. 
Canada, the True Witness, with which McGee had no desire to come in 
conflict. Rather, he wanted his journal to address itself to the Irish 
Catholic's position in Canada in political and social terms, not merely 
religious. After his time in the United States, it seemed to McGee that 
the move to Montreal was the start of a new chapter in his life; and 
this, coupled with his belief that in Canada he could carry on the work 
begun in the days of the Dublin Nation, led him to expect great things 
of this new era in his affairs. Once again the influence of Duffy can 
be seen in McGee's attitudes. Duffy had left Ireland for Australia in 
1856 and within a year he had been elected to the Assembly in Victoria 
and had chaired a committe which advocated the Confederation of the 
Australian Provinces, Duffy's committee called for a conference of the 
Provinces to discuss the proposal, and although that first initiative 
failed, Duffy continued to press for Confederation asttke most desirable 
goal? These proposals, and Duffy's prominent role in them, was given 
a central place in the pages of McGee's new journal, which he named the 
New Era, first published in May, 1857. As McGee said in his first issue: 
It is to be called The New Era as an indication of the 
time of its birth. 10 
In the prospectus for his first newspaper in the United States, named 
after the Young Ireland Nation, McGee had called for a new nationality 
for the Irish in America in words that were almost identical to those 
of Thomas Davis: 
...a Nationality of the spirit as well as of the letter 
^McMinn, W.G., A Constitutional History of Australia, C^elbourne, 1979), 
p. 95. 
^^New Era, 25 May 1857. 
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... - a Nationality which may embrace Protestant, Catholic 
and Dissenter. 11 
New Era, in his very first months in British North America, he 
laid down the framework for a new nationality for that collection of 
Provinces in a similar style and with, perhaps, more vision even than 
anything he had done in the United States. His very first editorial gave 
a catch-phrase to Canadian politics that would bind together many varied 
ideas and ambitions in the fdllowing decade: A New Nationality. 
This was not simply a vague, poetic dream couched in words that 
had no practical reievance to real life. McGee, in the pages of the New 
Era, set down the essential requirements clearly and boldly: 
Every important topic that can arise ought to be 
viewed by the light and decided by the requirements 
of Canadian nationality. 12 
You must become a nation de facto. 13 
Primarily, a new nationality required some political expression, and 
this McGee saw in terms of either a federation of the British American 
Provinces, or else British American representation in the Imperial Parl- 
iament. This latter idea did not appeal to him as much as the former, and 
it received little consideration in his articles. The main reason for 
the extension of the sphere of political life in British North America 
was the low standard of political representation, concerned withlmerely 
regional or sectional interests to the detriment of the Provinces: 
^^Public Archives of Canada, John O'Gorman Papers, "McGee the Irish Patriot',' 
p. 15, quoted in Burns, Robin, "D'Arcy McGee and the New Nationality", 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton, 1966), p. 127. 
^^New Era, 19 Jan. 1858. 
^^Ibid., 10 June, 1857. 
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When you have set before your soul that object [becoming 
a nation], its high influence will lift your counsellors 
out of the slough of mere pecuniary politics....Politicians 
will become nobler-minded, and the country will be every 
way better served. 
He rejected charges that his ideas might be impractical and visionary^' 
We by no means argue that the practical pressing questions 
of the day ought not to have their due share of attention. 
But there are questions of tomorrow as well as of today; of 
right and wrong, as well as of mere expediency. And one of 
these is the extension of the political sphere of these 
Provinces, either by confederation or Imperial representation.14 
This emphasis on all the Provinces, rather than just the Canadas, was 
a feature of McGee’s writings from the very beginning of his time in 
Montreal. In August 1857, he wrote an editorial on the economic aspects 
of confederation, laying great stress on the importance of establishing 
trade links wifh the Maritimes Provinces.In an editorial published 
for the 1857 elections, he posed "A Few Questions for Canadian Constituen- 
cies", in which he asked: 
Whether Canada§s true interestsdoes not point in the first 
place, to a reciprocity of dealing with the Maritime 
British Provinces, in preference to New York, Boston and 
Portland? 16 
Essential to such a change was the extension of the new railways to join 
the various Provinces. The Grand Trunk Railway, which was already losing 
money, ought to be encouraged and subsidized in order to facilitate 
^^Ibid., ]10 June 1857. 
4 Aug. 1857. 
16 
Ibid., 27 June 1857. 
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expansion to Halifax and St. John. 17 
Besides encouraging greater contact between Canada and the Marit- 
ime Provinces, McGee also looked West for the new nationality, writing 
about the Hudson’s Bay Company lands in Red River and the North-West. 
Aware of American expansionist ambitions, McGee wondered: 
Whether the increase of American population along the lake 
shores, and on the Minnesota frontier, do not demand the 
timely occupation of our north-western frontier? 18 
This led him to call for a great^increase'in immigratton-:to Candda in 
order to populate the new lands of the west, a call echoed throughout 
the life of the New Era. McGee was not insensitive to the native 
claims in the western lands, however, and he called for safeguards for 
the Indian bands in Hudson's Bay lands^v'the details of which:.were 
20 . . 
to be worked out by negotiation. But when it came to creating a new 
nationality, then political expansion was not enough. Such growth would 
merely be the frame in which the new nationality would grow. Political 
unity was not enough to ensure a common identity and culture which a new 
nationality would require. It was more ”of the spirit” than of mere 
politics. Alongside his concern for minorities like the Indians or the 
French-Canadians went a desire to see something newngrow up to replace 
the different ethnic groups: 
^^Ibid., 6 Oct. 1857. 
^^Ibid., 27 June 1857. 
1 Q 
Ibid., 27 May, 12 June 1857; 20 Ap. 1858. 
^^Ibid., 1 Aug. 1857. 
For my own part, I respect every nationality represented 
on our soil; but yet I hold that we should consider them 
as invaluable materials to a desired end, than as finalities 
themselves. 21 
It is here that the influence of Young Ireland is clearly seen, Just as 
the Gaels, Normans, Old English and Anglo-Saxons in Ireland needed to 
find a new nationality together, so the French, English, Irish and 
Indians of British North America had to develop something uniquely 
their own in terms of nationality. And that meant more than political 
structures, it also had to do with a common sense of pride and achieve- 
ment. This was why McGee objected to the Canadian Government referring 
the question of a permanent capital for the Province to the Queen in 
London. He believed that the experience of deciding such a matter for 
themselves would give Canadians a greater pride in themselves and their 
capital.'^ He sought an independent Canadian foreign policy, to increase 
Canadian self-respect and identity in the world. ^ This was not, however, 
an attempt to cut the links with the Empire. Rather, McGee sought to 
strengthen these links by strengthening the Provinces. He wanted to see 
a royal Prince of the blood sent to rule the federated Provinces, making 
24 
them an integral, though autonomous, part of the Empire. This was very 
much what Davis and the moderates of Young Ireland had wanted in the 
1840’s, a return to legislative independence, bqt with greater scope for 
^^Canadian Freeman, (Toronto), 12 June, 1859. 
72 
New Era, 15 June, 1857. 
^^Ibid., 1 June 1857. 
^'*Ibid.. 19 Jan. 1858. 
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national initiative and enterprise, within the British Empire. 
The remarkable thing about McGee’s editorials in the New Era is 
that they foreshadowed with amazing accuracy the major arguments con- 
25 
ceming Confederation that would be used in the coming decade. His 
own vision of a new nationality changed very little during these years, 
though it may seem that he accepted less in 1867 than he called for in 
1857. However, the truth is that, although the precise details of the 
Confederation scheme differed somewhat from the vision of the New Era, 
Confederation itself was only a part of McGee’s concept of a new nation- 
ality for British North America. Along with his political activities in 
creating a franework, he also laid down guidelines for the cultural and 
social aspects essential to such a creation. In the Young Ireland tradit- 
ion, literature was the lifeblood of his new nationality: 
Literature is the vital atmosphere of nationality.... 
No literature, no national life - this is an irreversible 
law Come! let us construct a national literature for 
Canada, neither British nor French, nor Yankeeish, but 
the offspring of the soil, borrowing lessons from all, 
but asserting its own title throughout all. 26 
In December 1858, McGee published a collection of poems, aptly titled 
Canadian Ballads and Occasional Verses, in which he wrote about Champlain, 
Cartier and other heroes of the new world. He was giving an example to 
young British American writers of the kind of material available to them 
2 5 
Material on the New Era editorials on new nationality is available in 
Burns, Robin, ’’D'Arcy McGee and the New Nationality”, C^npublished M.A. 
thesis, Carleton, 1966), which deals exclusively with the New Era period. 
26 
New Era, 10 June 1857. 
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in the creation of a new literature. But it was not as a poet, nor yet 
an historian, that McGee was to do most in reaching his goal. Politics 
was to be the forum, and eloquence and vision were to be his main weapons. 
II, Years of upheavaii 
In the affairs of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, British North America and 
the new nationality, 1858 was the watershed year. In February of that 
year, McGee took his place in the Canadian Assembly for the first time, 
having been elected as an Independent for Montreal West in the general 
election of the previous fall. He witnessed the first official proposal 
for the federation of the British North American Provinces being made in 
the Assembly by another Independent member, Alexander Tilloch Galt in 
July. Galt’s proposals were very much in keeping with McGee’s own ideas, 
although Galt's motives were economic rather than nationalistic. He feared 
for the economic future of Canada without union and a strong Grand Trunk 
Railway to link the Provinces into a unified economic trading block. By 
the end of 1858, Galt was a member of the Canadian Government and a 
delegation had been dispatched to London to discuss the question of 
British North American Union with the Imperial Government. The Maritimes 
were the scene of much discussion of the issue of a Union of the Lower 
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Provinces, encouraged and maintained by the Lieutenant-Governors of 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The governments of Prince Edward Island 
and Newfoundland had agreed to appoint delegated to a conference on the 
27 
issue should that be the will of the Imperial Government. There was 
growing support in Canada for a settlement with the Hudson's Bay Company 
on handing over their fiefdom in the North-West. On the face of things, 
then, it seemed in 1858 that some move towards political restructuring 
in British North America was imminent. 
However, in 1858 the British North Americans had practically no 
common identity, except insofar as the Empire gave them a common alleg- 
iance. The people of the Maritimes considered the Canadians to be foreign- 
ers. The Maritimers themselves were a variegated assortment, with Prince 
Edward Island and Newfoundland looking more to London than to Halifax or 
Fredricton. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were basically self-contained 
Provinces, secure in their status as Imperial colonies. From their pers- 
pective, Canadians were either French, Yankees or radical Grits like 
George Brown. It was this kind of hostilityythat Canadians would have to 
overcome if they were to create any continental nation. But the economic 
motivation of Galt's proposals would have little appeal for the Lower 
Provinces if it was thought that the chief beneficiary would be Canada. 
Canada's well-being was none of their concern. 
Galt's proposals were never voted on, as political events in the 
summer of 1858 overshadowed such imaginative enterprises. In August, the 
^^Morton, W.L., The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 
1857-1875, CToronto, 1968), p. 64. — 
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the Government of John A. Macdonald and George Etienne Cartier finally 
fell after struggling through months of uncertain rules.The new Brown- 
Dorion Government was brought down by dubious actions by Macdonald after 
only two days. Still using doubtful constitutional procedure, the old 
government became the new government within a matter of days, much to 
their own delight and to the outrage of their opponents. McGee came out 
firmly in support of Brown and his defeated administration. Aside from 
earning praise from such an unlikely source as the Globe, as well as some 
insulting references to his rebellious past from Macdonald in the House, 
McGee came in for some very serious criticism from an important and power- 
ful force, George Clerk of the True Witness. 
Clerk, the converted Scot who had carried on a fierce sectarian 
campaign against Brown and the Grits, was furious with McGee for daring 
to support the enemy. Clerk had always been dubious of McGee and the New 
Era, and had little time for McGee's new nationality ideas. What he had 
wanted was an Irishman to stand for the Assembly to fight for Catholic 
interests in the traditional sectarian manner of Canadian politics. Having 
that man actually support George Brown was like having Brown support the 
Pope: an aberration andhheresy of major proportions. Clerk began a cam- 
paign to force McGee out of public life. In this he had the support of 
many of the members of the Catholic hierarchy in Lower Canada, to whom 
the name of George Brown and his Clear Grit Party was synonomous with 
evil and the worst excesses of evangelicalism. McGee was already fighting 
for his political life. In November 1857 he had written: 
First in my order of obligations I rank the duty of 
promoting unity among Irishmen themselves - unity for 
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noble public purposes and no other. 28 
Now that Clerk was attempting to undermine his support among Irish Cath- 
olics, it was more than ever necessary that McGee grasp the leadership 
of that community away from sectarian interests and to use it to further 
his own concept of a new nationality that would be free of Brown-versus- 
Clerk bigotry. Before McGee could preach to others on a new nationality, 
it seemed that he would first have to convert his own Irish Catholic 
community to the idea. He no longer had the New Era to use as his public 
mouthpiece. It had ceased publication in May 1858, since McGee was too 
busy as a parliamentarian to see to the duties of a newspaper editor. But 
he was too aware of the power of the press to give up journalism completely; 
and in June 1858 he helped found a new newspaper for Irish Catholics, this 
time based in Toronto. It was called the Canadian Freeman, symbolically 
named after Francis Collins' journal of the 1830's. McGee was always 
careful to remind Canadians that Irish Catholics were loyal and trust- 
worthy : 
We believe the Irish in Canada to be sincerely attached 
to the present form of government, and to be daily 
growinggin constitutional knowledge....At home, an 
Irishman's sympathies were often against the law, because 
law and justice were long and widely divorced in Ireland. 29 
Drawing on Francis Collins' memory was another attempt to identify Irish 
Catholics of the 1860's with the loyal reputation.of Collins and the 
Irish of the 1830's. The new Canadian Freeman was to educate Irish Cath- 
^^New -Era, 7 Nov. 1857. 
^^Ibid., 25 May 1857. 
olics to that same sense of loyalty and allegiance. To edit it, McGee 
personally chose his friend James G. Moylan, who had been so important 
in his success in his adopted land, and who represented an influential 
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section of the Catholic community in Upper Canada. 
Clerk published clear condemnations of McGee’s actions in allying 
himself with Brown and the Reform group in the Assembly. Whatever the 
reason, an alliance with the forces of evangelicalism was unacceptable to 
the reactionary Catholicism of the True Witness. With the zeal of the 
convert. Clerk sought to bring down McGee. 
As McGee’s ally in the fight against Clerk and his supporters in 
the ranks of the Catholic hierarchy, James Moylan was in an uncomfortable 
position. Far more than McGee. Moylan was very much a Catholic journalist, 
believing that his Catholicism was central to his role as a journalist 
and public man. It was always Moylan’s contention that the struggle for 
religious liberty for Catholics was, at root, a spiritual battle; and that, 
when he was writing editorials against the machinations of those who sought 
31 
to deprive Catholics of their rights and freedoms, he was fighting Satan. 
His political convictions were coloured by this view of the importance 
of his religion and made compromise difficult, if not impossible. In the 
election campaign of 1863, he laid down guidelines for Catholics to 
follow: 
As Catholics, we are bound by every obligation to consult 
for the free and full exercise of our holy religion. 
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untrammeled by any odious or irritating restrictions. As 
Canadians, we must pay due regard to whatever concerns 
the well-being of our native or adopted couiitry. 32 
Moylan's priorities were clear. Catholicism was the prism through which 
all issues were viewed. He held that patriotism itself had to stem from 
one’s religion, and that "the State should be in harmony with the Church, 
33 
whether they be organically connected or not". That was the ideal, of 
course, and Moylan had to recognise reality. As a Catholic, he might 
believe that states should follow the Church. As a Canadian, he accepted 
the rights of others to differ. In the area of Church supremacy in Canada 
34 
he agreed that Catholics had tOo"limit it to the matter of education". 
The question of separate schools for Catholics was one on which Moylan 
stood firm. He believed that Catholics in the Upper Province should have 
the same guarantees in education that Protestants had in Lower Canada: 
Put this our national right on a clear footing, and 
Canadian Catholics and Protestants can go hand in hand 
in all other matters. 35 
Moylan’s bete noir on this, and most, issues was George Brown of the 
Toronto Globe. Brown's anti-Catholic- editorials of the 1850’s had marked 
him as the leading bigot in Canada in the eyes of the Catholic community. 
Although his tone softened under McGee's influence after the events of 
^^Ibid., 27 May 1863. 
^^Ibid., 15 May 1862. 
Ibid., 
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August 1858j Moylan never trusted Brown's conversion to toleration and 
never understood his Scots Presbyterian mentality. For Moylan, the 
"Scotch Clear Grits" were a group of bigoted democrats who were out to 
destroy the very fabric of civilization. But his own beliefs must have 
given Brown pause in his turn: 
When they [Brown and the Grits] blame us for uniting 
religion with politics, and for appealing to religious 
prejudices in our warfare against the insidious and 
wicked devices of false guides and evil counsellors,... 
we are only a private soldier passing along the ranks 
the watchwords given by the Commander-in-Chief at Rome. 36 
Moylan was writing as a loyal Catholic, but it only convinced Presbyter- 
ians of the popish disloyalty of the Catholics of Canada, and of the 
improper influence of a foreign potentate on the political affairs of 
Canada. This view of politics as an integral part of the Catholic's bat- 
tle with evil was one of the things which perpetuated the sectarian 
divisions that McGee sought to dissipate in the new nationality. 
It may seem then that Moylan was an unlikely ally for McGee in 
his fight for survival, especially when McGee's crime was consorting 
with Brown and the "enemy" were the Catholic Bishops of Lower Canada. In 
fact, Moylan was showing great courage and faith in McGee's ideas, and 
was a vital factor in McGee's survival. The campaign to force McGee out 
of public life culminated in a Declaration by Bishop Bourget of Montreal, 
which was read in all churches in that city on August 14, 1859. In it, 
the Bishop publicly supported Clerk and the True Witness by name against 
those politicians "who through imprudence or malice foment prejudices of 
race".^^ It was an obvious reference to McGee's support for Brown and 
36 
^^True Witness, {Montreal}., 19 Aug. 1859. Ibid., 26 Feb. 1863. 
60. 
representation by population. When Clerk editorialised on the pronoun- 
cement a week later, he claimed to have the support o£ almost every 
bishop in Lower Canada. It seemed to be the end for McGee; instead it 
boomeranged on Clerk. On September 30, Moylan hosted a banquet in McGee’s 
honour in Toronto, at which a letter from Bishop de Charbonnel of that 
city was read. The Bishop warmly praised McGee as ”a true, practical 
friend of the principles and institutions of the Church”. In addition, 
as though to soothe any fears Moylan and his supporters may have had 
regarding his stand on representation by population, McGee made a speech 
in which he called clearly for an entirely new constitutional arrangement 
in which .representatiorby population would be accompanied by guarantees 
for minority groups. Even the:Protestaht i press, who had heretofore 
been busy condemning McGee , now came out in his support against what 
they saw as the blatant clerical interference in politics being practised 
by Clerk's friends in the hierarchy. It was a precedent for these journals 
to publicly endorse an Irish Catholic politician of McGee's background; 
and out of the entire campaign he emerged stronger than ever before and 
with a broader-based level of support and recognition as the spokesman 
for Irish Catholics in Canada. 
McGee had proved that Catholics could deal with Brown and the. Grits 
and had gained the respett of the Protestant journals of Upper Canada. 
It was a major victory for the forces of moderation and a defeat for 
sectarian and sectional ideas. James Moylan had been invaluable to McGee 
^^Globe, CToronto), 29 Sep. 1859. 
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during the year. He had decided to give the McGee-Brown alliance a try, 
but he was not sanguine about the likely results. Moylan did not believe 
in representation by population. He saw it as a dangerous move toward 
democracy and the dissolution of the Union. This, too, was a product of 
his Catholic philosophy. Moylan thought democracy to be "inimical to 
ZQ ... 
the Church", and that "in the very nature of things, Conservatism and 
Catholicity are fitting allies".Not only was George Brown openly 
antagonistic to the Catholic Church, he was suspected by Moylan of being 
a democratic republican, an ideology at variance with the best interests 
of Irish Catholics in Canada. Representation by population was also a 
threat to the Union: 
Representation by Population, as understood by the Radical 
press of Upper Canada, and Dissolution of the Union are 
synonomous terms. 41 
The reason Moylan supported McGee in his alliance with Brown was simply 
that Moylan believed in McGee and in his concept of a new nationality. 
Moylan believed in the idea of a Federation of the British North Amer- 
ican Provinces from the beginning of the Canadian Freeman, though he was 
vague about what exactly such a federation would involve. He often echoed 
McGee's call to Canadians to form a new nation in North America: 
The rising generation of Canada should not forget that 
their true interest lies in cultivating, by all legitimate 
means, the closest intimacy with the sister provinces, in 
considering themselves as one with them, and in showing by 
Canadian Freeman, 13 Feb. 1862. 
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their acts that they believe themselves the destined 
founders of a great empire, and not what they have 
hitherto been - a race of cosmopolites, without flag 
or country. 42 
The evolution of that "great empire" would take time and a growing sense 
of common purpose and direction on the part ofnall the Provinces: 
Nations, like individuals, must see one another before 
becoming acquainted....Yet what means have been taken 
to facilitate the necessary intercourse between the 
people? 43 
It was clear to Moylan that McGee, at least, was doing his part to 
bring about the better communications between the Provinces. As early 
as September 1859, McGee had visited the Maritimes, speaking at Halifax 
on the need for reconciliation between the people of the Provinces in the 
areaeof religion and sectionalism. He had called for unity among the 
Provinces, and the Globe noted the enthusiastic reception for his speech 
from Samuel Tilley and Joseph Howe, the Premiers of New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia.In October of that year, the Opposition members of the 
Canadian House of Assembly passed resolutions, drafted by McGee, in favour 
of a general scheme of federation for the British North American Prov- 
45 
inces. 
D’Arcy McGee had succeeded in drawing the Irish Catholics of 
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Canada a working alliance with their natural enemy, and in opening 
communications with the people of the Maritime Provinces within two 
years of entering the political arena in British America. He was now 
determined to make these advances work in favour of his scheme for a 
new nationality. In May 1860, George Brown rose to move either federat- 
ion or else dissolution of the Canadian Union. It was the act of an 
impatient man, and McGee regretted the stark choice Brown forced on the 
House. He spoke on the motion on May 3, and he gave perhaps the clearest 
picture of what he dreamed of for the new nationality: 
I call it a Northern nation - for such it must become if 
all of us but do our duty to the last....I look to the 
future of my adopted country with hope, though not without 
anxiety; I see in the not remote distance, one great 
nationality bound like the shield of Achilles, by the blue 
of ocean - I see it quartered into many communities - each 
disposing of its internal affairs but all bound together 
by free institutions, free intercourse, and free commerce; 
I see within the round of that shield, the peaks of the 
Western mountains, and the crests of the Eastern waves...I 
see a generation of industrious, contented moral men, free 
in name and in fact - men capable of maintaining, in peace 
and in war, a constitution worthy of such a country. 46 
It was a powerful speech. He saw that a vision was necessary otherwise 
the mundane day-to-day problems and factionalisms of politics would make 
the dream of a new nationality but the empty ramblings ofoaeprophet in 
the wilderness. McGee’s aim was to set before’the people of British North 
America a goal to aim at, a revelation of what could be. 
We had advanced a certain way on the road to nationality, 
and all the power o'f the Legislature could not stop it, 
though it might retard it. He looked forward to the day 
^^McGee, T.D., Speeches and Addresses chiefly on the Subject of British 
American Union, CLondon, 1865), p. 175-6. 
64. 
when we should be known not as Upper or Lower 
Canadians, Nova Scotians, or New Brunswickans, but 
as members o£ a nation designated as the Six United 
Provinces. 47 
Although his eloquence was impressive, he was still very much alone in 
his mission to create a new nationality. Brown and the Grits saw feder- 
ation as an escape from the domination of Lower Canada, and as a first 
step to the acquisition of the West for Upper Canada. As Moylan had said, 
either federation or dissolution of the Union were equally acceptable for 
Brown. The Galt proposal was primarily designed to ensure the economic 
well-being of Canada through the development of the Grand Trunk Railway. 
A new nationality was not in Galt’s political guidebook. 
D^Arcy McGee carried on his fight for federation almost alone among 
Canadian politicians, supported by an uneasy Moylan. But circumstances 
brought about a change in attitudes necessary to bring people to accept 
his recipe for a restructuring of British North America. During the 1850's 
the great fear in British America was that the Americans might try to 
deflect their own mounting domestic tensions by turning against ,fJihera 
instead. And when, on April 12, 1861, the American Civil War finally 
broke out, the sympathies of British Americans, initially on the side of 
the North in their fight against slavery, shifted to the South as it be- 
came clear that it would be a long and costly affair for both sides. It 
was hoped that a Southern victory would leave both sides too weak to try 
any hostile moves against the British Provinces, ensuring a divided and 
permanently inoffensiveeneighbour. From the beginning of the war, McGee 
47 
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had been warning that Canadians needed to look to their means of defense: 
a new, militant and powerful entity had emerged south of the border: 
That shot fired at Fort Sumter was the signal gun of 
a new epoch for North America, which told the people 
of Canada, more plainly than human speech can ever 
express it, to sleep no more, except on their arms - 
unless in their sleep they desire to be overtaken and 
subjugated. 48 
With his experience of the nationalistic fervour of the United States, he 
was convinced that an American invasion was quite as likely during the 
War as before it. American politicians and journalists only added to 
British American fears by their aggressive and threatening speeches and 
editorials. A prime example was Secretary of States Seward, who congrat- 
ulated the British American Provinces on their great progress over the 
years, since that would make them better States of the Union when Annex- 
ation became fact. The deep-seated fear of being caught up in a war 
between Britain and the United States made the Provinces even more aware 
of their vulnerability. In November 1861, those fears seemed justified 
when a Northern ship stopped a British passenger vessel, the Trent, and 
abducted two Confederate emissaries who were travelling to England. The 
British authorities demanded their return and war fever on both sides of 
the line reached a critical level. McGee took the opportunity to call a 
meeting of Irish Catholics in Montreal to raise an Irish regiment for 
the defense of Canada. The regiment was not required in the event, as 
the two emissaries were released after a few weeks and the threat of war 
^^McGee, T.D., Two Speeches on British North American Union, (London, 1865), 
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subsided. But the experience was a traumatic one for British North 
America for two reasons. First, they realised their vulnerability to 
American invasion. Second, there arose a fear that Britain might not 
come to the aid of her American Provinces if it meant risking war with 
the United States. The prevailing opinion in Britain was that the colon- 
ies should look to their own defense and not be totally dependent on the 
Mother Country to bear the burden of financing troops and fortifications 
abroad. 
The Times of London was outspoken in its statements on the respon- 
sibility of the Canadians to look to their own defense, and it was 
accurately expressing the ideas of Her Majesty’s Government when it said: 
Let not the Canadians.. .believe that they have Cw.?their- 
present connexion with Great Britain a sufficient 
protection against invasion without taking any trouble 
to defend themselves. Such an opinion is founded on a 
mistake both of our power and our will....If we had the 
power, it is quite certain that should not have the will 
....If they are to be defended at all, they must make up 
their minds to bear the greater part of the burden of 
their own defense....To us the exposure of Canada to 
foreign invasion is a secondary matter; to Canada herself 
it is life and death. Let her arm by all means, but let 
her arm, not for our sake, but for her own. 51 
Between the fear of invasion fom the South, and such stern warnings from 
Britain, the people of British North America were brought face to face 
with what was for many aenew and unpleasant realization: the burden of 
responsibility for their own affairs was being forced on them and it 
demanded a rethinking of the political and military future of the Prov- 
inces. Although the Trent affair of 1861 passed peacefully, it had done 
much to educate Canadians in the political facts of life. Indeed, a new 
era had arrived in North American affairs. 
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III. A split in the ranks 
In the early years of the American Civil War it seemed that the 
suspicions of James Moylan regarding George Brown were justified. The 
sectarian diatribes of the Globe were becoming ever more offensive to 
Moylan and his co-religionists, and Brown’s relations with McGee were 
deteriorating. In the summer of 1860, during a visit to Canada by the 
Prince of Wales, there had been attempts made by the Orange Order to 
gain tacit recognition by the Prince in a number of cities in Upper 
Canada. Although these had been foiled by the Prince’s Secretary, the 
Duke of Newcastle, they had been bitterly resented by the Catholics of 
the Province. Moylan hardened in his attitude to Brown and Protestant 
extremists like him, and in the early days of the general election of 
1861 he announced in the Canadian -Freeman that he could no longer sup- 
port the Reformers. McGee was taken by surprise by Moylan’s decision 
and angrily turned on his protege. For a number of weeks the two men 
traded insults in the press, doing their common cause of new nationality 
no good by their bitter mutual denunciations. It did neither man any 
credit, though perhaps Moylan showed more discernment than McGee in the 
matter. McGee himself was forced to cut his ties with Brown within a 
year because of the same sectarian provocations in the Globe. But he 
suffered from Moylan's defection, losing his Toronto mouthpiece at the 
start of an election.campaign. Moylan’s name-calling helped neither the 
campaign nor the new nationality either. He accused McGee of being a 
"West Briton" and a "parvenu", titles which owed their force to sectar- 
52 
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The quarreT' between McGee and Moylan passed by the end of the 
year, but the former intimacy and support never returned, and from 1861 
on, Moylan was very much his own man with a distinct idea of new nation- 
ality and the future of Canada which did not necessarily agree with 
McGee’s. Moylan’s vision of Canada’s future was, as ever, seen through 
the prism of Catholicism and Irish identity. Although he would defend 
Canada’s reputation against the slights of the American press, it was 
done as an Irishman, rather than a Canadian. In response to a campaign 
by the Irish-American newspaper, the Boston Pilot, to gather subscript- 
ions from the Irish in Canada, Moylan declared: 
If the Boston Pilot would learn to treat Canada and 
Canadians with the same love and consideration as it 
treats the bank bills of the Province, there would be 
no cause for complaint....Canada - where Irishmen 
enjoy more of real liberty and freedom of conscience 
than they do in any other part of this continent. 53 
The future nation that Moylan looked to was perhaps more independent 
than McGee had in mind: 
When the day comes, and come it must, for the Confederate 
Provinces, of which we will be one, to declare their 
supremacy, under an independent government; then we should 
be not only wielding, but prepared to maintain our right 
by force of arms. 54 
By early 1862 the danger from the Uhited States had become the centre 
of attention for British North Americans. Moylan, like McGee, saw the 
English unwillingness to defend Canada as an opportunity for promoting 
^^Ibid., 7 May 1863. 
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the new nationality. Moylan wrote advising Irish Canadians to look to 
Confederation as their only alternative should the Empire decide to 
break the link with her American colonies.McGee wanted the Empire 
to stand by her committments as long as they continued to oversee the 
Provinces; 
Those who talk...of it being unreasonable to expect the 
Empire to defend Canada forget that Canada i_^ itself 
the Empire, in North America. 56 
As the Civil War dragged on, the danger of invasion or annexation 
remained to underscore the uncertain fate of the Provinces should Britain 
actually withdraw from her Empire in North America. This clearly helped 
McGee’s cause. He was offering a clear and viable solution, both for the 
Provinces and for Britain an arrangement by which the Empire and the 
colonies could remain linked in a mutually agreeable fashion. Unlike 
Moylan's rather vague ideas, McGee never wanted aniindependent Canada 
totally separated from the Empire. He summed up his thoughts on the issue 
in an election speech in Montreal in 1863: 
I intend to adhere to the national policy I have always 
advocated and acted upon...the policy of reconciliation 
between our different classes and creeds - the policy of 
internal reform, and parri passu with that reform, a 
great series of internar improvements stretching from the 
frontier of New Brunswick to British Columbia. This policy 
is the only true basis of Colonial defense - for it is a 
policy of...a new northern nationality, subordinate to, 
helpful to, and helped by the empire to which we belong. 57 
^^Ibid., 30 Oct. 1862. 
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The duty o£ British Americans, according to McGee, was to take action 
for their own defense and make the Provinces something which the Empire 
would want to stand by: 
We must defend Canada to the best of our power, or we 
must Americanise. 58 
If there were a Crown Colony at Red River, and a Crown Prince 
presiding over our united destinies in British America, would 
she [England] not have something to stand by? 59 
It was, in many respects, another adaptation of the philosophy McGee had 
tried to spread among the Irish immigrants in the bntted" States in the 
1850's; an encouragement to improve and grow in unity based on native 
talents and initiative. The basis of a new nationality as McGee saw it 
had chaT&g^d little from the days of the New Era, and by 1863 it was clear 
in his mind in all its challenge and grandeur. He found that there were 
three main converging arguments in favour of federation: 
Upper Canada says to Lower Canada unmistakeably, 'the 
present state of things between you and us cannot 
continue much longer'; Great Britain says to her 
North American colonies, 'the present statesof things 
between you and us cannot continue'; the American 
Government by the voice of all its cannon proclaims 
that the former state of things on this continent is 
closed, and a veritable new era opened. 60 
The issue of defense had linked together the last two factors cited by 
McGee. The truth of the first was daily demonstrated in the Canadian 
House of Assembly, where it was becoming ever more-difficult for any 
political group to gather and maintain enough support to govern adequately 
thiS' at a time when the nature of events demanded a strong and stable 
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administration for Canada. By the Mddle of 1860 George Brown had 
despaired of anything other than a complete dissolution of the existing 
Union as an answer to the deadlock rapidly overtaking the political 
process in Canada. Other Grits had spoken out in favour of annexation to 
the United States, further alienating McGee from the Refonii group in the 
Assembly, with whom he had allied himself since late 1858. 
In 1862 McGee had become a cabinet minister in the government of 
Sandfield Macdonald. It was a frustrating experience of ministerial life, 
as the weakness of the Government forbade any imaginative enterprises. 
What made McGee’s tenure worse was a dispute which began with Sandfield 
Macdonald on the matter of immigrants. Immigration was part and parcel 
of McGee's new nationality. He wanted immigrants to populate the West and 
increase the size of the new nation's labour force and citizenry. When, 
however, Macdonald made slighting references to immigrants being "white- 
washed" at the docks, it angered McGee and enlarged the growing rift 
between him and the Reformers. When Macdonald dropped him from Government 
in May 1863, McGee entered into open dispute with the Reformers, and 
Macdonald in particular, on their attitude to immigrants. Moylan rejoined 
McGee, happy to see his natural partner free of the snare of the Grits. 
Moylan claimed that McGee had been dismissed from the Government for 
personal reasons and at the insistence of Brown, who wanted no Irish 
61 
Catholics in the Reform Government. Brown's Globe attacked McGee, 
accusing him of being illiberal and ambitious. McGee, hurt by Brown's 
ingratitude, replied: 
61 
Canadian Freeman, 27 Aug. 1863. 
Was I illiberal in 1858, when I demanded fair-play for 
Mr. Brown in Toronto and elsewhere, at the peril of 
losing many of my best friends? 62 
He pointed out that Brown only wanted to expand to the west because he 
coveted the land for Upper Canada, yet derided a general Federation as 
a means of self-defense for Canada: 
The Globe people advocate western extension, because it 
is western, and oppose eastern extension because it is 
eastern; while I advocate both, because I desire to see 
the speedy union of all British America, as one great 
self-protecting power. 63 
It was, therefore, with a full awareness of the dangers of Canadian sect- 
ionalism, the American menace, and British indifference to the fate of 
British America, that McGee set off on another tour of the Maritimes in 
the summer of 1863. 
McGee was probably the only major Canadian politician to have had 
first-hand experience of the Lower Provinces before 1864. There was almost 
a complete lack of political interest in the affairs of the Maritimes on 
the part of the Canadian governments. McGee’s visits to the area had begun 
as early as 1859, putting into practice what he had been preaching about 
the necessity of getting to know others before uniting with them. He had 
already established relations with the leading politicians of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick, and had much in common with the leading Irish Catholics 
journalist of Prince Edward Island, Edward Whelan. On his 1863 tour, then, 
McGee was renewing his acquaintance with provinces already famiiiar and 
for which he had the warmest regard. He spoke in Halifax, his first stop, 
^^Ibid., 17 Sep. 1863. 
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in July. As usual, he put forward the practical, as well as the vision- 
ary, arguments in favour of Federation, demonstrating the benefits in 
free trade that Federation would bring to the Maritimes. But his main 
thrust was what he called ’’the patriotic argument": 
The argument to be drawn from the absolute necessity of 
cultivating an enthusiastic patriotism amongst us. 
And dealing with a topic which was to become common in the Federation 
issue, McGee wondered: 
Why are our great men sometimes found so small? Because we 
are sectional and provincial in spirit, as well as in fact.64 
These were the old and tried lines of reasoning that he had been using 
since the days of the New Era. But in St. John, New Brunswick, they rec- 
eived a cold reception from Timothy Warren Anglin. 
By 1863 Anglin was a respected member of St. John society, totally 
assimilated into the life of his adopted Province. For Anglin, New Bruns- 
wick was his country, his nation. Within the Imperial framework, and 
benefitting greatly from the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, New Brunswick 
and its Irish Catholic leader were complacent in their provincial 
isolation. This complacency was most clearly seen in Anglin's attitude 
to the idea of Federation of the British North American Provinces. Although 
he had commented briefly on the idea ever since it was first raised by 
Galt in 1858, Anglin had always dismissed it as an impractical and 
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main points: the idea was impractical at that time and for some time to 
come; it meant breaking the link with the Empire; and there was no need 
for any "new nationality", the identification of New Brunswick with the 
Empire was more than Confederation could offer in the realm of national- 
ity. 
Before the American Civil War broke out in 1861, Anglin was secure 
in these beliefs. The few references made in the Morning Freeman to fed- 
eration were in response to speeches in Canada, an area which intruded 
very little into the affairs of his adopted Province. Anglin wasiixomplet- 
ely involved in New Brunswick, with little interest in the outside world. 
His main concern with external events was limited to whatever affected 
New Brunswick directly. Paramount among these concerns was the Imperial 
link. New Brunswick was the "Loyalist Province", and Anglin was careful 
to remind his readers of the loyalty of the Irish Catholics of the Prov- 
ince. In December 1861 he wrote to reject the idea that the Irish of 
New Brunswick would ever support an American invasion of the Province: 
It is an erroneous idea, that the 'Irish population', 
because they detest a bad and odious Government in 
Ireland, must necessarily be disloyal to a good and 
beneficient Government in these Provinces because it 
is called by the same name....they too know their duty, 
and they have never yet been found unfaithful to the 
Government that protected drelio the flag that sheltered 
them....They value the blessings of liberty, sustained 
and regulated by law, and tho' bearing no ill-will 
towards the Americans, entertaining no wish to see 
the great Republic weakened or humbled, they know 
their duty to theicountry in which they live and of 
whose people they are truely an integral part, and 
knowing it will perform it. 66 
Like McGee, Anglin wanted to see the Irish Catholic community accepted as 
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as an "integral part" of life. Ultimately, that would require a certain 
loss of "Irishness", but Anglin considered such a change to be in the 
very long-term future of the Province. In the meantime, it was his wish 
to see New Brunswick enjoy her place in the Empire, secure in Imperial 
protection. But by 1861, the Empire was no longer as keen to carry on 
the role of protector and was looking to the colonies to bear their own 
share of the defense budget. Anglin was not prepared to allow this: 
If England chooses to sever the connection it is for us 
to submit with all patience and do the best we can to 
protect and take care of ourselves; but while we form 
part of the Empire England must and will do all she can 
to protect our soil - not, indeed, for our sake but for 
her own. Th§ people of thescolonies have already shown 
that they are willing to do their part. They know that 
if ever there be a war with the United States while these 
Provinces are part of the Empire, it will be an Imperial 
war, and that the Empire, not these poor Provinces, must 
bear the chief burden of it. 67 
Throughout the civil war years, this would be Anglin’s stance on defense 
we are part of the Empire, therefore the Empire has the duty to protect 
herself. He castigated those English journalists who dared suggest that 
a war fought in British North America should be financed and fought 
primarily by British North Americans.^^ 
The main impetus for Anglings strong editorials on the subject of 
defense was the very real danger of hostilities with the United States. 
In January 1862 he examined the changed nature of the neighbouring rep- 
ublic, noting its new militaristic character under a powerful President. 
That a fundamnetal transformation had come over the United States was 
69 
clear to him. On February 1, 1862 he wrote an editorial titled, "War 
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or Peace", in which he concluded that a "war with England at no distant 
70 
day is far from improbable" for the United States; and that New Bruns- 
wick would be a major battle-ground in such a war seemed inevitable. 
Anglin, therefore, was faced with much the same quandary ras McGee .in Can- 
ada. Both saw the danger of war and the unwillingness of England to bear 
the burden of defense as a threat that demanded action. But whereas McGee 
called for Canadian action, Anglin demanded that the Empire meet her 
comiaitments ^of honour. McGee saw the emergency as an opportunity for 
Canadians to act together in the face of a common danger, hence building 
bridges to a common nationality based on common experiences and history. 
Anglin, on the other hand, wanted to continue with the status quo. The 
Empire was essential to New Brunswick's continued development and growth. 
Under the sheltering power of the Empire, the Province was secure and 
stable. Ultimately, Anglin's loyalty was to the Province, not the Empire, 
but as long as the Empire was prepared to play its proper role, as Anglin 
saw it, then he would uphold the Imperial link. But let that link become 
detrimental to New Brunswick, and he would happily break the connection. 
The attachment to the Empire was closely related to Anglin's views 
on federation and the new nationality. Federation he viewed with great 
suspicion, seeing it as a danger to the Imperial link that safeguarded 
the integrity of the Province. He was very much aware that the current 
thinking in England tended to see the colonies of North America as an 
^^Ibid., 1 Feb. 1862. 
embarrassing complication which might draw them into war with the United 
States. When the Confederation project gained prominence in 1864, he 
was convinced that the London politicians were using it for their own 
ends: 
This new agitation for a Union arose out of the 
difficulties of Canadian politicians, but the Imperial 
Government seized almost with avidity on this opportunity 
for preparing the way virtually to get rid of this part 
of the Empire. 71 
In fact, it would seem that the events of 1864 caught Anglin completely 
by surprise. Until 1863, he had given the idea of federation little 
thought, as the columns of the Morning Freeman indicate. The lesser 
scheme of a union of the Maritime Provinces, warmly supported by success- 
ive Lieutenant-Governors of New Brunswick, was one which Anglin saw as 
both feasible and beneficial to his country: 
There can be no doubt that at the present day a union of 
the three Lower Provinces would be of vast benefit in many 
ways to them all, and that if the people were properly 
alive to their own interests such a union would be demanded 
at once. 72 
However, after this brief mention in May 1862, Anglin ignored the subject 
for another year. Reflecting the complacency of the New Brunswick people, 
Anglin was in no mood to change anything. The Province was doing well 
without taking any risks with new constitutional arrangements. What was 
to change Anglin’s attitudes was the interference of an outsider in the 
affairs of New Brunswick. 
^•^Ibid., 25 Aug. 1864. 
^^Ibid., 10 May 1862. 
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McGee's speech in St. John in August 1863 marked the beginning of 
Anglin's serious study of the federation question in the pages of the 
Morning Freeman. In fact, McGee said nothing that was new. He made clear 
his hope for a Federation of British North America, warning that the new 
militancy of the United States necessitated such a union in matters of 
defense: 
I advocate the union of the Provinces on, among other 
grounds, that of providing for the common defense. 73 
He agreed with Anglin that defense was an Imperial duty, but argued that 
the Provinces too ought to contribute to the support of a militia body. 
On the question of defense, McGee claimed that an Intercolonial Railway 
was the most important requirement for the speedy movement of troops and 
supplies throughout the Provinces. Such a railway would also facilitate 
travel and combat ignorance among the colonies concerning one another: 
It is Intercolonial ignorance which primarily stands in 
the way of the Intercolonial Railroad. 74 
Union, McGee went on, would attract many of those immigrants now going to 
the United States, since federation would give the Provinces a higher 
profile than they had separately. Turning to the United States and the war 
there, he said that America had changed and the British North American 
Provinces had to change also if they were to survive and not be absorbed 
into the neighbouring republic. That would be a tragedy, since the nature 
of society there had led to a Civil War, a breakdown in social standards 
73 
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and the fajiiily, as well as an assault on religion. Summing up, McGee 
called on the press of the Maritimes to encourage the spread of inform- 
ation from Province to Province in order to combat the ignorance he 
described. He looked for daring and vision, which, in the North American 
context, could so quickly be turned into reality. It was a typical McGee 
speech, inspiring yet practical. 
Anglin's response to the speech was sharp and severe. He had nothing 
good to say about McGee's remarks, content to believe that McGee had 
blamed the republican form of government for all the ills of the United 
States. This McGee had not done. He made it plain that he had expected a 
social, not a political breakdown in America, due to democracy, and not 
republicanism. Anglin himself had said much the same thing in his articles 
in the Morning Freeman, and had condemned the rule of "the Sovreign Mob" 
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in the United States. He had also condemned the ,nativism'and corruption 
of that country. Anglin branded McGee as a visionary and impractical. He 
had no time for any "new nationality", and as for encouraging a greater 
vision among politicians, he thought it enough "to be known merely as 
76 
inhabitants of British America as subjects of the British Empire". 
The defense issue was likewise dismissed. Anglin could see no way 
in which federation would improve the defense capabilities of the prov- 
inces : 
If you could believe these men, the mere act of union 
would give us military and naval strength, would bring 
us a population. 77 
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Anglin then expressed his fundamental question with regard to federation: 
what good would it do New Brunswick? This was his constant theme through 
the following year and a half. The McGee speech at St. John was important, 
not for what he said, since there was nothing new in it, but for the 
effect it had on Anglin. For the first time, he came down against federat- 
ion a la McGee, and that was to have serious consequences for the cause of 
Confederation in New Brunswick. It is hard to know to what extent Anglin's 
reaction to McGee was based on personal dislike, rather than differences 
of opinion on constitutional matters. Anglin probably resented an outsider, 
especially a famous Irish Catholic journalist, coming into his country 
and trying to change things. Anglin's standing in the Irish Catholic 
community was based on his background and position as a spokesman for 
their interests. McGee had more credibility on each of these issues. He 
had been the rebel in 1848, and had done tremendous work for Irish Cath- 
olics in the United States and Canada. Perhaps Anglin felt threatened by 
McGee's reputation, especially in a larger sphere under federation. Anglin 
seems not to have been against federation per se. He had actually said 
in the New Brunswick Assembly a few weeks before McGee's speech that "the 
.79 
British North American Colonies should be joined in one great nation". 
He thought such a union to be impractical at that time, but that hardly 
explains the force of his condemnation of McGee's ideas in August 1863. 
The idea of a new nationality may have been irretrievably linked in his 
mind with the originator of the phrase. 
^^Ibid., 13 Aug. 1863; 30 Aug., 8 Sep. 1864. 
^^Ibid., 11 Apr. 1863. 
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IV. Conflicts and conferences 
At this pivotal point in the development of Timothy Anglin’s 
thoughts on the subject of federation and union, political events in his 
Province were moving toward a new departure also. Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of New Brunswick, was preparing a new 
initiative to bring about his own pet project - a union of the Maritime 
Provinces. Gordon had been increasingly impatient with political affairs 
in New Brunswick ever since he arrived in 1861. The corruption and sect- 
ionalism of the Assembly horrified him, as members boasted openly about 
buying votes at elections. Even the introduction of the secret ballot in 
1862 had not stopped the bribery and graft. The members were involved in 
"pork-barrel" politics, using their influence and position to gain advant- 
age for their constituents and themselves. The proceedings in the House 
were often interspersed with fights, verbal and physical, and name-calling 
was of a particularly coarse nature. Even the relatively well-behaved 
Anglin could refer to the Speaker of the House as "a low, worthless 
blackguard" and "a pothouse brawler andsswaggerer". That the Speaker 
might merit such language was but a further sign of how insular and 
provincial were the politics and politicians of New Brunswick. This pro- 
blem was not peculiar to that Province; McGee and Moylan had commented on 
it in Canada also, and McGee had made reference to it in his Halifax 
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speech in July 1863. But Gordon was not about to let it continue without 
making efforts to change the situation. His solution was Maritime Union, 
believing that, in the wider sphere of activity provided by such a 
merger, politicians would rise to higher standards of political and 
parliamentary conduct. To that end, he approached Samuel Tilley, the one 
politician he trusted, and convinced him of the need for Maritime Union. 
By early 1864 he had come to an agreement with the leading politician of 
Nova Scotia, Charles Tupper, to call a conference to discuss the question. 
Prince Edward Island also showed interest in the scheme. But, in the 
memorable phrase of W.S. MacNutt, in New Brunswick "Government was tame, 
but the people were not". Government only moved in response to public 
opinion, and public opinion was not interested in any scheme of Maritime 
Union, So, by the early summer of 1864, although the Assembly had agreed 
to send delegates to a conference to discuss the scheme, none had been 
appointed and no date or venue had been arran’ged for the conference. It 
was at this point that Canada chose to intervene in the affairs of the 
Lower Provinces. 
Canada's own political affairs were in a state of crisis. MdGee 
had returned from his tour of the Maritimes in 1863 to a country that 
had almost run out of options politically. The government of Sandfield 
Macdonald had not enough support in the House to do more than carry on 
normal day-to-day business. It was a matter of time before it had to 
fall, if only through inanition. McGee carried on preaching his cause. 
^^MacNutt, W.S., New Brunswick: A History, 1784-1867, CToronto, 1963), 
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In late November 1863, he was reported calling for a good library for 
Montreal, and also speaking out against an Irish-American secret organ- 
ization, the Fenians, with whom he would have more dealings in the future 
82 
months. James Moylan called on Irishmen of all traditions to unite 
83 
against the "Scotch Clear Grits" of the Macdonald Government. McGee 
and Moylan had now reached the same place politically. Both had turned 
against the Reformers, and both had found in John A. Macdonald and the 
Conservatives a political home they could be comfortable with. McGee’s 
political affiliation in the House of Assembly was always judged more on 
how closely a group reflected his own beliefs than on party loyalties. 
Hence, in his parliamentary career in Canada, he served in both a Reform 
and a Conservative Government, as well as sitting as an Independent. His 
was not a party political career, but rather an ideological crusade in 
which he combined on an ad hoc basis with whatever group would support 
his campaign for a new nationality. The Reformers in the Sandfield Mac- 
donald Government had failed him, and he found in John A. Macdonald a 
kindred soul, after a fashion. Like McGee, Macdonald would not be tied 
down by labels, though it was from a pragmatic, not an ideological point 
of view. Macdonald the pragmatist was praised by Moylan as: 
One of the few leading men M Upper Canada who has had 
sufficient statesmanship to see...from a broad national 
point of view. 84 
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Sandfield Macdonald, on the other hand, was "The Clear Grit Thug". 
McGee campaigned with John Macdonald in Leeds at a bye-election in Jan- 
uary 1864, during which they became close ftiends and McGee obviously 
enjoyed Macdonald’s ideas as well as his company. When the Assembly 
reconvened, he was attacked by the Grits as a traitor and a turn-coat 
for joining with the Conservatives^^McGeetnever?tried tSD^excuse the past, 
and spoke openly in his speeches about apparent inconsistencies in his 
career. In December 1863 he had spoken on ’<!The Future of Canada", and 
dealt with another issue raised by various opponents: 
It may be said that it is rather strange for an Irishman, 
who spent his youth in resisting that government in his 
native country, to be found among the admirers of the 
British Constitutional government in Canada. To that this 
is my reply - if in my day Ireland had been governed as 
Canada is now, I would have been as sound a conservative 
as is to be found in Ireland. 86 
In spite of the attacks of the Grits, it is typical of McGee that in his 
relations with George Brown there was a return to something of their 
former intimacy, and the Grit leader always dealt gently with the new 
87 
Conservative convert. As always, McGee's aim was to end strife and 
sectarianism in Canadian political life, and his continued friendship 
with Brown, in spite of his treatment at the hands of Brown's followers, 
was to do much to establish future working partnerships among men of 
different parties in the Province. 
^^Ibid., 18 Feb. 1864. 
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In March 1864, acting on information from unknown sources, McGee 
announced to the House that thetthree Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had agreed to a scheme of union. 
He was rather premature in his news and his language appears somewhat 
fanciful in the light of actual feeling in the Maritimes themselves: 
Laying aside all partisan and personal considerations, 
the leading spirits of the Maritime Provinces have 
simultaneously agreed to unite...into one great 
maritime community. 88 
Just four days later he seconded a motion by George Brown to set up a 
committee of the House to study constitutional reform for Canada, This 
was to be a major advance on the road to Confederation as members of all 
sides joined together under Brown's direction to seriously and privately 
talk out the problems besetting the Province. The initial motion was not 
put to a vote. On March 21, the Government of Sandfield Macdonald resigned. 
In the ensuing election, McGee stood unopposed in Montreal West, the 
people of the constituency showing their appreciation for their member by 
presenting him with a house of his own that April. 
In the new Government of John A. Macdonald, McGee held the portfolio 
of Minister for Agriculture and Immigration. An old ambition of McGee's 
was finaliy realized. But in every other way it seemed that nothing had 
been changed by the election. The first division for the Conservative 
Government was won by only two votes. The forces of sectionalism were 
^^Legislative Assembly of Canada Debates, Canadian Library Association 
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still at work in Canada ensuring continued instability in government. 
In May Brown reintroduced his motion for a bipartisan committee on the 
Constitution, and again McGee seconded the motion. The committee was 
vot€d through this time, although John A. Macdonald voted against it. 
Nevertheless, he was appointed to the committee, along with Sandfield 
Macdonald, who had voted in favour, McGee, Cartier, Galt, and Brown himself, 
who chaired the proceedings. The committe produced a report in favour of 
a Federation of British North America as a solution to the problems of 
the United Provinces. Both Macdonalds voted against the report, John A, 
because he wanted a straightforward legislative union rather than a 
federal one, as the report recommended. The same day the Brown Committee 
reported to the House, the Conservatives were, as predicted, defeated on 
a minor issue. It seemed that another powerless government would have to 
be concocted. But this time, with the recent experience of co-operating 
on the Brown Committee behind them, the politicians of Canada found annew 
alternative. Brown joined with John A. Macdonald, Galt and Cartier in a 
series of negotiations which led to the formation of the Great Coalition 
of June 1864. The Coalition was committed to the Federal Union of the 
Canadas, with a larger union of British North America should that prove 
possible. The new Government, with McGee retaining the Immigration port- 
folio, sought an invitation to the conference on Maritime Union which 
they believed was already planned. The Canadians were about to interrupt 
the political life of the Maritimes with profound consequences. 
James Moylan was distrustful of the new Coalition. He saw it as 
87. 
a move of expediency, not principle, and Moylan was pessimistic about 
89 
its likely results. However, tied securely to both McGee and Macdonald, 
He was willing to wish the experiment well: 
If...the coalition is simply for the purpose of 
bringing about a federation of all the provinces 
and nothing further; well and good. We wish it the 
largest possible degree of success. 90 
Timothy Anglin was likewise sceptical of Brown’s motiveSland considered 
91 
the future of Canada to be as uncertain as ever: "the end is not yet". 
When he heard of the request of the Canadian politicians to attend the 
Maritime Conference, Anglin was convinced that the Canadian plan was to 
push ahead with the Injliercolonial Railway. In August, McGee led a 
party of Canadian journalists, politicians and businessmen on a tour of 
the Maritimes, eager to introduce one Province to the others. The Canad- 
ians and the Maritimers enjoyed each other’s company and the entire 
climate of opinion in New Brunswick, antagonistic to Canada over past 
differences, warmed to the Canadians in the jovial conviviality of McGee’s 
speeches and jokes at Canadian expense. McGee was well-known in the 
Maritimes and well-liked. His role in bringing people together in an 
atmosphere of friendship and good humour did much to make the tour a 
real success, and this made the future relations between Canadians and 
Maritimers that much more relaxed and open; Anglin, however, was not at 
all impressed. At a banquet in honour of the Canadian visitors in St. John, 
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he made a speech in which he declared himself opposed to Confederation 
on the old grounds of impracticality and danger to the Imperial link. 
He claimed that Confederation was merely a step towards total separation 
from the Empire; but he rather spoiled his case by ending with a declar- 
ation that: 
He did not wish them to suppose from what he haddsaid 
that he was absolutely opposed to a Union of the Provinces 
at any time or on any terms. He believed that ultimately 
the destiny of these Provinces must be either to drift 
into annexation with the United States or to form one 
great Union or Confederation of some sort. 93 
The report of this speech was not published until November. In fact, 
Anglin made no comment in the Morning Freeman on the issue until after 
the McGee delegation had left the country. He was then quick to pass 
judgement on the supporters of Confederation: 
Like Mr. McGee...they have no plan, no scheme, no definite 
system. Their whole stock in trade is a few poetically 
vague and misty ideas. 94 
Anglin failed to realize that what he saw as ’’the ultimate destiny" of 
the Provinces had arrived, at least in the minds of the supporters of 
Confederation. The threat from the United States, when seen in the context 
of Imperial withdrawal from defense committments to the Provinces, meant 
that the choice was urgent and pressing. Anglin carried on in his faith 
in Imperial action, declaring that Confederation was not necessary for 
defense. 
^^Ibid., 19 Nov. 1864. 
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Mr. McGee said...that if we were united, a blow given at 
Sarnia would be felt in Halifax; but as we now are, a 
blow at Sarnia would be felt in London even more keenly 
than at Halifax. 96 
This was to ignore the many warnings from London that any blow in British 
America might not be felt at all in London. 
In Canada, James Moylan too was caught by sui^rise by the speed 
of events. His ideas of federation differed from McGee’s. Moylan saw the 
Federation scheme as involving total separation from the Empire, as Anglin 
did. But, whereas Anglin rejected the idea for that reason, Moylan wel- 
comed it as the only safe course: 
Argue as we may, our only safety isein becoming a nation 
distinct from that of the British Empire, whatever kindly 
sympathies and relations may still exist between us and 
the land of our fathers. 97 
At first, Moylan seemed prepared to allow the future prospects of federat- 
ion to compensate for the short-term problems of Canada: 
Although it [Federation] may not bear instantaneously 
upon the development of out internal resources, or the 
amelioration of our financial difficulties; yet it will 
pave the way to our speedy independence, and immediately 
alter the attitude assumed towards us by the American 
Republic. 98 
But almost immediately, he began to echo Anglin’s cry of: 
What good or benefit, great or small, now beyond our 
reach, can be attained by means of such a union? 99 
^^Ibid., 20 Sep. 1864. 
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Moylan questioned whether Confederation would really change anything for 
Canada, since it would not add a "pickaxe, loom or shovel", a phrase he 
used on a number of occasions to describethe immigrants he believed were 
vital to Canada's future and which Confederation would do little to 
attract.Moylan agreed with Anglin also in believing that the British 
Government were behind the entire scheme: 
There is strong presimiptive evidence that the grand 
confederation scheme now before the country has been 
accelerated by the recent and indirect influence of 
the British Government. 101 
Both men were groping in the dark. They wrote their articles ignorant of 
what exactly Confederation would mean, and therefore fearful of what it 
might mean. Moylan feared for Catholics caught in the predominantly 
Protestant Province of Upper Canada without the Lower Canadian support of 
the French Catholics. In the columns of the Globe he saw the future laws 
of a Protestant Canada: 
In the face of the merciless crusade invoked against us 
with such hardy atrocity, the possible Federation of the 
Provinces looms up before us menacing and portentious. 102 
Anglin feared for the independence of his country. New Brunswick; and he 
cautioned that once a decision in favour of Confederation was taken, it 
would not be possible to reverse direction: 
While we maintain our independence we have an absolute 
^Canadian Freeman, 13, 20 Oct., 2 Nov. 1864. 
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right to accept or reject any proposition that may be 
made to us. 
And the old loyalty cry was used against those who would risk the link 
with the Empire: 
It does not satisfy them to belong to that Empire; it is 
not greatness enough for them; they want to be known as 
belonging to a Great North American nation. lOS 
Finally, he wondered what was to be gained by it all: 
In this great new nation can we find any trade that will 
be advantageous to us? What have we to send to Canada? 
What has Canada to send to us? 10^ 
As they wondered and waited, along with the people of British North 
America, their future was being decided by a gathering of their political 
leaders. 
When the Canadian request to attend the Maritime Conference was 
received in June 1864, there was simply no conference arranged for them 
to attend. The apathy of the various Assemblies had frustrated Gordon’s 
efforts. Now there was a hurried decision to convene a conference at 
Charlottetown, fFrifieetEdwardllsl’and^ for September 1. Gordon should have 
been pleased, but he was not. He wondered what the Canadians wanted at 
his conference. He was not in.favour of a general Federation of all the 
Provinces, since he saw that a Federal Parliament would only take the 
cream of New Brunswick politicians, such as they were, leaving the dross, 
behind in the local Assembly. The .last state would be far worse than the 
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first. The Canadians were invited to state their case to the Maritimers 
when the conference opened, and, faced with the eloquence of Brown, Galt, 
Cartier, McGee and Macdonald, the lesser scheme of Maritime Union had 
little chance. It was decided to postpone discussion of the lesser union 
and to convene a conference on federation of the British North American 
Provinces at Quebec in October. On the way home from the Charlottetown 
Conference, McGee and most of the Canadian delegation stopped in St. John, 
New Brunswick, where they were welcomed at a banquet. At the event, a 
toast was proposed to "Colonial Union". The only man not to stand for the 
toast was Timothy Warren Anglin. 
Anglin was not prepared even to consider whatever proposals might 
come from the Quebec Conference. As.early as September, during the first 
Charlottetown meetings, he declared: 
Whatever the delegates may think or say, the people are 
by no means prepared for such a measure....The people 
don't want it. 106 
He was perhaps even more confirmed in his opposition by the reports that 
came from the Prince Edward Island newspaper closest to the Conference 
proceedings, Edward Whelan's Charlottetown Examiner, which stated bluntly 
that "By Confederation...we are certain there must be a separation from 
107 
England". Moylan, still concerned with Protestant persecution of 
Catholics in a Federal system, asked in December: 
^^^Slattery, p. 242. 
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I£ Confederation be the only thing attainable, we desire 
that it should in its nature approach as nearly as 
possible to the character of a Legislative Union. 108 
This, he believed, would give adequate protection for minority groups, 
as well as providing a more stable form of government. However that was 
not acceptable to some of the delegates at the conference and was dropped 
as an option. 
The- conferences introduced to the Canadian politicians a new 
face. Edward Whelan, Irish Catholic journalist and owner of the Charlotte- 
town Examiner had been appointed a delegate from Prince Edward Island. 
Whelan was already known to McGee from the latter’s tours of the Maritimes 
and they had renewed their acquaintance.at the Charlottetown Conference 
in September. Like Anglin, Whelan had spent much of his time in Prince 
Edward Island deeply involved with the political and social affairs of 
the Province and had not considered seriously the idea of Confederation 
or a new nationality until the Canadian involvement of June 1864. Faced 
with the issue, Whelan asked his readers: 
Shall we, then, think seriously about a Federal Union? We 
believe we ought. Great Britain is constantly urging upon 
our attention a Union of some kind. The only kind of 
Union we can have is a Federal one. That means little or n 
nothing short of separation from Great Britain.... If we 
make up our minds for an Independent Federation...we must 
prepare to bid goodbye to old Mother England, and to lay 
on the shelf with other rubbish those antiquated notions 
of loyalty for which she herself has not now that senti- 
mental regard. 109 
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It was clear that Whelan had little regard for the Imperial connection 
and sought in Confederation an independent nation on the lines of Moy- 
lan*s ideas. Loyalty was not a feature of Whelan's attitude to the 
current state of the constitutional position of the island. However, 
Quebec was to change his ideas radically. He left Prince Edward Island 
on October 7, 1864 to go to the Quebec Conference vowing that he would 
^earnestly labour to be guided by a strict regard for the interest of my 
adopted country" of Prince Edward Island.But the experience of the 
Conference soon opened his mind to the possibilities of a new nationality 
for North America and his provincial nationalist language gave way to 
something closer to McGee’s. By October 11 he was saying that: 
the prospects for the future of British America are of 
the most encouraging description, that the destinies of all 
the Provinces are in safe hands. Ill 
The next day he voted in favour of a general federation of the Provinces1 
By the end of the Conference on-November 14, Whelan was advocating the 
publication of the Resolutions adopted at that gathering: 
thfeelessssecrecy that is practised, the more likelihood 
there is of gaining public opinion in favour of the 
great Confederation scheme. 113 
So complete was Whelan’s conversion to Confederation that he took to 
calling his "adopted country". Prince Edward Island, an "obstacle in the 
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way o£ progress". Whelan was a late-comer to the stage o£ Con£ederation 
and he le£t early. In December 1867 he died in Charlottetown, knowing 
that Prince Edward Island had rejected the great Con£ederation scheme. 
The proceedings o£ the Quebec Con£erence were overshadowed by the 
news of a raid on three banks in the town of St. Albanis in Vermont. The 
raiders had claimed to be Southern Confederates, killed one man, and fled 
across the border into Canada with $206,000. The American Government 
reacted angrily, as did the American press. GeneraT:Dix-of the"Northern 
Army, wanted.tor send his/troops into Canada at once to capture the 
raiders. Although fourteen of the twenty-one raiders were captured, along 
with about $80,000 of the stolen money, their treatment while awaiting 
trial in Canada further incensed the Americans. The Confederates were 
well-housed and fed, and were free to read the newspapers and mix without 
restrictions. Their jail was the home of their jailer. The trial was begun 
in November, and then postponed until December. When it restarted, the 
presiding judge almost immediately released the prisoners on a technical- 
ity without binding them over. In addition, the recovered money was 
handed back to the Confederates who promptly disappeared. 
The fiery General Dix again ordered an invasion of Canada, though 
this was later countermanded by President Lincoln. McGee and others in 
the Government of Canada realized the extreme danger of the hour. Almost 
unwittingly, Canadians had found themselves on the brink of war with the 
United States; without any help from the Empire, they had brought them- 
^^"^Ibid., 20 Feb. 1865. 
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selves once again to the point o£ being invaded and overrun by the 
furious American army. Prime Minister Macdonald moved quickly to save 
the situation, ordering the rearrest of the raiders and a new trial. He 
also offered to reimburse the banks of St. Alban’s to the extent of 
$50,000. By the beginning of 1865 the St. Alban's affair was petering 
out; but it had had a serious effect on the thinking of British North 
Americans. Until then, they had been sure that only a war between England 
and the United States would bring them into conflict with their southern 
neighbour, and in such a situation the Empire would have to protect them. 
But suddenly it was clear that another scenario was possible, one in 
which the Empire might be uninvolved. There was real fear that such an 
eventuality would leave the Provinces alone against the might of the 
armies of the United States. After the St. Alban's raid and its sequel, 
British Americans also feared that the Southern Confederacy had planned 
the entire chain of events deliberately in order to start a war which 
would distract the Northern armies and present the South with much-needed 
time to regroup. Such an idea made the people of British America very 
nervous and much more aware of their need for each other and for closer 
relations between the Provinces in the matter of defense. It-was, indeed, 
a happy coincidence that the raid on Vermont should happen as the Quebec 
Conference met, and the sense of.imminent:.and common danger stirred up 
by the crisis, similar to that of the Trent .crisis, helped to prepare 
people's minds for new ideas, ideas that might give more security to the 
British Provinces. The actual risk of invasion was probably slight, 
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since the American administration was not prepared to enter into further 
military conflicts after the draining years of the Civil War, now 
drawing to a close. But the uncertainty in the minds of Canadians and 
Maritimers was very real. 
Agreement had been reached by the delegates on the future Union of 
the British Provinces; now it was their task to convince their respective 
Assemblies and peoples of the merits of the plan and of its necessity. 
Although it may have seemed certain that the Canadian Assembly would 
vote in favour of the plan, owing to the majority enjoyed by the Great 
Coalition, the result was by no means sure. Aside from the French Canadian 
radicals of Lower Canada, there were many in the Upper Province too who 
did not like the actual terms agreed upon. If even Moylan's feelings were 
unsure, how could McGee be assured that this central part of the new 
nationality would get enough votes in the House? McGee was well aware 
that a new nationality needed the support of the people and so, as the old 
year ended, Thomas D’Arcy McGee set out to ensure that the work would be 
brought to a happy conclusion. In February 1865 he rose in the Canadian 
House of Assembly to speak on the Quebec Resolutions.bHeotried to encap- 
sulate in one speech all the many strands that madeuup his argument for a 
new nationality. He recalled the great warning of the Americans, sounding 
out the alarm against invasion, either military or economic, that would 
rob British North Americans of their birthright and freedom.He then 
reminded the Canadian members of the. warning given by the Empire that it 
was time for a new relationship between.Mother Country and Colonies, one 
11 s 
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that would demand new unity and strength from the Provinces that they 
could not have separately.He tried to show that Confederation 
would strengthen, not weaken, the link with the Empire since British 
North America would then be less of a burden' and more of an attraction 
117 
to England. He looked for a higher sense of duty on the part of 
politicians than they had known before: 
Federation, I hope, may supply to all our public men 
just ground for uniting in nobler and more profitable 
contests than those which have signalized the past. 118 
Finally, gladly and proudly admitting to be the father of the phrase "a 
new nationality", now common among the proponents of the scheme of Con- 
federation, he called on his colleagues to make it a reality: 
If you want to feet any patriotism on the subject; if 
you want to stir up a common sentiment of affection 
between these people and ourselves, bring us all into 
a closer relation together, and having the elements of 
a vigorous nationality with us, each will find something 
to like and respect in the other; mutual confidence and 
respect will follow, and a feeling of being engaged in a 
common cause for the good of a common nationality will 
grow up of itself without being forced by any man’s 
special advocacy. 120 
It must have seemed to McGee in the early months.of 1865 that the dreams 
of Young Ireland were coming true in North America. He said that the 




















miraculous nature and might never come again. The Quebec Resolutions 
were passed by the Canadian Assembly, much to McGee’s delight. It seemed 
that his dream was coming true; but in the years to come, McGee would 
come face to face with the problems of Young Ireland yet again, as his 
work and dreams became threatened by another band of men who dreamed of 
the day when Ireland "long a province, be a Nation once again". 
121 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DIVIDED LOYALTIES 
With the formulation of the Quebec Resolutions, the groundwork 
for Confederation had been completed. What was hoped for was a quick 
ratification by the Provincial Assemblies, followed by a final conference 
in London to draw up the actual terms for the British North America Act, 
by which Confederation would be officially implemented. McGee recognized 
that Confederation was but one step on the way to a new nationality: the 
political framework in which a common identity could develop among the 
people of the Provinces. Anglin had certainly suffered a reversal: his 
local nationality was in danger of being overtaken by the new, Moylan, 
as usual, was waiting to see how things would work out before deciding on 
his attitude. In early 1865 it seemed merely a matter of time before the 
Provinces of British North America were united in a Federal system that 
would be the incubator for a new nationality in British America. 
But the relative ease with which the Quebec Resolutions had been 
passed in Canada was deceptive. Not only was there well-organized oppos- 
ition to Confederation in other Provinces, there was also a major crisis 
approaching in the affairs of Irish Catholic community that would have 
tremendous consequences both for that community as a whole, and for the 
future course of Confederation itself. 
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I. Anglin’s Confederation debate 
As the delegates to the Quebec Conference made their way home, 
it became clear that the future hopes of Confederation were restingoon 
the Province of New Brunswick. The scheme could possibly survive with- 
out the involvement of the two island Provinces of Newfoundland and 
Prince Edward Island; but without New Brunswick, the entire scheme would 
be impossible to implement. For even if Nova Scotia voted to accept the 
idea of Confederation, a doubtful possibility in itself, the withdrawal 
of New Brunswick would make such an acceptance a geographical impossibility 
ity. Then, New Brunswick alone could provide the new nation with an 
open Atlantic winter port. Without that, much of the economic reason for 
Confederation would collapse. But as Premier Samuel Tilley arrived back 
from the Quebec Conference, he faced an unexpectedly strong opposition. 
The future seemed to hang on the strength of public opinion in that 
Province, and Timothy Warren Anglin was ready for battle. 
When he heard that the Quebec Resolutions would not be made public 
before they were presented to the Assembly, Anglin saw a threat to the 
rights of the people of New Brunswick; 
This is clearly a conspiracy to defraud and cheat the 
people out of the right to determine for themselves 
whether this Union shall now take place. 1 
On November 15, lB64i. Anglin had published the main points agreed upon at 
Quebec, happy with his scoop over the Confederates. Once again he pointed 
1 
Morning Freeman, 3 Nov. 1864. 
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out the impracticality of the scheme, as he saw it: 
We are not one people with Canada, and no laws of Imperial 
or local legislatures can in an instant make us one....We 
are and for many years we must remain, distinct communities, 
with many interests either conflicting or not common. With 
Nova Scotia, a great part of which is within sight of this 
City, with which we now do a large trade, a real union may 
be possible. A union with Canada can not in our day be such 
an amalgamation that we will cease to consider ourselves or 
to be different communities. 2 
In a detailed refutation of the Quebec scheme two days later, Anglin laid 
down the precise areas in which he disagreed with Confederation: 
a) It would involve a loss of legislative "sovereignty" for New 
Brunswick. 
b) Representation by population would deprive the country of proper 
influence in the House of Commons, since there would only be fifteen mem- 
bers from the Province in a House of 194. 
c) The scheme was only a legislative union in disguise, since the local 
assemblies were a "sham" that would soon be done away with. 
d) It would involve tax increases, since New Brunswick would be paying 
for Canada's deficit and grandiose western schemes. 
3 
e) New Brunswick would be swamped by Canadian manufactures. 
In a series of articles beginning on November 22, 1864, Anglin 
tried to prove the economic disaster that would folToww Confederation. 
The very vagueness of the predictions* made by Tilley gave added cred- 
ibility to Anglin's predictions and did great harm to the Confederation 
^Ibid., 15 Nov. 1864. 
^Ibid., 17 Nov. 1864. 
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cause in the Province. As Anglin said in response to a vague listing o£ 
benefits for New Brunswick under the scheme: 
If any man thinks he can utter greater nonsense in coherent 
language, let him try. 4 
On December 10, Anglin took pleasure in reporting that Tilley and Galt 
were in disagreement over the basic economic premises of Confederation, 
and were contradicting each other on the estimates. The question of the 
advantages for the defense of the country advocated under Confederation 
also got short shrift from the Irish editor. He refused to believe that 
Britain would ever renege on its defense commitments to British North 
America: the Imperial link was too strong. Even when a pro-Confederation 
delegate, John Gray, warned that such an eventuality was likely should 
Confederation be rejected, Anglin replied, "The thing is really too 
absurd’’.^ Nor did he think that the colonies should send the wrong 
signals to Downing Street by bearing too great share of the defense 
burden: 
Now our idea is that these Provinces are still part of the 
British Empire; that an invasion of any one of these 
provinces is an invasion of the Empire and would be resisted 
as such; and that...the responsibility of repelling such an 
invasion would rest primarily on the Imperial Government, 
and that we should do nothing, which, without relieving us 
from the danger of invasion, would seem to relieve the 
Imperial Government of the responsibility, which, as matters 
now stand, rests upon it. 6 
^Ibid., 24 Nov. 1864. 
^Ibid., 22 Dec. 1864. 
^Ibid., 17 Jan. 1865. 
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This was the foundation of Anglin's ideology: New Brunswick was a part 
of the Imperial domain and nothing should be done to risk that position, 
especially not for some "visionary" scheme like a new nationality. Anglin 
had absolutely no time for such an idea; he could see nothing wrong with 
the old nationality: 
[Anglin] wondered that men who talked so much of loyalty 
did not believe it honour and glory enough to belong to 
the British Empire, and that they thought it would be 
more glorious to belong to a North American nation. 7 
If we were no longer part of the British Empire; if we were 
separate, disjointed States; if we were merely New Bruns- 
wickers. Nova Scotians, and Canadians, such an argument [new 
nationality] as this would have some force; but under the 
circumstances that really do exist, it is the silliest 
nonsense.... and now it is not Irish or French or any others 
but the people who pretend to be proud of being known as 
British subjects, who are so anxious...that they may be 
able to boast, 'I am a-a-a--what d'ye call 'em'. 8 
In November 1864, Anglin published a statement by Tilley that Confedaration 
did not originate at Westminister, but in Canada. For Anglin that had been 
sufficient reason to damn the scheme even aside from the general economic 
reasons. Anglin's nationalism was centred on New Brunswick; he looked on 
the Province as his "nation", preferably within the Empire. 
Samuel Tilley was faced with a harder struggle in New Brunswick 
than he had expected. The degree of opposition to Confederation surprised 
him and it increased as the weeks passed and the Quebec terms were”;ever more 
^Ibid., 24 Nov. 1864. 
^Ibid., 15 Dec. 1864. 
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minutely scrutinized by the anti-Confederation forces. Since the Assembly 
was nearing its end, Tilley felt he could not lay the terms before it 
until after an election. But when to have an election was the question. 
Lieutenant-Governor Gordon urged Tilley to an early dissolution, thinking 
that any election in New Brunswick could be won by buying the required 
votes. Tilley was not as sanguine, realizing the depth of support won by 
Anglin and the anti-Confederates. Still, he bowed to Gordon’s pressure 
and the election was called for February. Anglin decided to stand for St. 
John, and the opposition campaign used many of his arguments already in 
print in the Morning Freeman. The continued vagueness of the Confederation 
proposals, as they applied to New Brunswick, was a major help to Anglin's 
colleagues. He himself was tireless in his campaign against Tilley, using 
the issue of impracticality to beat the Confederates. 
Anglin made it clear in the columns of the Morning Freeman that 
his basic opposition to Confederation was on the grounds of New Brunswick 
nationalism; 
There shall be no difficulty in defeating this attempt 
to destroy the independence of this Province. 9 
He called on each one who "really loves his country" to go out and vote 
on this crucial issue. The economic arguments were important insofar as 
they demonstrated that Confederation would mean economic domination by 
Canada. When a Confederate candidate was compared with the Irish nation- 
alists, Grattan and Curran, in his eloquence,-Anglin acidly remarked: 
^Ibid., 24 Jan. 1865. 
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Grattan and Curran made speeches to liberate their 
country, but John [Boyd] to enslave his...to destroy 
the Legislative independence o£ his adopted Province 
or reduce it to a contemptible municipality. 10 
Echoing his favourite themes, Anglin warned against Confederation as a 
threat to the Imperial link: 
No one of common sense can look at the Confederation 
scheme without perceiving that it is a step towards 
entire separation from the Empire. 11 
He pointed to the detrimental effects of the Act of Union of 1801 on the 
economic and social fortunes of Ireland, joined to a larger, dominating 
12 
entity. He gleefully played on the disagreements and d:iscrepancies 
among the Confederates and their economic statistics, especially when 
John A. Macdonald announced in the Canadian Assembly that the Quebec terms 
were not open to change, thereby contradicting what Tilley and Gray had 
been saying for weeks. Confusion as to the precise route of the Inter- 
colonial Railway, as well as to its cost, gave Anglin ammunition to 
increase the suspicions of what exactly Confederation would entail for 
14 
New Brunswick. As Anglin observed after the election: 
One of the misfortunes of the Confederation conspirators 
was that they could not all agree on their statements; 
that in their endeavours to deceive and delude the people 
of different Provinces and districts, they were compelled 
to tell stories which contradicted one another. 15 
For Anglin found great satisfaction in the election results. Of 
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the Assembly, none retained their seat5 The new Assembly numbered no 
more than twelve Confederates, while the anti-Confederates picked up 
every other seat. Anglin himself was elected easily. The Confederates 
accused the Irish Catholics of voting en bloc at Anglin's instigation. 
They also accused them of being told how to vote by their priests, a 
comment dii the sectarian quality of New Brunswick politics. Anglin s 
strongly rejected both charges, saying that the Irish simply voted as 
they saw fit. He himself, nevertheless, was appointed to the Executive 
Council in recognition of his political importance in Irish Catholic 
areas. In a burst of euphoria, Anglin let his true sense of nationality 
show: 
Standing together, shoulder to shoulder, at the late general 
elections, we achieved a glorious triumph and saved the 
country. 16 
For Anglin, the election results were as good as a victory in battle in 
the war against the foreigners of Canada who had tried to seduce New 
Brunswick away from the Empire. His "country" was saved. 
The victory was not long enjoyed. The new anti-Confederate Govern- 
ment under Albert Smith was too weak to govern. It was comprised of those 
who opposed Confederation per se, as well'as those who objected only, to 
the actual terms of the Quebec agreement. These latter would be willing 
to support a revised scheme of Federation. In addition to the internal 
problems, the Smith Government was faced with external difficulties too. 
In the summer of 1865, the American administration gave notice that they 
^^Ibid., 4 Jan. 1866. 
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would not renew the Reciprocity Treaty when it expired in 1866. At a 
stroke, the Smith Government lost the American markets they had been 
counting on as an alternative to those offered by Confederation. The 
New Brunswick economy would be hard hit by such a loss; and Anglin’s 
complacent economic theories now seemed to have been built on sand. 
Anglin was to find another decision causing him greater anguish 
than this: the British Government decided not to accept the election 
results of 1865. On April 1, 1865, the Colonial Secretary, Edward 
Cardwell, pointed out in a memorandum to Gordon that the defense of the 
colony was a matter for the people there as well as for the British. In 
June, he instructed Gordon to: 
express the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's 
Government that...all the British North American Colonies 
should agree to unite in one Government....The Colonies 
must recognize a right and even acknowledge incumbent on 
the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just auth- 
ority any measures which they consider to be expedient on 
the part of the colonies with a view to their own defense. 17 
Anglin was furious. The Empire was deserting New Brunswick. From this 
time on, it becomes clear that Anglin's nationalism became very much 
narrower than before. Gordon refered to him as "the most determined isol- 
18 
ationist", and Anglin certainly felt betrayed by the Empire. The Premier, 
Albert Smith, was in England when the Cardwell memorandum arrived, and it 
was Anglin, left in chkrge during Smith's absence, who drafted the offic- 
ial reply. In it, he strongly stated the right of the people and govern- 
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ment of New Brunswick to decide on their own affairs. He felt that the 
British Government were to abide by that decision: 
To confer on this Province a right of self-government 
would have been mockery if...the wish of the mother 
country was in all cases to be followed.,.whatever the 
opinion of those to whom the power of judging has been 
entrusted...and who...consider themselves not unable 
to judge with respect to their own affairs. When a wish 
is expressed by Her Majesty’s Government, it will be 
received with that deference which is due to suggestions 
emanating from so high a source...but if such views 
should unfortunately not coincide with the views of those 
on whom alone the responsibility for action in the 
Province falls, the Committee [of the Council] 
feel assured that Her Majesty’s Government will expect 
and desire that the Government of this Province should 
act according to their own convictions of right, and in 
conformity with the sentiments of the people they 
represent. 20 
This passage indicates the direction in which Anglin’s mind was moving 
at this time. He was not slow to state that ’’loyalty" need not mean 
21 
"submission to the will of colonial secretaries". Gordon referred to 
22 
Anglin as "ahelrish rebel", however inaccurately, and this would be 
used against Anglin to discredit the Smith Government. There was outrage 
among the Confederation supporters at the tone of Anglin’s memorandum of 
July, and this added to the strains on the Government. Gordon entered 
into talks with Tilley to try and arrange a change of government, as his 
orders from London demanded. Things began to move quickly for Anglin. 
20 
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In November, Charles Fisher, a prominent supporter of Confederation, 
and one-time Premier of the Province, was elected in a by-election for 
the York constituency against the government candidate. On the day the 
news of the victory was sent to Cardwell by Gordon, the Lieutenant-Gov- 
ernor also informed his superior of Anglin's resignation from the 
Executive Council. The two events were, in fact, closely linked together. 
Anglin's retirement from the Council immediately after Fisher's 
election was ostensibly over the issue of the European and North American 
Railway, which he had wanted built by the Government, but which was given 
23 
out on contract to a private company. But it is very likely that Anglin 
was seen as weakening Smith's administration in the light of the loyalty 
issue. The fact that he was thought of as being a Young Ireland rebel 
only complicated things. The problem for Anglin was that he had never 
stated clearly whether or not he had actually been "out" in 1848. He 
preferred to leave it a mystery and so, perhaps, .claimttheggiorywwithout 
risk. Now the risk had caught up with him. Anglin had always been the 
object of Confederate attacks on the Government, not only because of his 
fierce campaign against Federation, but also because of his Catholicism 
and his perceived influence on his Irish co-religionists. In the York 
campaign, Fisher made little reference to the Confederation issue, and 
concentrated instead on Anglin's connections with an Irish-American 
organization, the Fenian Brotherhood. The attacks on Anglin's loyalty 
were probably unfair, given his oft-repeated declarations of commitment 
to New Brunswick and Empire. But it was effective and could be used with 
23 
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great effect against anti-Oonfederation candidates in the future. 
II. The Fenians 
Anglin was not the only Irish Canadian to be affected by the rise 
of the Fenians in these years. The Fenian Brotherhood and their Irish 
wing, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, or IRB, played a vital part in 
the history of Confederation and the new nationality. They would cause 
the Irish Catholics of British North America great anguish as they were 
forced to choose sides in a clash of loyalties that would finally put an 
end to a distinctive Irish Catholic presence in the political life of 
the North American Colonies. The Fenian Brotherhood was a totally new 
phenomenon in Irish history: the first Irish-American revolutionary 
organization. There had been many emigre groups of Irishmen in the United 
States since the time of the United Irishmen, but this was an American- 
inspired movement, taking its identity from the environment of the Irish 
ghettoes of the American north-east. The Irish in America had developed 
what may best be described as a split mentality. On the one hand, they 
lived in the every-day world of struggle and opportunity that was the 
United States, On the other hand, however, they still dreamt of the "old 
country"; and with time and distance came distortion. Soon the Ireland 
of reality was lost beneath the wei'ght of memory and romance. The Irish- 
American was born, with a mythology of his own that took little notice 
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of reality and thrived on dreams and emotions 
The acknowledged leaders of the Fenians in the early years of 
the 1860's were John O'Mahony and James Stephens. Both men had taken part 
in the Young Ireland rebellion in 1848 and had fled to France afterwards. 
Stephens, in particular, had been active in what little fighting took 
place in the abortive rising, and spent his time in France involved in 
European revolutionary groups, learning the ways and methods of secret 
societies. O'Mahony moved to the United States in 1852, where he got 
involved with Irish emigre groups. He was a mentally unstable individual, 
having spent time in mental hospitals, but had produced a good translation 
of an Irish history into English. In 1858 he wrote to Stephens on behalf 
of fellow emigres, asking his friend to set up a revolutionary group in 
Ireland to be financed and supported by the Irish-American community. 
Stephens accepted eagerly, being careful to ensure that he would have 
total control over the new organization. The initiative, however, came 
from the United States. Stephens ' lieutenant, John.O'Leary, admitted later 
25 
that the Fenians were "an American society, formed in the United States". 
For the moment, however, the Fenians were organized on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The Irish section does not directly concern us here; it 
is enough to say that it appears to have been more of a social, rather 
than a political event. Men joined the Fenians to enjoy the social and 
24 
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recreational aspects rather than for ideological purposes. O’Leary was 
forced to comment on the rather lackadaisical attitude to military 
planning that characterized the movement in Ireland. In the Irish Fenian 
newspaper, the Irish People, he said: 
Surely there is a time and a place for all things, and 
midday marching before a police barracks is neither 
rational as to time or place. 26 
The American parent group was far more serious about itself than the 
Irish, and Stephens’ failure to promote even an attempt at rebellion 
before 1865 led to widespread dissatisfaction.among American Fenians. 
When, in that year, the British authorities raided the offices of the 
Irish People, arresting O’Leary and almost the entire Fenian leadership 
in Ireland, it provoked a strong reaction in the United States that was 
to have profound eoxtsequejices for British North America. 
The Fenian movement in America had been given a boost by the 
military ardour of the Civil War years. The Fenians thrived on the anti- 
British sentiment of these years, and, in return for half-promises of 
future aid in Fenian actions against England, the administration in 
Washington found in the Fenians an effective recruiting agent among the 
Irish-American people. Men were encouraged to join up to gain experience 
that would be later used a'gainst England. This was no empty promise; by 
the end of the Civil War, there were thousands of Irish-Americans trained 
in arms and ready to turn against Britain under the Fenian banner. But 
for a period, the only fighting done was in the form of verbal disputes 
with other Fenians. There had been developing within the movement a 
^^Irish People, (Dublin), 12 Mar. 1866. Cited in Comerford, R.V., 
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school of thought that advocated an assault on the British American 
Provinces rather than @ne on Ireland. The amazing plan was that the 
Fenians would capture Canada and use it as a base of operations against 
England. The feelings of British Americans was expected to be with the 
Fenians, since these good republicans could not imagine that anyone 
would be satisfied living under the British Crown, itephens' failure 
to rise in Ireland gave this alternative some'credibility. Quite simply, 
there seemed to be nothing else to do, since Ireland was so closely 
controlled by the authorities. The ’’Canada" wing of the Fenians took 
control of the Fenian Convention in Philadelphia in 1865, and O’Mahony's 
powers as President were limited by the Fenian Senate which later split 
formally with the O’Mahony wing. Stephens tried desperately to heal the 
split, coming out strongly against the Senate wing. The new leaders, 
William Roberts and Thomas Sweeny, were held in high suspicion by the 
Irish branch who saw any deviation from the primary purpose of freeing 
Ireland as detrimental to the Fenian cause. O'Leary commented: 
O’Mahony was not, indeed, an ideal leader, but he was an 
ideal Irishman, while Colonel Roberts CP^ssident of the 
Senate) and most of the Senate were men of whom we knew 
little and for whom we cared less. 27 
The immediate result of this split, ,so far. as the Irish Catholics of 
British America were concerned, was to bring them under suspicion once 
again. The Fenian.menace against the Provinces would" haunt the Irish 
Catholics, especially those in public office, for the next five years. 
27 
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Of all the Irish Catholicsjournalists and politicians in British 
America, it was D’Arcy McGee who most clearly saw the danger Fenianism 
posed, not just to the Irish Catholic community, but more especially to 
the hopes for a new nationality under Confederation. From his earliest 
days in Canada he had spoken out against any group that sought to carry 
on the feuds of Ireland in British America. It was on this matter that 
he judged the Orange Order unCanadian, and in his remarks on sectarian 
secret societies there is a foreshadowing of his opposition to Fenianism: 
We all belong to one lawful political brotherhood - the State. 
The civil hierarchy we obey....This is the only oath-bound 
association, with authority to command our'.political action 
to which a good citizen can belong. 28 
If any co-religionist of ours should so forget himself as to 
propagate a secret society among Catholics, we volunteer our 
heartiest aid to arrest the evil and punish the offender. 29 
It is impossible to know just when McGee learned of the existence of the 
Fenians. His first public attack on. them followed the Trent crisis in 
1861. He learned that many of those who had opposed his attempt to raise 
an Irish Catholic regiment were actually Fenians from the United States 
who had come to Montreal for the purpose of opposing him. He condemned 
3 
them in a letter, to the Montreal Herald, under the name Civis Canadiensis. 
Then, in March 1864, a new Irish association in Montreal, the Hibernian 
Society, held a St. Patrick's Day banquet during which, it was reported, 
"one speaker said he hoped the day was fast approaching when all Irishmen 
would be a Fenian Brotherhood, and Britain as a nation would cease to 
28 
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31 .... 
exist". This association was to become the core of Fenian activity in 
British America arid McGee was quick to reveal its roots. In a letter to 
the Montreal Gazette on March 23, he expressed regret that any Irishman 
in Canada would get involved with the Fenians, and he laid great stress 
on the fact that O’Mahony was a "spiritualist" who had spent some time 
in a mental asylum. Then he expressed .his own strategy for dealing with 
the organization: 
For my part, I advise that both the punishment of publicity 
and the penalties of the law should at once be put in force 
against these propagandists. Seditious societies are like 
what the farmers in Ireland used to say of scotch grass; that 
only way to destroy it was to cut it up by the roots, burn it 
to powder, and cast the ashes to the four winds. 32 
Clearly, McGee had no sympathy with the Fenians and meant to do all he 
could to defy them in Canada and punish.them by publicity in order to 
protect Irish Catholics from their own emotional involvement. 
That there was such a danger was at first hard to believe. It 
seemed unlikely that Fenianism was very popular in British North America 
simply because there was no visible sign of such an organization. Besides, 
McGee himself claimed that there collld not be more than a few Irishmen 
foolish enough to get involved with such a mad scheme. However, it does 
appear that those few were active in their allegiance to the Fenians. 
The Hibernian Benevolent Society had been.formed in .1858 as a defense 
force for Catholics in Toronto after the murder of a Catholic named 
Sheedy during the St. Patrick’s Day parade that year. Although not a 
^^Ibid., 19 Mar. 1864. 
^^Ibid., 23 Mar. 1864. 
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Fenian group at first, its leader^ Michael Murphy, was Head Centre of 
33 
the Toronto Fenians by 1860, with a Circle of about sixty members. 
With the support of these Fenians, Murphy was able to gain overall 
control over the Hibernian Society and use its events as a cover for 
Fenian fund-raising. It was significant that the main Fenian group in 
Canada was found in the Orange city of Toronto. Both organizations fed 
off the fear of the other among their communities. But until 1865 there 
was little to fear from Canadian Fenians. The organization in Ireland 
was almost dormant for most of these years, and the American Fenians were 
too busy fighting in the Civil War to bother much with British North 
America, other than to threaten and bluster. Murphy was able to gain the 
goodwill of the Catholic hierarchy and the Hibernians became a respectable 
force in the life of Toronto’s Irish Catholic community. 
Why then, was McGee so violently opposed to the Fenians? His many 
speeches and letters on the subject are very strongly-worded, denouncing 
Fenians as subversive, demonic and a threat to the Irish Catholic position 
both in British America and in the United States. It may well be that, 
after condemning the Orange Order as strongly as he did in the New Era, 
McGee felt obliged to do the same.with what, after all, seemed to be an 
organization with little relevance or power in Canada and therefore of 
negligible political consequence. There was, in short, no obvious political 
danger in attacking them. The political capital to be made, howeverip was 
significant. McGee needed to expand his political base beyond the Irish 
Senior, Hereward, The Fenians and Canada, CToronto, 1978), p. 51. 
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community of Montreal West if he were to survive in Canadian politics, 
and attacking the Fenians gave him credibility with other ethnic and 
religious groups. Not least, perhaps, it showed how serious he was 
about creating a new nationality in British North America in which old 
feuds would have no place. 
McGee was not the only Irish Catholic journalist speaking out on 
the Fenian issue, even though he was the earliest and most vocal. James 
Moylan also condemned the Irish-American group in the columns of the 
Canadian Freeman. In his first reference to the Fenians in March 1864, 
Moylan, commenting on McGee’s letter to the Montreal. Gazette, said: 
We are not aware that there are any Fenians in Toronto, 
If so, they keep the matter a profound secret. 34 
A week later, he was admitting that the movement did actually exist there 
and was making inroads throughout Canada. He thought it was time to make 
some public comment on them, so he asked: 
Does the Fenian organization recommend itself to the approval 
of Irishmen? should it be encouraged in Canada?...All good 
Irishmen,abroad, return a universal negative 
response. 35 
In condemning the Fenians, Moylan laid great stress on the fact that it 
was an organization which had been condemned by the Catholic hierarchy 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Fenianism would also be a danger to the 
Irish position in Canada: 
This is an.association eminently calculated to beget hostile 
feelings between those who have hitherto lived in peace and 
34 
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harmony, and that would unquestionably act to the prejudice 
and injury of the Irish Catholic in Canada is self-evident. 36 
Following this statement with quotes from various Catholic Irish news- 
papers, Moylan showed that the Fenians had been condemned by all serious 
Irishmen. In a second article in the sajne issue, he turned to more 
immediate concerns with regard to Fenianism and echoed the thoughts of 
McGee on the new loyalties Irish Catholics had in Canada: 
We have all, it is to be presumed, adopted, voluntarily, 
this country as our home....But, orrce having made the 
choice of living here, it is every man’s duty to be loyal 
and true to the Government of the Province.... Let it 
[Fenianism] get a footing here, and let its members be 
ever so few, will it not attach to the Irish Catholic 
the stigma of disloyalty? Will we not - and deservedly, 
unless we protect against it - be considered traitors 
in disguise? 37 
Moylan expressed the fear that Fenianism-would only lead to the return 
of "no Irish need apply" attitudes to Canada, thereby risking all that 
they had gained. He then added: 
It is not our intention to question their sincerity 
of purpose, or to diiscuss the prudence or folly, the 
righteousness or unrighteousness, of their aims and 
motives. We have simply to ask. Does Fenianism commend 
itself to the approval of Irishmen? 38 
Such was the vehemence of McGee’s campaign that he took Moylan to 
task for not being more strict with the villains. In a letter to Moylan 
in October 1865, McGee lashed out against the motives, unrighteousness and 








We have in the way the worst obstacle the devil has ever 
invented for the Irish, an irreligious revolutionary society 
in which patriotism takes the garb of indifferentism, of 
hostility to religion. This is the enemy of- the Irish cause 
in our time; and it is that every man should combat, first 
and foremost. 
...it is not honest men gone astray that we have to 
deal with, but dogmatic, anti-clerical demogogues, strong 
in their pride of opinion and eager for propagandism - a 
new sect, in fact, who aim at changing the heart and mind 
of Ireland - ie., the faith and feeling of the people - 
even more than its government. This sect is altogether 
novel in Irish history and it is not to be put down byth 
half-apologetic pleadings of 'good intentions!. 39 
McGee probably could claim to know more about the Fenians than 
Moylan. Moylan had stated in April 1864 that the Hibernian Society was 
not a Fenian group and that ninety-nine out of a hundred Irishmen were 
loyal to the Government Moylan was quickly disabused about the 
Hibernians. In response to his claim on their behalf, the society passed 
a motion stating: 
While disclaiming all connection whatever with the Fenian 
Brotherhood, and publicly putting on record, the fact ofat 
our being established for other and different objects to thos 
those said to be entertained by that body, we would nevertheless 
make it known that any organization having in view the 
independence of our Native Land shall ever enlist and will 
have our warmest and most heartfelt symapthies. 41 
This resolution was published in the Irish Canadian, a newspaper which 
the Hibernian Society had established in January 1863, adding an eloquent 
voice to the group of Irish Catholic journalists working in British 
North America. The publisher of the Irish Canadian was Patrick Boyle, the 
McGee to Moylan, 27 Oct. 1865, quoted in Burns, Robin, "D'Arcy McGee 
and the Fenians", in Harmon, Maurice, i Fenians, and Fenianism, 
(Dublin, 1968), p. 79. 
^^Canadian Freeman, 7 Apr. 1864. 
^^Irish Canadian, (Toronto), 27 Apr. 1864. 
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Treasurer o£ the Hibernian.Society. The Irish Canadian was very open in 
treatment o£ Ireland's wrongs, and equally clear about what it £elt the 
solution to be: 
We are persuaded that liberty £ollows only a£ter victory, 
and that victory must be purchased by the sharp edge o£ 
the sword. Moral £orce we look upon as a mere sham to 
blind and deceive the people. 42 
The newspaper carried advertisements £or the Fenian.Fair in Chicago in 
43 
1864, an event organized to raise funds for the Fenians. It quoted 
with warm approval Michael Murphy's remarks at the St. Patrick's Day 
celebrations in Toronto in 1863 that "Ireland's liberty must be obtained 
44 
only by blood". 
There was much more to the Irish Canadian and the Hibernians than 
this type of remark might suggest. For allied to this open support of 
Fenianism and armed revolution in Ireland was an equally open loyalty to 
Canada and its government. Boyle, like McGee and Moylan, believed that 
Canada offered the Irish "a fair field...to attain high and useful posit- 
ions"; and he encouraged his readers, "To attain them, let us labour - 
let us aspire".What, in fact', existed in the thinking of the Can- 
adian Fenians was a split similar to that existing in Irish-American 
thought. Whereas the Irish-Americans viewed Ireland through romantic 
dreams of exile, while yet living in the real world,of poverty, disease, 
"^^Ibid., 4 Mar. 1863. 
^^Ibid., 17 Feb. 1864. 
"^"^Ibid., 18 Mar. 1863. 
"^^Ibid., 11 Feb. 1863. 
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and American xenophobia, the Canadian Irish could recognize the truth 
of McGee’s words: 
The British flag does indeed fly here, but it casts no 
shadow. 46 
In fact, as they saw the fruits of enlightened British rule in Canada, 
the Irish began to question even more strenuously the short-sightedness 
of British policy in Ireland. Boyle, Murphy and their companions could 
not see any discrepancy in being loyal to the Crown in British North 
America and advocating, plotting and preaching rebellion against that 
same Crown in Ireland. Even as they acknowledged their support for 
Fenianism, the Hibernians passed a resolution at the same meeting, 
printed beside the first in.the Irish Canadian, stating: 
We yield to none in our loyalty to Canada, the free and 
well-governed land of our adoption. 47 
This compartmentalized thinking rejected all accusations of treason as 
unwarranted: 
Before the charge of’treasonable utterances’ can be 
substantiated against us, it must be shown that we 
have some design upon the person of our sovereign 
or the integrity of the Commonwealth. 48 
So wrote Boyle in accusations made by the Toronto^Leader and Globe after 
Murphy’s remarks at the St. Patrick’s Day events of 1863. 
McGee and Moylan, unlike, Boyle, believed that continuing to print 
46 
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anti-British articles in Canada would only bring the cry of ’’Irish 
rebels” to the lips of the English in the Provinces. How were any other 
than the Irish expected to appreciate the fine distinction between 
loyalty to the Crown in North America and treason to the same Crown in 
Ireland? McGee preached an end to Irish feuds in Canada; so did Boyle 
and Murphy. The pages of the Irish Canadian from its earliest days 
called for unity among Irishmen of all classes and religions in order 
to make Canada a better nation. But whereas McGee believed it necessary 
to abandon certain provocative talk in order to create a new nationality 
out of the various ethnic groups, Boyle and Murphy held that the Irish 
in Canada ought to usettheir freedom on behalf of their homeland. When 
McGee spoke openly against the Fenians in 1864, Boyle turned against 
him in a vicious attack on ’’the vulger little arch-hypocrite”, the ’’Goula 
of Griffintown”.'^^ (Goula was a Fenian term for an informer)} From April 
of 1864 relations between the two opposing Irish.Catholicsgroups deter- 
iorated rapidly. Boyle attacked McGee and Moylan as self-appointed 
judges of the Irish: ’’the would-be Dictator to^the Irishmen in Canada”, 
as he called McGee. 
As Moylan tried to undercut Fenian support in Canada by pointing 
out the fact that the organization had been .condemned.by the hierarchy 
in Ireland and.North America, he accused them of dishonesty: 
^^Ibid., 9 Mar. 1864. 
^^Ibid., 27 Apr. 1864. 
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Tlieseeinoy.tllingf'P^^t^io'ts care as little about Ireland and 
her destiny as they do about truth and manliness. Their 
sole object is to dupe as many of the unsophisticated and 
confiding as they possibly can, with the express view of 
making money out of the operation. 
...Let them seriously ask, what good result has Fenianism 
effected for Ireland or for Irishmen, at home or abroad? 
What possible goood is it likely to accomplish? Has it 
the sanction and blessing of the Church? 51 
Throughout 1865 this quarrel with Boyle continued, as the Irish Canadian 
tried to make light of the Church’s opposition to Fenianism, always 
eager to print speeches and letters by nationalisttbishops like Lynch 
of Toronto and MacHale of Tuam, in order to appear as one with consti- 
tutional nationalists. 
Until the end of 1865, this could be seen as merely a division 
between two opposing groups of Irishmen trying to find an acceptable 
form for the expression of their Irishness and Canadian nationalism. 
Each wanted the Irish Catholics of Canada to be accepted and to be loyal 
to their adopted land. One group thought that could only be done by 
toning down the old nationalism; the other group considered such a move 
base treachery. But with the Fenian split of 1865, and especially after 
the decision by the Roberts faction in January 1866 to plan and launch 
an invasion of Canada, this domestic quarrel took on a very different 
complexion. Neither the Hibernians nor McGee had gained from the dispute. 
The Hibernians and Boyle had been so open in their allegiance to the 
Fenian cause, that no amount of loyal declarations would remove the 
stigma of disloyalty in the face of Fenian aggression. As for McGee, he 
51 Canadian Freeman, 3 Apr. 1865. 
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had been forced into such strong denunciations of revolutionary groups 
that he had alienated much of the Irish Catholic community in the 
process. 
It is difficult to know whether McGee would have gone so far with 
his condemnation of Fenianism without Boyle’s provocative articles. But 
once Fenianism gained a mouthpiece in Canada, McGee felt bound to oppose 
it. He himself had been taunted on more than one occasion by references 
to his part in the Young Ireland rebellion, as well as to his writings 
in the United States. Of all the Irish Catholics in Canada, he was the 
most vulnerable to any reaction against Fenian aggression. If he did 
not speak out, he would be branded a fellow-traveller with Fenians. He 
had no c’poice. The premise on which he acted was that Fenians were as 
dangerous to the Irish position as the Orangemen. But whatever his own 
motives, Boyle's newspaper drove him to ever more violent condemnations 
of the Fenian form of Irish nationalism. The effects were not always 
what he intended. Boyle published a letter in the Irish Canadian in April 
1864 written by a Catholic who might naturally have been a McGee supp- 
orter. He expressed McGee's fault accurately; 
I don't deny that there is much truth in what Mr. McGee 
has lately written against the Fenians in Canada; but 
the tone of authority over us which Mr. McGee assumes in 
his writings, and the paternal air which he adopts,... 
are felt as very insulting by many who quite agree with 
him in his estimate of Fenianism. 52 
As a Minister of the Government of Canada, as well as an intimate with 
many Irish nationalists in the United States, McGee had sources of 
information on the Fenians that other writers lacked. In addition, he 
52 
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was the only Irish Catholic journalist in British North America who had 
actually been a rebel. He knew many of the Fenians personally and had 
been involved with that school of Irish nationalism since 1846. To him, 
the Fenians were just another name for the republicans he had come in 
conflict with in the United States from 1849. But his inside knowledge 
was expressed in what was seen to be an insulting, patronizing manner 
that only served to alienate the very people he sought to reach. He 
well recognized that the Irish are easily attracted to emotional appeals 
to nationalism. The language of the Fenians was designed to trigger a 
very Irish response: emotional, romantic and irrational. McGee’s mistake 
was that he appealed to the rational side of the Irish; he tried to make 
them see what they did not , want to see. It may''be said that he forgot 
that the Irish are easily led, but very hard to drive. This was something 
Boyle understood, and he was always careful to pay lip service to popular 
figures in the Irish nationalist pantheon. In spite of his dismissal of 
moral force as a "sham", he was careful to praise the memory of O'Connell 
and the Grattan era. 
In the summer of 1865 McGee made what was probably the biggest 
mistake of his career. While visiting Ireland as a Canadian representative 
at an Exhibition in Dublin, he travelled to his home town of Wexford and 
gave a talk on his "Twenty Years in North America". He was determined to 
strike a ringing blow against Fenianism and everything it stood for; and 
in his attempt he managed to alienate almost every section of Irish 
nationalists, both at home and abroad. He began by stating his views on 
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his Young Ireland days: 
I am not ashamed of Young Ireland - why should I be? 
Politically we were a pack of fools, but we were honest 
in our folly, and no man need blush at forty for the follies 
of one-and-twenty, unless, indeed, he still perseveres in 
them. 53 
Then, to distance Young Ireland from the Fenians, he continued: 
Some...seem to think that as I was a Young Ire lander some 
twenty years ago I ought to show some leniency for them. 
Why, Young Ireland, as I am free to say, was politically 
a folly, but the men were honest and manly. Men like 
Thomas Davis and Duffy and others still living would have 
scorned to range themselves with these Punch and Judy 
Jacobins whose sole scheme of action seems to be to get 
their heads broken. 54 
During the speech McGee also condemned the lifestyle forced on the Irish 
immigrants in the United States and spoke truthfully and forcefully 
about the dishonesty and immorality common among the poorer sections of 
the Irish in the cities of the east coast. It was a devastatingly honest 
speech, one which McGee had written out in advance, contrary to his.usual 
style, in order not,to be carried away by his emotions. He wanted it to 
be a calm, reasoned and fair statement of facts which he believed the 
Irish needed to hear. But once again he failed to realize that what the 
Irish needed to hear and what they wanted to hear were two different 
things.. McGee had done the unforgiveable: he had made the Irish face up 
to the truth and pulled down their hallowed myths. By 1865 Young Ire- 
land's rebellion was a myth in the history of Irish nationalism: McGee 
called them fools. Irrelevant that he had been one and ought to know; 




it was unpalatabletherefore wrong. The United States as a refuge for 
poor Irish exiles, the land of opportunity, equal rights and freedom 
was also a myth. McGee spoke of anti-Catholic nativism, crooked Irish- 
American political bosses, and Irish girls forced into prostitution. 
It was all true, but what did that matter? His friends of Young Ireland 
were angry and turned against him, even though many of them, too, would 
come to the same conclusions in their turn. His crime was that he expressed 
his views loudly and publicly. 
It was not until he returned to Canada that McGee realized how 
seriously his position had been jeopardized by the Wexford speech. Boyle 
naturally condemned him strongly; but the fact that even Moylan was not 
solidly behind him on this issue was a real shock. Moylan was undoubtedly 
embarrassed by the speech, since he was so closely associated with McGee. 
Boyle had even taunted him about McGee's influence on the Canadian Free- 
man in 1864: 
What property we possess is our own and no member of 
parliament holds a mortgage on it. 55 
Although Moylan defended McGee's comments on the Fenians and the Irish 
in the United States, he distanced himself from McGee's remarks about 
Young Ireland, printing an editorial from the Dublin Nation, the former 
Young Ireland journal. The Nation praised McGee for his oratory and for 
his courage. They even agreed with his opinion of the 1848 fiasco: 
[The leaders of 1848] refer to it as a disastrous error 
into which they were swept by that surge of popular 
excitement, which, rising at Paris, spread through Europe, 
Irish Canadian, 7 Sep. 1864. 
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and momentarily bore away the strongest minds with 
irresistible force. 56 
This was what McGee wanted to warn against in Wexford: that excitement 
that bore away the strongest minds which he saw manifested in Fenianism. 
But, as the Nation pointed out, he had not made that clear: 
Nevertheless we take exception to Mr. McGee’s references to 
the politics of the:lYoungXIreland Party...not so much for what 
he does say, as for what he does not say, while touching on the 
subject at all, do we take objection....To confess or condemn 
folly may. be highly praiseworthy; but not to define more 
clearly the limits to which such condemnation was meant to 
reach, is, in the present case, to abandon to aspersion, if 
not, indeed, indirectly to cast aspersion upon the noble 
principles... and useful labours of the 'Young Ireland Party'.57 
That illustrated McGee's predicament. To remain loyal to his new nation, 
he had to condemn publicly the Fenian threat. But to qualify that in the 
way the Nation, and Moylan, required, would be to risk giving legitimacy 
to Fenian propaganda about British "tyranny" in Ireland. Trying to walk 
that thin line, McGee fell foul of both sides, republicans and constit- 
utionalists ajike. He seemed to be condemning all Irish nationalists in 
one stroke. It was a dangerous mistake; but one made in all honesty in 
an attempt to clarify the divided loyalties of Irish Canadians. Of 
course, he was right in what he said, but he could have been more sensi- 
tive. Surely McGee of all men should have realized how little the Irish 
appreciate having the truth told to them about their heroes and their 
martyrdom? 
In October 1865, the authorities in Ireland moved against the 
56 
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Fenians, arresting the leadership and effectively ending any hope of 
a rebellion there for some time. Although Stephens esdapedrrather 
quickly, Moylan felt justified to write, "the bubble is beginning to 
C O 
burst". Almost immediately, Moylan and McGee started writing articles 
and making speeches calling for an amelioration of conditions in Ireland. 
59 
Moylan referred to British policy in Ireland as "blind and infatuated". 
Speaking at a dinner held in his honour in November, McGee also called 
on Britain to deal fairly and justly with Ireland. The dinner was an 
attempt to restore his prestige among the Irish Catholic community, and 
was attended by Macdonald and Cartier, and other leading lights of 
Canadian politics and society. Once again, McGee lampooned the Fenians: 
They liberate Ireland! Why don’t they liberate the Ireland 
at their own doors, from the poisonous and murderous 
surroundings of the tenement houses of New York and Boston? 
Heetried to explain why he said what he did in Wexford: 
I thought it necessary to show my countrymen the reverse 
of the American medal always glistening before their eyes. 60 
McGee had been thrown off his stride by the reaction to his speech at 
Wexford, and by the end of 1865 he was trying to restore some of his 
forjner credibility with his Irish Catholic constituency in Canada. But 
Boyle was in no position to benefit from McGee’s discomfort. He, too, 
ended the year in an uncomfortable position, caught by surprise by the 
threatened Fenian invasion of Canada. To add to his discomfort, the 
^^Ibid., 5 Oct. 1865. 
^^Ibid., 12 Oct. 1865. 
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Hibernians had taken part in a show of strength in November 1865 that 
was primarily designed to show the organization and discipline of the 
society. On Guy Fawkes night, November 5, there were rumours that the 
Orangemen were going to bum O’Connell in effigy. That evening, the 
Hibernians gathered in front of Queen’s Park in Toronto. Then, while a 
group remained there, the rest divided into sections and marched away 
to the four corners of the city. A number of shots were fired, then all 
was still; the Hibernians had dispersed. There was no violence or riot, 
but the very efficiency with which the drill was carried out struck fear 
and suspicion in the minds of the Protestant population. 
As 1866 dawned, Boyle was left with the dilemma of repudiating any 
move against Canada as a loyal Canadian citizen, after encouraging and 
abetting for years the very men who were now threatening his adopted 
land. Divided loyalties began to catch up with the Hibernians. D’Arcy 
McGee, and to a lesser extent James Moylan, were also caught in divided 
loyalties. They had tried so hard to educate the Irish Catholics in 
their duties to the new nationality that they had alienated many, angered 
more, and had lost a great deal of credibility among their natural cons- 
tituency. In many ways, their disagreements had been more about the speed 
at which the Irish should become Canadians; there was no doubt about the 
desirability of the process. The question they had to answer was: how 
much of the Irish can Irish-Canadians retain and for how long? How much 
Irish nationalism is compatible with a developing Canadian nationality? 
Can loyalty to the British Crown in Canada be allowed co-exist with 
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advocating treason against that same Crown in Ireland, where the situ- 
ation is entirely different? The questions were answered differently 
by both sides, but each was trying honestly to do what was right for 
the future of the Irish in Canada, their adopted land. It might have 
resolved itself in time, but time had run out. The events of 1866 
should have united Boyle and McGee against a common threat, but by then 
the bitterness and suspicion built up since 1864 made that practically 
impossible. 
III. Anglin and the Fenians. 
In New Brunswick, Timothy Anglin realized from the beginning, as 
McGee did not, how dangerous it was for an Irish public figure to be 
seen speaking out against Irish nationalists. His problem was essent- 
ially the same as that of his Canadian rival: if he did not appear to 
condemn the Fenians, he would rikk being branded a sympathiser. As his 
biographer admits: 
Whatever position he took, discussion of Fenianism could 
only hurt him politically, and he undoubtedly felt that 
on this issue silence was the better part of valour. 61 
Neither silence, nor clear statements of principle would be of use to 
61 
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him, and might even harm his standing in the Province. As far as he 
could, Anglin declined comment on Fenianism, and where it was necessary, 
he tried to play both sides at once. He tried to distance himself from 
the Fonians* methods while approving their motives and aims. He showed 
this equivocal position as early as 1863: 
Revolution is always a fearful, often a wicked thing, and 
the views of these Fenians may be visionary, their hopes 
may be baseless; some may think their intentions wicked 
and their schemes rash and wild; but those who approved 
of revolution in Tuscany and Parma must at least admit 
that the grievances which the Fenians would redress are 
unparalleled in their enormity, even if the means by which 
they would redress them should not meet with approval. 62 
Anglin generally ignored the Fenians until other St. John newspapers 
raiseddthe rumour of Fenian activities in New Brunswick early in 1865. 
He stated then in the Morning Freeman: 
We are satisfied that no such body exists here, and that 
no attempt has been made to establish such a body. When 
we have any reason to apprehend that any such attempt may 
be made, we will not hesitate to say what we think of it 
in very plain and unmistakeable language. 63 
But, in fact, Anglin avoided ever saying exactly what he thought of the 
Fenians. Instead, he refused to add any comment to reports of Fenian 
events. He reportedtthe Convention in Philadelphia, when Roberts and 
Sweeny began to take charge, without any comment, either for or against 
them.^^ He reprinted an article on Stephens without comment,' although 
the article certainly made Stephens out to be quite a romantic and 
6 2 
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mysterious figure. 
Anglin was .to pay for this ambivalence towards the Fenians. 
When Fisher stood as candidate in York in November 1865, he centred his 
campaign, not on Confederation, but on Anglin. Using the Fenians as an 
issue for the first time, Fisher accused Anglin of being in sympathy 
with them, and therefore condemned the government of which Anglin was a 
member. It was a nasty ploy to.identify Fenianism and Catholicism, and 
Anglin, as the Irish Catholic leader in the Province, of being in league 
with the organization. 
The reckoning day is at hand, Monday next will decide 
whether Mr. Anglin is to rule this Province, or this 
Province to rule Mr. Anglin; whether loyalty or Fenianism 
is the chief power in the land. 66 
It was an unfair and scurrilous attack, typical of the tactics 
Fisher used in politics, but it worked. In spite of Anglin’s declaration 
that ’’Confederation, and only Confederation, is the issue", the loyalty 
cry was effective and Fisher won the seat. Anglin even had to deal with 
a fotged cheque made out to "H.C.T.W.Anglin which surfaced during the 
campaign. Anglin accused the Confederates of trying to make out that he 
6 7 
was Head Centre CH.C.) of a Fenian circle in St. John. But it is 
true that he had left himself open to such attacks by his refusal to 
unequivocally condemn Fenianism, either in the United States, or in 
^^Ibid., 21 Oct. 1865. 
^Reporter, CF^edericton), 3 Nov. 1865. 
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British North America. The great supporter of the Imperial link was 
being denounced as a Fenian! As in the case of Boyle and McGee, this 
could have remained a local issue, part of the petty politicking in 
New Brunswick. Unfortunately for Anglin, and the anti-Confederates with 
whom he was identified, 1866 was to make Fenianism the central issue in 
the Confederation scheme. 
Lieutenant-Governor Gordon was determined to use the internal 
divisions in the Smith Government to bring about a change in their 
attitude to Confederation. In February, Smith himself went to Washington 
to try and salvage something from the Reciprocity Treaty, but he had no 
success there. Under pressure of events. Smith negotiated with Gordon 
and agreed to include a passage in the Speech from the Throne favouring 
the scheme of Federation adopted at Quebec. This was done in March 1866, 
but debate on the Speech drifted leisurely for five weeks, as neither 
side wanted to bring the matter to a head. Smith was no true convert to 
Confederation, and Tilley had no intention of allowing Smith be the one 
to bring Confederation to New Brunswick. Gordon was losing patience with 
all, and arranged with his Legislative Council to receive a motion from 
them favouring the Quebec scheme. Smith was in a .quandary. As the official 
advisors to Gordon, his government had recommended forwarding the motion 
for more: consideration in London. By refusing to follow that advice, the 
Lieutenant-Governor had given Smith little choice but either to accept 
his actions, and the motion, or else to resign. After rejecting Gordon’s 
helpful advice that he .resign immediately. Smith had second thoughts and 
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lormally resigned on April 10, 1866. 
Anglin was predictably furious. From early February, he had been 
warning the Governor in careful statements in the Morning Freeman that 
any action oh Gordon's part to bring down the Smith Government would be 
69 
unconstitutional. When word leaked out that Gordon had decided to 
include the passage favouring Federation in the Throne Speech, Anglin 
claimed that it was a vicious rumour: 
If their statement is true, the conduct of the Government [sic] 
must atvonce have been the most extraordinary and 
unconstitutional ever known in this Province, for he must 
have caballed with the leaders or some members of the 
opposition. 70 
Of course, this is exactly what Gordon.had done. When it seemed likely 
that Gordon would press the issue, Anglin privately threatened to 
expose him publicly: 
Should a break-up take place we must at all events be able 
to tell the whole story so the public may iinderstand all 
about it and how we are hampered and thwarted by His 
Excellancy under the guise of friendship. 
Anglin promised to "skin him as I never yet skinned recreant and deceiver"^^ 
while in a letter to Gorddn he made more polite threats: 
I hope most sincerely that when an election does occur 
no party will have any cause or even plausible pretext 
for dragging your name before the public, and discussing 
your conduct or your motives. 72 
^^MacNutt, p. 446-7. 
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When Gordon went ahead with .his scheme and precipitated Smith's resig- 
nation, Anglin announced it.in the Freeman as a major constitutional 
crisis: 
Extraordinary Conduct of the Governor!1! 
The Government About to Resign. 
The Liberties of the People at Stake, 
Responsible Government Overthrown!!! 73 
He was vehement in his denunciation of Gordon's actions and saw them as 
a threat to the independence of New Brunswick, his constant concern: 
[Gordon's action] was, at all events, an act of gross 
despotism; of arbitrary power, to which no people who 
love, and who deserve freedom, can possibly submit. At 
one blow. Responsible Government was overthrown, the 
liberties of the people were destroyed, the independence 
of the Province was shattered. 74 
Anglin had no doubt that Gordon had been "acting under directions 
yr 
from Downing Street". He had long come to see Cardwell as "a tool of 
the Canadians", and even went so far as to make - a distinction between 
the evil designs of Her Majesty's Government and Tier Majesty's personal 
76 
wishes? no doubt in. order to remain loyal to something of the Empire. 
The Tilley group, both in the Assembly and in the election campaign now 
beginning, were known in the pages of the Freeman as the "Canadian Imper- 
ialist Party". Anglin tried to defend himself against charges of dis- 
78 
loyalty leveled at him during the Fisher campaign. This was essential 
73 
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if he were to have any chance of being re-elected for St. John. It was 
also about time he cleared the air on the subject: the Confederates had 
been very effective at portraying him as a Fenian sympathizer, and the 
Irish Catholics of the Province as secret Fenians to a man. It was up 
to Anglin to defend them against such attacks. Even Gordon had been able 
to assure Cardwell that the Irish of New Brunswick were almost totally 
loyal, but until their representative spbke out clearly and unequivocally 
on the issue, the suspicions would remain‘unchallenged. Unfortunately, 
Anglin could not bring himself to condemn the Fenians in the terms 
required by the situation. In a speech to the Assembly, he gave his 
equivalent to McGee's Wexford speech, trying to explain his involvement 
in Young Ireland and distance himself from the Fenians. .Unlike McGee, 
though, he did not change his mind about the validity of Young Ireland's 
rebellion: 
He believed-the Fenians were a mad and reckless body of 
men, who did not know what they were about, and with them 
he had no sympathy; but in regard to the movements of 
1847-48, he said he could scarcely speak impartially 
without strong feelings. 
Anglin spoke emotionally about the suffering, starvation and death he 
had witnessed in Ireland during the Famine years; how he had seen old 
and young, men, women and children die: 
He would be less than a man .and an Irishman, to speak 
harshly of the men..who took steps Which they believed 
would remedy this state of things. The Fenian party 
knew little or nothing of these things, and could not 
remedy them, if they now existed. 79 
79 
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It was reported that Anglin was overcome with emotion during this part 
of his speech, but he still failed in his main purpose. Some were 
confused about whether he had refused to- speak harshly of Young Ireland 
or the Fenians. He had still not condemned the latter outright, merely 
said he had no sympathy for them, and that left him open to the charge 
of disloyalty. McGee had realized that a new nationality required a 
break with the old; Anglin was not prepared.to abandon the defense of 
the Young Ireland days. 
Time had run out for clarifying-issues. In early April, the long- 
feared Fenian invasion seemed certain. In the first weeks of April, 
Fenians from various parts of the United States congregated-in Eastport, 
Calais, and other towns on the New Brunswick border with Maine. They 
were led by Bernard Doran.Killian, Treasurer of the O'Mahony Fenians, 
and one-time associate of Thomas D'Arcy McGee during the latter’s days in 
American journalism. The Fenians marched and made speeches, obviously 
preparing to cross the river into New Brunswick at the first opportunity. 
They flourished guns and knives and Indulged in wild rhetoric about 
Ireland and her freedom. They also made speeches about Confederation and 
how they were going to,save,the Provinces from having British schemes 
forced upon them. 
Killian made himself highly visible, giving speeches, visiting 
his ’’troops” at different points along the frontier. There.was near-panic 
in the towns across the river in New Brunswick.as the people lived in 
hourly fear, of attack and slaughter. Commercial life along the St. Croix 
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river was brought to a total stop. Gordon, who had been warning Card- 
well about exactly such an event months before quickly organized the 
militia and called on the military authorities in-Halifax to send ships 
to patrol the St. Croix, and prevent cfpssings. But other than capturing 
a British flag at gunpoint in a night raid on the island of Campobello, 
the Fenians kept to the right side of the border and confined themselves 
to speeches and marches. When the American Government sent General Meade 
to protect their side of the river, the Fenian "raid" came to an end, 
82 
and by early May almost all of the Fenians had returned home. The 
feared Fenian invasion was something of a damp squib. 
The impact of that damp squib was much greater than the event. 
Fenians had actually threatened British North American territory, and 
the accusations of disloyalty leveled against the Irish Catholics in 
general and Anglin in particular, gained added force. When it was learned 
that the Fenians had spoken out against Confederation, Tilley could 
claim that a vote for Confederation was a vote against Fenianism and 
disloyalty, and vice versa. Anglin was undoubtedly on the spot and he 
replied with the most amazing accusation of the campaign: he accused 
D’Arcy McGee of being behind.the Fenian raid and blamed the Canadians 
for.the entire event. It was an attempt on his part to shift the stigma 
of disloyalty away from himself and his party'and implicate McGee and 
on 
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and the Canadians instead. Both sides were attempting to use the cry 
o£ loyalty for their own purposes: Anglin declaring that Gordon and 
the pro-Confederation party had destroyed ^esp6hsfble‘igo^rnmen% and the 
independence of New Brunswick;;while Smith and his party were to be seen 
as the true patriots fighting cthe tyranny of Canadian Imperialism. 
Tilley, on the other hand, was trying to identify Anglin, and therefore 
the anti-Confederation cause, with Fenianism and disloyalty. The raid at 
Eastport seemed a highly fortuitous event for the Tilley campaign. 
Anglin believed the entire sequence of events was too much of a 
coincidence to be believeable. On April 21, he reported on the haphazard 
manner in which the Fenians were acting. It seemed to him that if the 
Fenians were seriously thinking of invading, they would hardly go about 
it so openly. He decided thaty in fact, the Fenians had no intention of 
invading New Brunswick and that their purpose was very different indeed: 
After looking at all these ^reumstancesy and the 
remarkable fact that these parties appear on the frontier 
just when the Governor is preparing for his coup d'etat, 
read what, according to the Journal, Mr. Killian said at 
Eastport:- 
'The Fenian Brotherhood saw that the British 
Government would force Confederation on the Provinces, 
and the Fenians won't let them force it on them. The 
Fenian Brotherhood will stand with people against their 
ministers.'... 
If Mr. Killian were in the pay of the Canadians, and Mr. 
McGee himself wrote his speech for him, he could not have 
said anything better suited to the purposes of the Canadian 
party....the Canadian party obviously believe that Mr. 
Killian's nonsense will help them and their cause amazingly. 
...the conclusion is irresistible that Mr. Killian is doing 
the work of the Canadian party, and in all probability with 
a full knowledge of what he is doing. 83 
83 
^Morning Freeman, 21 Apr. 1866. 
142 
What made the Fenian.activities even more suspicious was that they 
were not members of the Roberts faction: 
The movements of the Fenians on our frontier are quite 
inexplicable. The O^Mahony Fenians repudiated the idea 
of invading the Provinces, and ridiculed the proposition 
made by General Sweeny; yet we find that the small bands 
now collected at Eastport belong to that faction and that 
they are under the immediate control of the redoubtable 
B.D. Killian himself, once an intimate friend of the Hon. 
T.D. McGee and his associate in the management of the 
American Celt, a rabid anti-British journal, now the 
right-hand man of O'Mahony and some time ago accused of 
furnishing information to the Canadian Government for a 
consideration. 84 
This seems to have been a desperate attempt by Anglin to escape from the 
fruits of his ambivalence of the past three years. 
Relations between McGee and Anglin had been poor since McGee's 
speech in St. John in.1863. His Wexford speech further alienated Anglin 
who resented any attack on the Irish anywhere. Their opposition on the 
Confederation question simply confirmed a previously cold relationship. 
But this dispute was an. attack on the very integrity of McGee. Should 
Anglin’s.charge be found valid, then McGee’s entire career in Canadian 
politics, as well as his new nationality hopes, would be discredited 
forever. The charge was too serious for McGee to ignore, and when Anglin 
again published the accusation that McGee.was behind the Eastport raid 
in a June issue, of the Freeman, McGee responded with a strongly worded 
letter. But rather than settling the issue, McGee’s self-defense only 
confused matters further. He denied that Killian had been his business 




Killian had been his associate on the paper and McGee had left it to him 
when he moved to Canada. McGee then denied that Killian was still his 
partner, which was impossible to prove one way or the other. Then McGee 
did something totally strange: he denied that he had left Ireland with 
a price on his head. Anglin had not raised this issue at all, so why 
did McGee? And, having raised it, why did he deny something, the source 
for which was a letter he himself had published immediately after arriving 
in the United States in 1848? He had said that he had seen a wanted poster 
.with his name and description on it, offering a reward for his capture, 
in 1848 before he left Ireland. 
Anglin’s questions were worth finding answers to. Why did the 
anti-Canadian invasion faction of the Fenians launch an attack on New 
Brunswick? Why were they so obvious in their preparations, thereby ensur- 
ing the authorities had time to prevent their success? What explanation 
was there for the timing of the raid and the presence of Bernard Killian 
at their head, speaking in a way that was bound to help rather than 
hinder Confederation in New Brunswick? No doubt Anglin would have pursued 
the matter further had he known that O'Mahony laterrdismissed Killian as 
Treasurer of the Fenians "for disobedience to orders, and for inaugurating 
86 
movements calculated to injure and defeat the Brotherhood". An informer 
called O'Donnell, working for the Canadian Government,, infiltrated the 
0'Mahony group and reported after the Campobello fiasco: 
^^Ibid., 12 June, 1866. 
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O'Mahony...has consequently become very dispirited... 
on account of Killian's doings. Indeed he suspects 
Killian to be secretly in league with Mr. D'Arcy 
McGee. 87 
The Boston Pilot, a Fenian.sympathizer, reported in May that: 
Leading politicians in Montreal are of the opinion that 
Mr. Killian and Mr. D'Arcy McGee have formed an alliance 
for the benefit of each other, and that the movement at 
Eastport is intended to further the provincial confeder- 
ation scheme??.t 88 
Anglin was obviously not alone, in his suspicions. There .is no concrete 
evidence to link McGee to Killian and-the Eastport raid; but a closer 
investigations of McGee's movements, does give room for doubt. In 1859, 
after his election as M.P. for Montreal West,.McGee travelled from 
Boston to Washington, D.C. in the company of.James Stephens. Stephens 
was in .the United States trying to raise.money for the new organization 
he had founded. There is no mention of this journey in any biography of 
McGee, and the source.for this information,. Stephen's diary, simply says 
that he was on business in Washington. McGee gave Stephens some money 
and apologized that he had no more to give for a cause "he so deeply 
sympathized with".^^ McGee had often hinted, as in the Wexford speech 
for example, that he had contact with high-ranking Fenians, although he 
never mentioned Killian by name. However, if, as Anglin claimed, Killian 
had been offering information to the Canadian Government, then McGee 
^^D'Arcy, W., The Fenian Movement in the United States, (IVashington, 1947), 
p. 141. Edward Archibald, British Consul at.New York to Viscount Monke, 
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would certainly have known about it. James Moylan published an article 
from a U.S. newspaper in June 1866 referring to Killian as "that shrewd 
pupil of D’Arcy McGee".Finally, during the trial of James Whelan for 
the murder of McGee, an important prosecution witness claimed he heard 
Whelan threaten McGee, saying: 
[IJhelan] called McGee a traitor. 'McGee got money from the 
Fenians', Whelan said, 'and the bloody old pig turned the 
money over to Protestants.* 92 
A reading of McGee's condemnations of the Fenians from 1863 leaves 
no doubt as to his sincerity. He recognized how attractive such a move- 
ment could be to Irish nationalist.feeling in .British America, and that 
it could only lead to problems for the Irish. For their sake, and for 
the sake of the new nationality he campaigned for, the Irish had to learn 
to leave their aggressive form of nationalism behind them. But the evid- 
ence for his involvement in the Eastport raid, though circumstantial, is 
impressive. As early as November 1865, during the crucial .Fisher election 
in York, McGee had sent, word to Gordon.that St. John would require watching 
owing to the Fenians.What did he know then? Both Anglin and O'Mahony 
suspected that Killian was working secretly with McGee.on the raid in 
order to further the Confederation cause in. New Brunswick, which it 
undoubtedly did. Perhaps it may seem incredible that McGee should be in 
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league with the Fenians at all, but two points: are worth noting here. 
By April 1866, McGee did not consider the Roberts wing.of Fenianisn to 
be a real threat to the Irish in Canada. Because that wing threatened to 
invade their adopted country, they had little popular support among Irish 
Catholics of the Provinces. But the O’Mahony faction hadmmaintained the 
affection, if not loyalty, of that community, since they had remained 
committed to an attack on Britain. So what were they doing at Eastport? 
If McGee had arranged the raid with Killian, he managed to kill two 
birds with one stone: push New Brunswick into Confederation on the grounds 
of loyalty; and discredit the O'Mahony wing of the Fenians in the eyes 
of Irish Catholics in British America, who would not support an attack 
on their adopted homeland. There is no doubt that McGee would have gained 
greatly from such an event. At this point, another character comes into 
the picture. Such a plan.as Anglin accused McGee'of concocting would have 
to have the support of the man who dealt directly with Fenian informers 
in Canada, a man .who would be quite capable of using such "auxiliaries" 
as the Fenians - John A. Macdonald. It is interesting to note that his 
94 
name, too, was mentioned in connection'with the Killian-McGee conspiracy. 
There is, of course, no way of proving, -or disproving, such a 
theory. McGee’s personal papers might have contained some hints on the 
matter, but they disappeared after his death, whenhhis family was dispersed. 
Their absence only adds to the mystery. Anglin himself, however, was not 
beyond promulgating the conspiracy .story against McGee in order to save 
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himself from public attack. We have already noted that his accusations 
against McGee were designed to shift the charge of disloyalty to the 
supporters of Confederation and away from himself. He had good reason to 
do so, since Killian's second-in-eomman at Eastport, Patrick Sinnott, 
was said to have been related by marriage to Anglin himself, as was John 
95 
Warren, another of Killian's lieutenants. D'Arcy McGee was a logical 
choice for Anglin to blame, since he had been a bone fide rebel and had 
been associated with many of the Fenians during his days in the United 
States. Anglin may^.once have admired McGee as a Young Irelander, but by 
1866.his attitude had hardened considerably. During the election campaign 
of 1866, Anglin ..constantly referred to McGee's statement of November 1865 
that, in achieving Confederation, Canada was on "the very threshold of 
independence". Anglin used this to warn against "what Confederation 
would really mean for New Brunswick", He ridiculed McGee's idea of a 
Canadian monarch and nobilitybbased on the English model, with an English 
98 
Prince reigning over the new nation he dreamed of. Anglin claimed that 
McGee was trying to cgrasp positions far above his station. His attitude 
to his Canadian rival was well expressed in an article of June 1866: 
While we all admire the great talents he is ever so 
ready to prostitute, neither friend nor.foe respects 
him. 99 
By the time he wrote those bitter:words, Anglin knew that Confederation, 
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The General Election o£ 1866 did not go well for Anglin and his 
party. The pro-Confederation party concentrated ,on the idea of getting 
better terms than were given in the Quebec Resolutions, thus robbing the 
opponents of the scheme of anything to attack. No-one was defending the 
Quebec terms, so the Smith government were unable to use it as an issue. 
The government’s economic policy had been destroyed by the end of the 
Reciprocity Treaty, leaving no alternative to. economic reciprocity among 
the British Provinces, which was only available through Confederation. 
When Cardwell’s instructions to Gordon of June 1865.were published, and 
loyalty a major issue was wonnby the pro-Confederation party, since 
it was clear from them that the Imperial Government favoured Confederation. 
Thus, the opponents of the scheme were cast in the. unhappy role of the 
supporters of annexation, the only viable alternative to Confederation. 
All they had left to fight on was the unconstitutional action of Gordon 
in April 1866. This, of course, suited Anglin perfectly. All along, he 
had made the independence of New Brunswick the main plank, in his stand 
against Confederation. It was his sense of New Brunswick nationality 
that inspired.his efforts. The actions of.Gordon and Tilley had left him 
convinced that the only true loyalists in the Province were those who 
fought and-protested this attempt to destroy the legislative independence 
of responsible government. His entire campaign was based on.the premise 
that Confederation-was a plot by Canadians, British.officials like Gordon 
and Cardwell, and the "Canadian Imperialist'? party in New. Brunswick.to 
cut the Imperial link with Britain and destroy responsible government in 
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that Province: 
The late outrage on the principles of Responsible Government 
is so gross and so flagrant that the back stairs Imperialists 
and their organs, after a vain but desperate effort to 
defend the conduct of the Governor and his illegitimate 
advisers, have abandoned this ground as utterly untenable. 100 
Gordon.was again described.as a "mere tool of Downing Street", and the 
role assigned to the Fenians by Anglin was emphasized constantly. In 
April, when the scare at Campobello was over, Anglin wondered: 
The Fenians have left the frontier as queerly as they came. 
What will the Confederates and foes of Responsible Govern- 
ment do without their good allies? How, did it happen that 
they did not keep them there until after the elections? 101 
Nevertheless, warned Anglin, watch and see: when the election takes place 
the Fenians will return .at just the right time. As it happened, the 
Fenian invasion.of Canada did take place during the New Brunswick elec- 
102 
tions, and Anglin was quick to point out the "coincidence". He 
launched a strong attack against the loyalty of the supporters of Con- 
federation in Canada. Cartier was branded a rebel for his role in 1837; 
McGee was labeled.the same for 1848; and Galt, was condemned for his one- 
time support of Annexation. Anglin declared righteously: 
And the men who follow these leaders...have the impudence 
to denounce as disloyal, etc., the men who would save 
these Provinces, save their constitution, save their 
liberties, save their revenues from'the clutch of such 
rulers. 103 
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The anti-Confederation party became the Constitutionalists in the Freeman. 
Anglin’s cry was an appeal to the nationalism of New Brunswick, against 
the concept of a new nationality in Confederation; but it was a sincere 
declaration of loyalty: 
At present New Brunswick knows her position; her people 
are free Antis - they will remain free; they know their 
rights, and they will guard them;....She will be the 
subjects of England ever, but never the serfs of Canada. 105 
But it was not enough. In the middle of the campaign, Anglin was 
facedwith a formidable opponent when Bishop Rogers of Chatham wrote a 
public.letter supporting Confederation. Not only did this reduce Anglin’s 
influence on Irish Catholics, it led to a personal attack on.his ideas and 
methods by Rogers. Throughout May 1866, Rogers continued to publicly 
condemn Anglin by name for his treatment of Gordon and for his opposition 
to Confederation.Anglin riposted angrily, claiming that Roger's 
political views were not infallible: "twaddle is twaddle even if written 
by a Bishop".. In his response to Rogers, Anglin was consistent in 
demanding freedom for his fellow Catholics. He wrote to Rogers: 
I repel and repudiate your monstrous. assiimption of the 
power to decide for Catholics.in your diocese how they 
should vote on political subjects,, and - I assert the 
rights of myself and my fellow-countrymen to perfect 
equality with their Protestant fellowrsubjects on the 
political platform; their absolute right to think and 
judge for themselves on all political matters. 108 
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Such a dispute could not help Anglin's chances of re-election among St. 
John Catholics,,and in the electoral debacle-Suff^red by his party, he 
was among those who lost their seats. He was not alone; his party could 
win only eight seats in the new Assembly, almost all through the solidly 
109 
anti-Confederation vote of the Acadian Catholics of the Province. 
All Anglin could say in response to such defeat was: 
The people, by a majority of their votes, have declared 
that they prefer to be treated as slaves and dupes. 110 
The coming of Confederation.was almost inevitable after the election. In 
the year following, Anglin kept up:a half-hearted campaign against Tilley 
and the Confederates, showing how. their electoral promises were not being 
kept. But he recognized the reality of defeat and accepted it reluctantly. 
After Gordon's "coup-d'etat" in April 1866, the Canadians knew that 
an electoral win.for Tilley was almost a certainty. Along with the necess- 
ary funds required in any New Brunswick election, Macdonald made sure that 
Tilley and Gray had everything needed for victory. Well might Anglin 
ruefully declare: 
It was Fenianism and gold that carried all the elections 
won by the Canadian party. Ill 
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IV. The Fenians in Canada 
Fenianism has been an important factor in bringing about a pro- 
Confederation ascendancy in New Brunswick; but it had been done at the 
cost of great internal divisions in the Province. The Irish Catholics had 
been singled out as disloyal and possibly even treacherous in their links 
with the Fenians, however unfairly. Fenianism was to be the most dominating 
feature of Canadian life in 1866 also. Whatever may have been their invol- 
vement in the Eastport affair, McGee and Macdonald feared a similar raid 
on Canadian territory. McGee in particular saw such a possibility as the 
one great threat to his plan for a new nationality embracing all ethnic 
and religious groups in the country. The passing of the Quebec Resolutions 
in the Canadian Parliament was accomplished in spite of George Brown's 
resignation from the Cabinet early in 1866. Only the rumours reaching 
McGee of a possible Fenian raid on Canada in co-operation with Canadian 
Fenians remained to cloud McGee's thoughts by the stimmer of that year. 
This was a real threat to everything he had worked for since coming to 
Canada in 1857. Even after the Quebec Conference, he had not rested on 
his laurels, but continued to speak and write on the issue of theenew 
nationality and its implications for. British North America. He was a 
tireless prophet, encouraging, instructing and enlightening Canadians 
and Maritimers-on the prospects Confederation brought within reach: 
I have been blamed for using the phrase - 'creating a 
new nation in the North'....I believed then, and still 
believe, that we want an inspiration beyond thealocal 
sectional and sectarian feelings that divided and yet 
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separate us. I believe that...the only way to enlarge 
its views and liberalize them, was to show the people 
there was a great future in store for the inhabitants 
of all British North America. 112 
He spoke to the fears of the French Canadians who would be a minority in 
the new Parliament after holding a central place in the making of govern- 
ments since 1841: 
I will remind them, I hope not improperly, that every one 
of the colonies we now propose to reunite under one rule 
- in which they shall have a potential voice - were Once 
before united as New France....Well, gentlemen of French 
origin, we propose to restore these long-lost compatriots 
[the French of New Brunswick] to your protection. 113 
But it was to Fenianism that McGee devoted most.of his eloquence 
during 1866. This year was to be the climax of his campaign to discourage 
the Irish Catholics of Canada from involving themselves with "the organ- 
ization that will bring you to ruin". Nor were the Fenians unaware of his 
efforts. In March .1866, an informer, among the Roberts Fenians reported to 
Macdonald: 
I slept in one room with three Senators and Congressmen every 
night. Their full determination is to-organize immediately 
and make a strike for Canada. If they can arrest the 
Governor .-General and D'Arcy McGee and other Government officers 
they will do it. 114 
Ever since his Wexford speech, McGee had been receiving death threats in 
the mail, and the American Fenian press were'denouncing him in the vilest 
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the fact that McGee had been a rebel in 1848. As one of his biographers 
has put it: 
It was clear to his contemporaries that he had been an 
Irish rebel, a republican and.a revolutionary,...the 
charge of treason to the Irish republic would be made 
against McGee. 115 
But, it should be repeated, McGee, though technically a rebel in 1848, 
was never a republican, nor a revolutionary, aside from that short period 
of bitter disillusionment in the United States in late 1848. As for the 
"Irish republic", in 1866 it simply did not exist outsideoof Fenian head- 
quarters in New York, and the imaginings of exiled Irish dreamers. McGee 
was no traitor to Ireland or the Irish, certainly not in the way the 
Fenians implied..He was of the moderate wing of Young Ireland and only 
entered into rebellion when he felt forced to'it by the actions of the 
British Government. He wasoalso impelled by the strong currents of 
emotion and revolution then sweeping Europe. Almost from the moment he 
recovered from the shock of sudden exile in 1848-9, he was at odds with 
the republicans of New York and Boston. The charge of treason was without 
foundation, since it was based on a misunderstanding of McGee’s nationalism. 
In December 1848 he had written: 
It was not to the Irish soil, but to the Irish race, abroad 
and at home, I dedicated my .life....Not to sticks nor stones 
nor soil nor.sea is true patriotism confined, its sole object 
is the people. 116 
This was the basis of McGee’s commitment, .not just to the Irish, but to 
^^^Burns, Robin, "Thomas D’Arcy McGee: A Biography", CUnpublished PhD 
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Canada. Realizing that the Irish had to live .in British North America, 
he set it as his goal that they should be allowed to live fully and to 
their greatest advantage there. That necessitated adopting new soil and 
stones and sea to replace the old. His patriotism was directed at people 
in the new land, not against the old: 
Whether my way .of serving |TreiBhd<]i&abrda’dahasrbeene^ell 
or ill-chosen, there are few who have seen me tried, who 
will not admit that at heart I love her truely and dearly. 
She has been my inspiration so long as I can remember, 117 
In the same letter, written to .the Dublin Nation, he explained his stance 
on the Fenian question: 
I do not look upon these men,- these American Fenians - 
as enemies of England...but as enemies of Ireland, and 
in this capacity they are formidable. 118 
In November 1865, he advocated .a .scheme to bring Irish Canadian 
influence to bear on the British Government. He suggested that Canadians, 
especially those of Irish nationality, should together petition Westmin- 
ister to take .steps to remove Irish grievances. Moylan supported McGee on• 
this issue, declaring: 
Let the actual wrongs of Ireland be redressed and the 
ground is taken from under the feet of Fenianism - it 
receives its death blow. 119 
Moylan himself was concerned in the first half of 1866 to pour scorn on 
Fenianism at every opportunity,.and to dismiss rumours of a Fenian invasion 
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of Canada as foolish and groundless. In January 1866 he wrote an article 
on ’’The Failure of Fenianism - The Vindication of O’Connell’s Moral Force 
Policy”, a deliberate retort to the Irish Canadian dismissal of moral 
force as a ’’sham”. Commenting on an alleged Fenian raid on the Eastern 
Townships in March, Moylan warned against criminals using the Fenians as 
a cover for their own activities and stated: 
The Fenian excitement is dying a natural death....They 
will not venture to trouble us on this side of the line. 121 
With the Eastport adventure under way in'April, Moylan took issue with 
the Irish Canadian on the question of loyalty,' referring to the rival 
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newspaper as ’’the O’Mahony organ in Toronto”. 
Moylan was always glad to publish statements by Catholic Bishops 
who condemned Fenians or supported Confederation, since the influence of 
the hierarchy was .central to his philosophy. In May he gave over an entire 
issue of the Canadian.Freeman to an*attack on^the Fenians, and to proving 
that they were, in .fact, an oath-bound society, therefore under Church 
condemnation. All aiong, Moylan refused to believe that Fenianism was 
anything more than a money-making operation, with O’Mahony and his friends 
taking advantage of the deluded.Irish Catholics of America. After the 
failure of Killian's raid, Moylan published a piece entitled. ’’Fenianism 
^^^Ibid., 25 Jan. 1866. 
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- A Retrospect", in which he referred to the organization as "a huge 
and heartless swindle". He was sure that the danger of invasion, if 
ever it had existed, was past after Killian's failure. His surprise was 
all the greater, therefore, when the Fenian army under General O'Neill 
invaded Upper Canada on June 1. 
McGee was not surprised at all. He had been sure that the Fenians 
threat of invasion was serious, and that it consisted of more than just 
an assault on the hearts and minds of the Irish in Canada. In March 1866 
he had written an open.letter to the Irish press on the subject of "The 
Irish Position in British and in Republican North America". In it, he 
claimed that the Irish position, in the .'United States had been exaggerated 
in order to make their siuation seem more attractive to the people in 
Ireland.. He pointed out that the very existence of the Fenians proved 
that the Irish Catholics had no place in the United States and had to look 
to Ireland for the fulfillment of their dreams. If the Irish had the 
opportunities for advancement in the United StatesTji said McGee, they would 
not bother with wild schemes in Ireland. According to McGee, the 
great obstacle to true understanding of the advantages the Irish in 
British America had over their countrymen south of the line was "pre- 
conceived opinions". Ignorance was arweapon.of the Fenians and McGee 
intended to.wrest that weapon.from .them. The invasion, vindicated this 
approach. It proved that the danger from the Fenians'was real, not .only 
^^^Ibid., 10 May 1866. 
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to Canada, but to the continued good standing o£ Irish Catholics living 
there. In July, after the invasion, he spoke in. Aylmer, Canada West, on 
the subject: 
As there are always many exciteable people particularly 
susceptible to democratic appeals conveyed in high- 
sounding phrases, I have thought it ma duty I owe to 
Canada, and I may add, my duty to Ireland, and to Irishmen 
at home and abroad, wherever a channel of access to them 
was open to me, to exhibit the folly, the falsehood and 
the criminality of this organization. 126 
His initial reaction to the invasion-in June was to call on all citizens 
to defend their country. He had a special word for the Irish Catholics: 
All Canadians have their duties; but we have a duty additional 
to the duties of others. We are belied as•a class, we are 
compromised as a class, by these scoundrels; and.as a class we 
must vindicate our loyalty to the freest country left to 
Irishmen on the face of the globe. 127 
Moyi Moylan was quick to make similar declarations of loyalty on behalf 
of the Irish Catholic community: 
It were superfluous to point out to the reader - more 
especially to the Catholic reader - what his duty is at 
this crisis. It is that of uncompromising loyalty and 
allegiance to Canada. We have a country worth fighting 
and dying for. 128 
He pointed to the issue at stake .for the .Irish Catholic population in the 
face of Fenian.aggression against Canada: 
Our .adopted-country has been the scene of depredation and 
bloodshed;:our fellow-subjects, acting in self-defense, 
have been slain and maimed on their own soil; and all this 
^^^Ibid., 12 July, 1866. 
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in the nanie of Ireland, and by men the vast majority of 
whom profess to be Irish Catholics. That the whole Irish 
Catholic body in this country has not been compromised 
beyond redemption by this villainous invasion, is not 
the fault of Mr. Sweeny and Mr. Peep-O-Day of Buffalo, 
and the rest of its agents and promoters. 129 
This last phrase was another jab at the Irish Canadian,.who were already 
embarrassed by the Fenian actions. Boyle tried to divert attention away 
from himself by pointing out that Moylan had been one of the petitioners 
who had succeeded.in having Habeas Corpus suspended after the invasion. 
Moylan admitted the fact and explained,, in an article on "Hidden Fenians" 
in Canada, that: 
Now, it is quite certain that a large number of 
ill-disposed.persons, including^thieved, burglars and 
cut-throats, had established themselves in Toronto, 
Montreal, and other large cities and.towns in Canada. 130 
The achievement of McGee and Moylan should not be underestimated. 
It was to their credit that an anti-Irish pogrom was not whipped-up in 
the aftermath of the invasion, especially after the funerals of the young 
men killed in action at Ridgeway. That was what McGee had been dreading 
ever since he first spoke out against Fenianism.HHe had first-hand 
experience of the emotional power of "democratic appeals couched in high- 
sounding phrases". Not only had he succumbed to them in .1848, he was also 
a master of them in the cause of Confederation. His fear was that the 
Irish would.be seduced into aiding the Fenians. When that danger was 
averted, there was the real fear of an-anti-Irish backlash. McGee and 
^^^Ibid., 14 June, 1866. 
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Moylan were determined that no grounds would be given to justify such 
a reaction: hence their strong denunciations of Fenianism. That the 
risk of a backlash existed was proved by a letter in Moylan*s newspaper 
on July 5. It was sent to McGee by one F. O’Beirne of Grimsby, Canada 
West, who had been dragged from his bed at night by Protestant vigil- 
antes who suspected him of having Fenian sympathies. The writer was 
indignant and fearful: a loyal patriot had been ill-treated because of 
his religion and race, and the entire affair was the result of Fenian 
activities. In a number of townsiin Canada West, alarms were raised 
about the secret activities of Irish Catholics as imagined by frightened 
citizens. The Fenians were the scause of sectarian.bitterness and suspic- 
ions, as McGee had feared. It was not surprising that he had no pity on 
those caught at Ridgeway under arms in the Fenian army. A Catholic priest 
wrote to ask him to intercede for these prisoners and McGee publicly 
replied: 
To whatever punishment the law hands them over, no 
word of mine can ever be spoken in mitigation; not 
even, under these circumstances,.if he were my own 
brother. 131 
When he spoke in the same way at a public meeting, he was hissed by a 
number of people. He clearly lost his temper with them. He had saved 
themirish from a dreadful reaction by being so public in his opposition 
to the Fenians, thereby distancing them from Irish Catholics in Canada; 
now some of them were hissing him like a traitor. He strode to the front 
of the platform and spoke clearly: 
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I repeat deliberately, these men deserve death. But I 
will add, the spirit of our times is opposed to capital 
punishment. 
As to the handful who hissed just now,in the far corner, 
if I had not stood between them and the machinations of 
these men and their emissaries, some of them would be 
sharing today the fate of those condemned. 
I have had in my hands evidences of your criminal folly, 
and I could have put some of you where you could not hiss 
much, but you were not worth prosecuting. 132 
This was in November 1866, and it may seem that McGee was being unreason- 
ably harsh with his hecklers. But by then he had been through three years 
of being vilified and threatened by his fellow-Irishmen for daring to 
stand up for a humane and reasonable attitude among the Irish of the 
North American colonies. He had spent most of those years apart from his 
wife and family in the service of his adopted country, trying to bring 
to reality his dream of a new nationality. Almost alone among the Fathers 
of Confederation, D’Arcy McGee dedicated himself to an idea, and he knew 
of the great cost involved: 
In public life in this country,.the bitterness is real, 
the hardships are real and the rewards chimerical. The 
public man gives up his domesticity, is banished from 
his family for six months in the year, until even his children 
only recognize him as an occasional visitor. 
Is this not a sacrifice? He exposes his character to 
be traduced, andhhis motives to be aspersed, while he 
undertakes the heavy load of public business. 133 
Among those who were more than ready to traduce McGee’s character 
and cast aspersions on his motives were Timothy Warren Anglin and Patrick 
Boyle. At first it may seem strange to link the respectable editor of 
the Morning Freeman with the .radical, almost anonymous editor of the 
132 
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Irish Canadian; but, in fact, they shared a common attitude to McGee 
and his role in the Irish Catholic community. Anglin, as we have shown, 
had little time for McGee and his "visionar/'schemes of nationality. 
Nor wasiihe prepared to recognize McGee’s efforts against the Fenians: 
We believe that Mr. McGee did absolutely nothing to 
prevent the spread of Fenianism in Canada, because his 
language on that subject, uttered to please his patrons, 
was always calculated to irritate and provoke rather than 
to persuade. If Fenianism made -little way among Irishmen 
in Canada it was we believe because their own good sense 
and their own knowledge of the duty owed to the country 
of their adoption stood in the way. 134 
Such a dismissal of McGee’s work is simply breathtaking in its pettiness. 
Mot only was McGee trying to keep Fenianism from spreading in Canada; 
more importantly, he tried to prevent Fenianism being identified with the 
Irish Catholic population; and in this he was very successful. If he had 
not stood openly against the Fenians, leaving it to Anglin and Boyle to 
speak for the Irish Catholic community, .then the invasion of 1866 would 
probably have marked the start of a campaign of retribution against that 
group such as happened in Ireland in the wake of the Fenian rising 
there in 1867. Certainly Anglin, in his ambivalence and desire to pro- 
tect himself, did less than nothing to help avoid such a campaign in New 
Brunswick. 
Boyle, likewise, played with fire until the summer of 1866, and 
in doing so put his readers at risk.,His open support for the Fenians 
from 1863 until early 1866, and .his close relations with Michael Murphy 
134 
Morning Freeman,.6 Aug. 1867. 
163 
and the Hibernian Benevolent Society became a major embarrassment to the 
newspaper and its publisher in April 1866, when Murphy was arrested on 
his way to join Killian at Eastport.-Boyle made much, of the affair, using 
it, in fact, to cover up the fact that he totally ignored what was happen- 
ing on the Maine-New Brunswick border. Technically, the arrest of Murphy 
was a mistake, since he had not committed any crime. However, once 
arrested, he could not be released without loss of face^for Cartier, who 
135 
had ordered.-his arrest against Macdonald’s wishes. This concentration 
on the Murphy case was a rare break from an almost continuous campaign of 
vilification against McGee. Throughout 1866, the columns of the Irish 
Canadian were filled with insulting references to McGee and his work for 
Confederation. Boyle called McGee "a bastardised national emigrant, a 
member of the canaille of Irish society, a poor scholar from the purlieus 
of a provincial town in Ireland". Letters lampooning McGee and signed 
"D’Arcy's Friend" were a regular feature of the newspaper’s tirade against 
137 . . 
the "Modern Jester". Alongside this vilification ran apparent support 
for the Fenians. In January 1866, Boyle commented clearly on where he 
stood: 
English tyranny will never give up the hold it has 
upon Ireland if it is not compelled by physical force 
to do so. 138 
He even raised the idea.of a Fenian invasion of British North America as 
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a way of bringing England to her knees; though he was careful to add in 
139 
parentheses, "not that we encourage it". By openly supporting and 
approving of Fenian .activities and methods, Boyle was building up an 
arsenal of ammunition which his opponents could use in their charges of 
Irish Catholic disloyalty. But he never seemed to realize what he was 
doing; and in May, after the Eastport incident was over and the threat 
of invasion was now leveled at Canada, he wrote: 
We ourselves cannot see how an.attack on this Province 
can effect good to Ireland. It would certainly estrange 
the affections of many in Canada from the cause of 
Ireland who cannot see the object of breaking the peace 
of a people who havenneveriwrongedtfhatppeppl-e. 1140 
Itlis incredible that Boyle did not realize that his articles in 
favour of the Fenians and advocating physical force in Ireland would have 
the same effect on rion-Irish Canadians as an invasion. The pages of the 
Irish Canadian were calling into question the loyalty of the entire Irish 
Catholic population of Canada. It was useless for Boyle to claim that he 
was not a Fenian, or that the Hibernians had no links with that group. His 
words may have been strictly true, but his writing proved that there was 
another name for Fenians in Canada - Hibernians.. In April 1866, Boyle 
claimed that the Government was secretly trying yo close the paper by 
preventing its copies reaching subscribers.Cries of outrage came oddly 
from the man who was advocating treason. 
^^^Ibid., 3 Jan. 1866. 
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It is not surprising that Boyle and the Irish Canadian had no kind words 
for Confederation. What is surprising, perhaps, are his reasons for not 
having faith in the scheme. As early as October 1864, he had passed 
Confederation off as impossible because the Americans would not approve! 
The sum of the matter is this: the great Northern Republic 
will not allow a rival in the shape of a 'British American 
Nation'. 142 
Boyle generally had very little to say about Confederation. There is reason 
think that anything he may have said against the idea was inspired, not by 
any constitutional scruples, nor, like Anglin, by any latent sense of 
loyalty to the Province of Canada or the Empire. It is far more likely 
that Boyle rejected Confederation in part because of who he saw as its 
promoter - D'Arcy McGee. During the Quebec Conference he referred to McGee 
143 
as "the father of this political prodigy". Boyle's feelings, apart 
from those concerning McGee, were quite detached’ on the Confederation 
issue: 
We believe the people of Canada, or the vast majority of 
them, are not, at the present time, prepared to accept 
this scheme....it requires but a general election here 
to give the coup-de-grace to Confederation, and the 
inordinate amount of humbug attached to it since its 
appearance on the surface political. 144 
After the Quebec Resolutions were published, Boyle accepted the whole 
thing rather off-handedly,. as almost irrelevant: 
We agree with the scheme, so.far as to.say it is time 
our present system of government should be abolished, 
and some system...of more power and vigour substituted 
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fot it. But before we adopt another let us well consider 
whether...this is the right one. 145 
Boyle gave most of the space in"the Irish Canadian to the Fenians 
146 
and events in Ireland, mentioning the Quebec Conference only once. 
His whole emphasis was on Ireland and the Irish, and this is where he 
and McGee were most at.odds with each other. Boyle never became a member 
of the new nation created at Confederation; he remained incorrigably 
Irish. An Irishman.living in Canada, not an Irish-Canadian. Even the 
Fenian.invasion did not turn him from his set course; and he commented on 
the events of June 1866 in a most detached way, quite unlike McGee and 
Moylan. 
We have ever doubted the utility of attacking Canada 
as the road to Irish freedom....we regret the 
unfortunate occurence which has marred the happiness 
and peace of this country. 147^ 
His objection to the invasion is on the.grounds of utility, not morality. 
He "regrets" the invasion.as "unfortunate", without mentioning the fact 
that Canadian citizens were killed in the process. Instead of condemning 
the Fenians, as even Anglin did eventually, Boyle made excuses for them, 
claiming that the invasion was planned by the United States Government, 
and that: 
The strenuous efforts made by the United States authorities 
to enforce their neutrality compelled the Fenian leaders 
to abandon.their designs against Canada. 148 
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He almost seems to be saying that everything would have been all right 
if the Fenians had at least been allowed to pursue their "designs against 
Canada", and that somehow the American .Government spoiled the whole thing 
„ 11 149 
for all. 
By the end of 1866, Boyle was making optimistic comments about the 
future of the Fenian organization and praying for victory in Ireland: 
Oh holy Ireland...may the prayers of millions of your 
exiled offspring be answered by the God of battle in 
sure and decisive victory to your arms. 150 
Boyle and Anglin fought against McGee and everything he stood for, but 
for different reasons. Boyle's nationality was Irish and it would ever be 
Irish. As late as 1873, Boyle was still calling for allegiance to the old 
nationality: 
Above all and before all, we must remember we are Irish. 
We must preserve our identity as a race in our new home, 
and not suffer ourselves to be swallowed up in the 
maelstrom of other nationalities. We must still remember 
that to Ireland we owe our first i6‘&e5;iandethat we should 
never forget or forsake her till her national autonomy 
is reconquered. 151 
This was diametrically opposed to everything McGee had hoped for in Con- 
federation for the Irish in .Canada. It was an attempt to form an Irish- 
Canadian nationality to mirror that, of the Irish-Americans. As McGee 
said of the latter group, their existence’ was an indication .that the Irish 
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had not yet found their place in-American’ life. Boyle's writings, had 
they been representative, would have said the same for the Irish in 
Canada. But he was almost unique among the Irish Catholicsjournalists 
in Canada during'that period, -in that he spoke for a few and was out 
of step with the rest. This was clearly seen during the invasions, when 
the Irish Catholics did not .rise in their support, and were prominent in 
their loyal service against the invaders. What Boyle and the Fenians 
forgot was that the Irish may listen eagerly to emotional appeals to 
Irish national'feeling, they may march and sing and threaten and bluster, 
but it not an.easy thing to get them to actually take up arms in rebellion. 
It was said of Stephens that he "failed to realize that it is one thing 
to wave the flag and talk the good fight, and quite another to be present 
~i CO 
at the actual test of arms". John O’Leary, from his experiences with 
the Fenians found that: 
Your average bourgeois may make a very good sort of 
agitator, for here he can be shown, or at least convinced 
that his mere material interests are concerned, iand that 
he may serve them with little or no material risk. A rebel 
however, you can rarely make him, for here the risk is 
certain and immediate, and- the. advantage, if material 
advantage there should be, doubtful and distant. 153 
In that sense, the Irish were very bourgeois in Canada in 1866. 
They had little material possessions to protect, but what they had they 
valued, and they were not going to let the Fenians, however patriotic 
they may have been, interfere and put at risk the social and economic 
^^^D'Arcy, p. 409-10. 
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gains the Irish Catholics had made in Canada. 
What the Fenians proved in Canada.was that D'Arcy McGee had been 
far more perceptive than many had given him credit for. He had seen the 
inherent danger of an Irish-American society preaching republican treason 
against the British Crown. He saw the appeal such a society would have 
for Irish Catholics, always susceptible to emotional appeals to Irish 
nationalist feeling. He saw that the non-Irish population of British 
America would easily identify the Fenians with Irish Catholics north of 
the line, since it had always been assumed that such Irishmen were 
naturally rebellious and disloyal. Above all, McGee could see that a new 
nationality was an answer-to the problem, but only if he could distance 
the Irish in the new nation from the Fenian agitation. Politically, what 
that would mean was that ethnic and religious labels would become irrel- 
evant in the new nationality that would be created by Confederation, 
however long that process might take. In the general election to the 
first Dominion Parliament in July 1867, McGee summed up his hopes: 
Assuredly I look forward to the day when the people of 
this country will go to the polls, not as British or 
Irish or French, not as Protestant or Catholics, but as 
Canadian subjects and fellow citizens. 154 
The Fenian threat had helped push the Irish Catholics nearer to that day 
'.forcing them to choose in. their loyalties. .But .the price for McGee 
had yet to be paid. 
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V, The end of an era 
McGee had fully expected to be part of the new Dominion, both as 
an eager participant in the governing of Canada, and in the drawing-up 
of the final details of the British North America Act which was due to 
be drafted in the summer of 1866. In both he was to be bitterly disap- 
pointed. The Fenian.invasion, and serious disputes in the Assembly on 
the question of educational rights, had prevented the.Canadian delegates 
from leaving for England to discuss the terms of the British North America 
Act. In August, McGee wrote to Moylan, mentioning in passing that he had 
been invited to be one of the delegates at the London Conference. But 
when the list of delegates was published at the end of September, McGee's 
name was not on it. There was controversy over his exclusion, since it 
seemed that no-one had a better right, or was better qualified, to join 
the negotiators. Butlthis was but the first of a series of shocks McGee 
received in the next few months. 
In June of 1867, the Montreal Gazette published the list of mem- 
bers of the first Dominion cabinet. Again, McGee was not included. It 
would appear that John A. Macdonald had offered McGee a Ministry, in 
155 
writing, at some.time in early 1867. But the necessities of balancing 
regional and ethnic representation in the new Government were more impor- 
tant to the well-being of the new nation than personal, commitments. In 
fact, McGee had foretold such a difficulty in a letter to his constituents 
in May 1867. He was concerned about the need to incorporate the Maritimes 
as fully as possible in the Parliamentary life of the new country: 
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In all administrative arrangements with our maritime 
fellow-subjects...it must be the constant, unceasing 
care of every patriot hailing from the divisions of 
Quebec and Ontario, to observe not only a liberal, but 
a generous rule of distribution. The public men of the 
seaboard deserve richly of the new Dominion; and if 
there are any of our own men nearer home who have equal 
claims, it would be much better they should wait, than 
that the false but effective insinuations of anti- 
Unionists should appear, even temporarily, to be 
countenanced by facts. 156 
Even so, McGee resisted the attempt to exclude him from the cabinet. It 
took two long talks with Cartier and a generous offer from Charles Tupper 
to bring McGee around to the sacrificial altar. Tupper agreed to give up 
his seat in the cabinet to an Irish Catholic member from Nova Scotia, if 
McGee gave up his promised seat to Alexander Galt, who represented the 
English Protestant community of Quebec Province. That way, Irish 
Catholics would still have representation in the Dominion cabinet. McGee 
put a brave face on it, even telling his constituents that he "heartily 
approved" of the deal.^^^ In fact, he must have been bitterly disappointed 
and hurt. 
The reason for McGee’s exclusion is hard to find. Some say.this was 
partly retaliation by Macdonald for criticisms McGee made of him in his 
role as Minister of Militia at the time of the invasion. Macdonald was 
not the kind to forget an insult. Others point to McGee’s drop in 
popularity among the Irish Catholics, as evidenced by his failure, in the 
^^^Canadian Freeman, 30 May, 1867. 
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election of 1867 to carry the majority of Irish Catholics votes in his 
constituency of Montreal West. This was the first time McGee had ever 
had to seriously contest the seat since he first won it in 1857. One 
historian has linked this failure with his exclusion from office: 
[McGee's] outspoken position on Fenianism had cost him a 
great deal of Irish support, and thus made him expendable, 
if not a liability in Canadian politics. 160 
Whether this is so or not, what is certain is that his exclusion from 
the cabinet weakened his position vis--a-vis the more militant nationalists 
in the Irish Catholic community. His rival in the election campaign had 
been, for the first time in his career, another Irish Catholic, Bernard 
Devlin, President of the St. Patrick's Society of Montreal. Devlin was 
the candidate of those whose support McGee had alienated by his attacks 
on Fenianism.. It was, in many ways, to be a continuation of McGee's fight 
against the dangers of reviving old feuds in the new land. The question, 
raised once more by the election in Montreal-West, .was: to what extent 
could the Irish Catholics in Canada remain divided -in their allegiance 
to the new nation? 
In launching his campaign for Parliament, .McGee had addressed his 
opponents with typical bluntness: 
You do not pretend to condemn;me for anything done in 
any character or capacity as a Canadian legislator, 
but only because I have been.unsparing, and, as you 
think, unnecessarily severe on the Fenian Brotherhood. 
He pointed out that the Fenians had proved to.be everything he had warned 
against, and.with great clarity and insight, McGee diagnosed the cause of 
^‘^^Bums, Robin, "Thomas D'Arcy McGee: A Biography", p. 361. 
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the hatred shown him by his opponents: 
My unpardonable sin was telling the truth by way of 
prevention and.in advance of the times; if for this 
you'condemn me, I must bow to your decision, though 
I protest against its unreason and injustice. 161 
It was reported that some of those present hissed when McGee mentioned 
the Benians. The two camps of Irish Catholic thought were in direct 
conflict in the election, and McGee was expected to'lose; at least that 
was the opinion of Brown and the Grits. .McGee had been very ill with 
an ulcerated leg throughout the campaign, and.had tried to stand in an 
Ontario riding also. It was an uphill battle, hard to-take after the 
months and years of struggle for Confederation. Then, on August 1, the 
Montreal Gazette published a letter from Archbishop Connolly of Halifax, 
which gave McGee the kind of support he needed. Connolly referred to 
McGee as "the Daniel.0’Connell of Canada", and gave him all the credit 
for saving Canada from Fenianism, and Irish Catholics in Canada from any 
retaliation from ..loyal Canadians .that would .have been "nothing short of 
a disastrous conflagration". In a most explicit endorsement, Connolly 
said: 
If I were asked to whom above:all others I would wish 
to entrust the advocacy:of Ireland*s cause, I should say, 
without.a moment's hesitancy, that.that man.was Thomas 
D'Arcy McGee. 163 
^^^Canadian Freeman, 18 July, 1867/ 
^^^Howland to Brown, July 1867; quoted in.Slattery, The Assassination of 
D'Arcy. McGee . p. 406. 
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Another sensational event took place later that month,aagain courtesy o£ 
the Montreal Gazette. McGee published a series of articles tracing the 
spread of Fenianism in Montreal. He specifically accused the St. Patrick's 
Society of sympathizing with the Fenians, and of inviting John O'Mahony 
to speak there. He then named Bernard Devlin as the man responsible for 
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all this, in his capacity of President of the Society. It was cogent, 
well-written and explosivej but'whether it was wise was another matter. 
Emotions were already running high in Montreal, and the articles inflamed 
passions to the point of violence. When McGee won the election by a small 
margin, a mob attempted to destroy his headquarters and other buildings 
where they thought McGee might be staying. The clash of loyalties was 
becoming more dangerous. 
At this point, the other major Irish Catholic journalist in the 
Dominion, Timothy Warren-Anglin, joined in the affair. Having spent the 
months since the 1866 election in New Brunswick fighting a rearguard 
action against Confederation, he had turned about and stood as a cand- 
idate for a French-speaking riding in the Province in 1867. Moylan, too, 
had considered standing for Parliament, but he, too, had been compromised 
by the anti-Fenian campaign and thought better of the idea. Of Boyle in 
this period, little is known of his reaction to the coming of Confeder- 
ation, since the 1867 file of the Irish Canadian is missing. But it was 
^^^Ibid., 20 Aug. 1867. 
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clear that the role of the Irish Catholics in the new country of Canada 
would be largely decided by the stand taken by Anglin and McGee. Very 
soon, the two were representing the opposite camps of Irish Catholics. 
Arriving in Montreal, Anglin was invited to be the guest of the St. 
Patrick's Society, thereby siding with the opponents of McGee; it was 
an invitation he was quick to accept. His attitude to the new nationality 
had not changed since 1866 and his new ambition was to replace McGee as 
165 
spokesman for the Irish Catholics of Canada. Moylan was not impressed: 
Timothy is a Catholic of the Brownite stamp. He would 
be a Fenian if he had the pluck. 166 
This kind of barb was typical of the relations between the two sides 
for the next year. The Canadian Freeman rah a correspondance on Anglin’s 
ambitious efforts to replace McGee throughout the rest of 1867. Anglin's 
performance in the-House of Commons was derided: "Anglin has yet some 
things to learn". 
But it was already a triumph for McGee that Anglin and Boyle were 
fighting him over issues concerning Canada and who was to have leadership 
of the Irish Catholics in the new nation. That the new nation existed was 
already totally accepted by all sides; not even Anglin thoyght it possible 
to go.back to the pre-Confederation structures. The expansion to the west, 
the continued presence of Nova Scotia in the Federation, and the struggle 
for minority rights, were all debated in a Canadian context in the Canadian 
^^^Canadian Freeman, 12,24 Dec. 1867; 2 Jan. 1868. 
^^^Ibid., 22 Aug. 1867. 
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House of Commons. .McGee had never claimed.that the .newnationality could 
be formed overnight along with political structures. As he looked forward 
to the day when Canadians would no.longer classify themselves according 
to ethnic origin or religion, he recognized the slow pace at which that 
had to come about: 
...in order that we might reach that day, and reach it 
soon, it is needful to conduct our detachments of 
population by already frequented’ways and easy inclines 
to the general rendezvous. 168 
For what was left of his life, McGee strove for unity of purpose 
and an end of sectionalism and.sectarian strife, which he saw as the 
great danger to the entire enterprise. Politically, the new nationality 
was assured with Confederation; but bringing it to reality in the minds 
of the people was to be a gradual process requiring tact and tolerance, 
as well as some sacrifice. McGee wanted to see the rights of every part 
of the Dominion guaranteed: 
So long as we respect in Canada the rights of minorities, 
told either by tongue or creed, we are safe, for so long 
it will be possible for us to remain united. 169 
He was optimistic. The events of the past few years had only confirmed him 
in his vision of a new nationality. In an early speech in the first Domin- 
ion Parliament,' he exulted: 
We are here... as members of. one Dominion, -Puissance, or ’’new 
Nationality’...to begin a new set of journals which we all 
trust may become the precious' records of.a great, free people. 170 
^^^Ibid., 18 July, 1866. 
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In another prophetic passage, McGee commented on how easily Confederation 
had been won. There had been no War of Independence,, no Civil War. But 
perhaps that was not altogether an advantage: 
I verily believe that if we had bought the new 
Constitution with our blood, if we had paid for 
it its deserved price, we would understand its 
value better. 171 
That, ultimately, was to be McGee’s final contribution to the creation of 
his new nationality. 
On April 7, 1868, Thomas D’Arcy McGee was shot dead as he arrived 
home from a session of the House of Commons. The nature of the crime 
shocked the entire country. For the first time, people realized just 
what McGee had risked, in going against the Fenians, and upsetting the 
complacent nationalism of his fellow-countrymen. The sacrifices he had 
made to bring about a new nationality on .the North American continent were 
seen in perspective for the first time by the nation at large. His death 
had results that he himself would never have dreamt possible. It brought 
people to the realization ..that sectional and sectarian discord was a 
dangerous thing topplay with. Anglin and Boyle may have searched their 
hearts, wondering whether their violent and provocative articles had in 
any way contributed to McGee’s death. Even the St. Patrick’s Society of 
Montreal, .which had expelled him just months earlier as a traitor and a 
scoundrel, marched , in his funeral procession. Either Ff|ypoGrisy* or aware- 
ness motivated their members in taking such a public step of recognition 
of-McGee’s worth. 
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McGee's last speech in the House o£ Commons on the night of his 
death, was a fitting climax to his life's work. He appealed for reason 
and fair play for the people of Nova Scotia, trapped against their will 
in the new nation: 
It may be that there are grounds for complaint.... 
But Nova Scotia must only ask us to consider these 
subjects from a broad national point of view, and to 
deal with herself, not with exceptional partiality, but 
in the same spirit of even-handed fairness which we 
extended equally to Quebec, Ontario or New Brunswick.... 
Our friends need have no fear but that Confederation will 
ever be administered with serene and even justice. 172 
McGee then repeated his belief that such a new experiment in nation build- 
ing needed one essential feature for success: 
Time, Sir, will heal all existing irritations; time will 
mellow and refine all points of contrast that seem so 
harsh today; time will come to .the aid of impartial 
justice. 173 
It was a magnificent summation of a career dedicated to creating a 
new nationality. It was not blind or naive about the problems, but it had 
faith in the basic soundness of the experiment. It was fitting that the 
last words of the prophet of the new nationality to be spoken in the 
Canadian House of Commons should be the climax of his own personal 
odyssey: 
[Confederation's] single aim from the beginning has been 
to consolidate the extent of British North America with 
the utmost regard to the independent powers and privileges 
of each Province, and I, Sir, who have been, and amistill. 
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its warm and earnest advocate, speak here not as the 
representative of any race, or of any Province, but as 
thoroughly and emphatically a Canadian, ready and bound 
to recognize the claims of my Canadian fellow subjects, from 
the farthest east to the farthest west, equally as those of 
my nearest neighbour, or the friend who proposed me on the 
hustings. 174 
The speech was a marvellous and aiperfect end to his parliamentary career. 
D’Arcy McGee had reached the end of the process leading to a new nation- 
ality. He sought to show the way to others of his own,, and of all races 
in the nation. But he never forgot.his birthplace. 
It was-also fitting that his last public .letter, written just 
hours before his deaths was to Lord Mayo, the Secretary of State for 
Ireland. In it, McGee openly protested British policy in Ireland and he 
also suggested.a remedy. Moylan published the .letter after McGee's funeral 
to show how unjust his accusers had been in calling him a traitor: 
Let me venture to say, in the name of British America, to 
the statesmen of Great Britain - 'Settle for our sakes and 
for your own...on terms to satisfy the majority of the 
people to be governed.... there is one miraculous agency 
which has yet .to be fully and fairly tried out in Ireland; 
brute force has failed, proselytism has failed, Anglification 
has failed; try, if only as a novelty, statesmen of the Empire! 
the miraculous agency of equal and exact justice for one or 
two generations. 
Pointing out the loyalty of the Irish in Canada, McGee gave credit to the 
advantages and freedom enjoyed by the Catholics of the nation. He then 
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pointedly stated: 
Therefore it is, my Lord, we are loyal to the Queen in 
Canada....Were it otherwise, we would be otherwise. 175 
In these last public statements, McGee pointed the way for further growth 
towards a new nationality for all races in the Dominion. His main object 
was reconciliation among the various ethnic groups that made up the new 
nation; encouragement of immigration to populate the land; and the exten- 
sion of Canada’s borders in the west: 
If I could...keep repeating inetherears of our Statesmen 
one phrase, it would be 'colonize the Saskatchewan!' The 
future of the Dominion depends on our early occupation of 
that rich prairie land. 176 
Although he did not live to see that idea come to pass, one of the last 
meetings he had in his life was with Angus Morrison, a member of Parlia- 
ment from Ontario who was pleading the case of the Red River settlers in 
their desire for self-determination. Morrison mentioned in a letter to 
the leaders at Red River that he had informed McGee of their demands, and 
that McGee was completely in agreement with them. His only request was 
that they should not appear to be threatening the Canadian Government in 
177 
any way. Conciliation was the key to his thinking. As he had said, as 
long as the rights of minorities were respected, the new nationality;/ 
would be safe. He left a legacy for Canada, and especially for the Irish 
Catholics of Canada; one which Moylan and Anglin would inherit in the 
years to come. 
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McGee's death was a watershed in the history of the Irish Catholic 
community of British America. Before it, everything had been traced back 
to Ireland and the Irish identity of the community as they sought to 
come to terms with being Irishmen in British America. But, in his death, 
McGee changed that perspective for them. By dying for the new nationality, 
as he surely had, McGee had completed the process of forcing the Irish 
Catholics to look forward to something new. It was not sudden, nor easily 
perceived at the time; but from 1868 on, Irish Catholics in Canada ceased 
looking back for an identity, and started to look for it in the new land. 
This can be seen in the personal odysseys of the journalists we have been 
studying. James Moylan continued to be very much what he had always been: 
a Catholic journalist who was highly suspicious of Protestants. By 1869, 
he was off on his anti-Brown campaign again, blaming the Grits for most 
of the problems facing the new Dominion, including the Red River troubles, 
and sectarianism in education. He became very involved in the question 
of immigration, as McGee had been, and finally found work in the Canada 
Emigration Office in 1870. In the aftermath of McGee's death, there 
had been something of a witch-hunt against suspected symathizers of the 
Fenians. It was thought that the assassination was part of a general 
conspiracy by the Fenians and hundreds of Irish Catholics were arrestedu 
and imprisoned without trial. Moylan himself was convinced of the guilt 
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of the man tried and hung for the assassination, James Patrick Whelan. 
He continued to attack Fenianism, concentrating on its anti-Catholic 
aspects, until after a second, pathetic attempt at invasion by that group 
178 Canadian Freeman, 28 Jan. 
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in May 1870, when a few hundred Fenians under General O’Neill tried to 
achieve a second battle of Ridgeway but were easily repulsed by Canadian 
militia. In the spirit of the new nationality, Moylan called for fair play 
for the Metis in Red River, and acknowledged the legitimacy of Riel’s 
government there in 1870. The most obvious change in Moylan’s attitude 
to the new nation was that he no longer believed in an independent Canada 
as he had in 1866. He had come around to see the importance of the link 
with the Empire; and when some people tried to form an Independence League 
in 1870, inspired by a misunderstanding of McGee’s new nationality, Moylan 
would have nothing to do with them: 
If we are to preserve our institutions we must, at all 
hazards, maintain the Imperial connection....Independence 
is a myth; annexation, after the cutting of British 
connection, a certainty. Let us, therefore, stay as we 
are. 182 
If we are going to commit political hari-kari, let us 
rather go for annexation at once. 183 
Although he could still be accused of being too concerned with Irish Cath- 
olic interests, Moylan was well on the way to assimilation in the new 
nationality of his friend. 
Patrick Boyle was not so easily changed. He remained a confirmed 
Irish nationalist, with a loyalty to Canada as his home, but a greater 
love for Ireland paramount in his affections: 
Above all and before all, we must remember that we are 
^^^Ibid., 7 July, 1870. 
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Irish.... to Ireland we owe our first love. 185 
Boyle was arrested in the aftermath of the assassination and held in 
prison for months. On his release, he thanked George Brown of the Globe 
for being the only major Canadian journalist to question the arbitrary 
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treatment of the detainees.. Such an act by Brown, acknowledged by 
Boyle, was a sign that traditional sectional animosities could be over- 
come in a new nationality. Boyle was arrested again in March, 1869 on a 
charge of libel. He had accused the prison authorities of responsibility 
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for the death of a detainee, and was removed to Ottawa to stand trial, ne 
He seems to have toned down his comments after that time, and by the end 
of 1870, even Macdonald could consider taking over the newspaper and 
using it as an organ for the Conservatives in their bid for Irish Catholic 
^ 188 support. 
Timothy Warren Anglin was, ironically, to have the most success in 
adapting to the new nationality. Having taken his place in the Canadian 
House of Commons in 1867, he prepared to challenge McGee for the title 
of spokesman of the Irish Catholic community in the Dominion^.^^n spite of 
claims to the contrary, it is unlikely that Anglin had the charisma or 
talent for such a role as long as McGee was available. After the murder, 
Anglin found himself in an awkward situation: he had taken the side of 
those Irish Catholics who now came under suspicion of assassinating McGee. 
Irish Canadian, I Jan. 1873. 
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He himself had been outspoken in his criticism of McGee and his idea of 
a new nationality for years; and now that McGee had died a martyr to the 
cause he espoused, Anglin was eager not to appear to favour his opponents. 
In his statement to the House of Commons following the murder, Anglin was 
careful to be as noncommittal as possible, merely expressing general 
sentiments of shock and sorrow. But he did give expression to one idea 
that McGee had been warning about for many years: the danger by associat- 
ion that the Irish Catholicsoof Canada faced from the Fenians. It took the 
murder to convince Anglin that "the crime of one [Irishman] will reflect 
190 on them all". In the years following 1868, Anglin played a full role 
in the House, representing the interests of his Province conscientiously. 
He recognized that Irish Catholics were actually better off in the Dominion 
191 than those in the United States, and he was prepared to work within the 
new structures, especially when he saw how little power was left to the 
Provincial Assemblies. From 1874 to 1878, Timothy Warren Anglin was the 
Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons. The clearest indication of the 
change that had taken place in his thinking, and of how far he had come 
from the old narrow nationalism of New Brunswick, is his removalffrom the 
Province in 1883 to Toronto. Timothy Anglin, the Catholic editor, went to 
192 
work on the Toronto Globe of his old enemy George Brown. It was a slow 
process, but the Irish Catholics were being slowly assimilated into a new 
nationality, as McGee had hoped. 
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The Irish Catholics of Canada suffered a change in the years after 
1868. They toned down their hitherto high profile presence in Canadian 
society; and there was very little political activity that could be 
called specifically Irish after that year. Even the militant St. Patrick's 
Society of Montreal became more circumspect in their activities. In 1869, 
Archbishop Lynch considered them to have been sufficiently rehabilitated 
193 to enable him to review their St. Patrick's Day parade. What had 
happened in the wake of April 1868, was that the process of assimilation, 
already under way. in the early 1860's, was hastened by a communal sense 
of guilt and shame which facilitated their absorption into the mainstream 
of Canadian life. 
Canada itself was coming to the end of an era by 1870. With the 
entry of Manitoba into Confederation in 1870, and of British Columbia in 
the following year, the dream of a nation "from sea to shining sea" had 
become a reality. The further path to a new nationality within these new 
political boundaries would stretch on into the next century, but the role 
of Irish Catholic journalists in that development ended with the final 
and feeble Fenian attack on Canada in 1870. The complete lack of success 
of that operation, either in military terms, or in terms of Irish Catholic 
support in Canada, showed that McGee's work had not been fruitless. The 
last thirty years of the nineteenth century would see the fading influence 
of Irish Catholics in the areas of journalism and politics. After 1870 it 
became increasingly a matter of Canadians of Irish extraction, rather than 
of Irish-Canadians. The Celts experienced a twilight of culture and ident- 
ity as they became part of a new nationality in British America. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CELTIC TWILIGHT 
Thomas D’Arcy McGee had called his Canadian'newspaper the New Era, 
"as an indication of the time of its birth".^ With his death, it may be 
said that the era came to an end. By 1870, the attitudes of Irish Cath- 
olics in the Dominion of Canada were conforming increasingly to 
the pattern McGee had envisaged for them.in his speeches and articles 
since 1857. The refusal of the Irish Catholic community to support the 
final Fenian attempts at invading Canada in 1870 formed the last link in 
a.chain of allegiances to a new nation and a new nationality in Canada. 
From the time of McGee’s death, they had been forced to choose sides, much 
as McGee had always forced choices on them and their journalists. It was 
McGee who brought the question of a new nationality to the attention of 
Irish Catholics in British America^and imposed it as an issue to be debated. 
Moylan, Anglin, Boyle, Whelan and other less important Irish Catholic 
journalists wrote tellingly on the issue, but it was always in response 
to something that McGee had brought to their attention. They were always 
reacting to ideas that he was responsible for; often, as in the case of 
Anglin, identifying Confederation with McGee. We have noted that much of 
Anglin’s opposition to Confederation, in 1865-66.was based as.much on his 
^New Era, 25 May, 1857. 
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dislike for McGee as for any theory of Federation. In that respect, McGee 
is the central, pivotal figure in any study of Irish Catholic reactions 
to the concept of a new nationality. Quite simply, it can be said that 
without McGee, a new nationality would not have figured in the thinking of 
Irish Catholics at this time. None of.the other Irish Catholic journalists 
were showing any sign.of rising above the usual murky world of sectional 
and sectarian journalism that was the normal pattern:in British America at 
the time. For all his support of McGee's ideas, James Moylan could never 
resist making blatantly sectarian attacks against George Brown and the 
Gritspoliticians and journals. Nor was this confined to political affairs; 
he was as quick to. write an article condemning Protestant theology as he 
was to attack Protestant politicians. 
The same was true of Anglin, whose.language did nothing to ease 
sectional animosities, in New Brunswick. Patrick Boyle was single-minded in 
his hatred of British rule in Ireland and was not willing to fit into a 
Canadian environment without dragging in historic Irish grievances. McGee 
was the only one who was prepared to rise above sectional and sectarian 
differences to work with whoever he believed was most useful for the new 
nation. Even experiments that failed, like his alliance with George Brown 
in 1858, did not prevent him from trying again; and his continued friendship 
for political foes, however much.they or their journals personally vilified 
him, did much to. create an atmosphere conducive „to.the.formation of other- 
wise unthinkable alliances in 1864-5. Clearly then, Thomas D'Arcy McGee 
must be granted .the honour of being-the most important Irish Catholic 
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journalist of the period in connection with the new nationality. The others 
merely reacted in response to McGee's actions. 
Among the Irish Catholics, over whom he'had most influence,until 
at least 1867, Confederation was something quickly accepted. The question 
of Fenianism was more pressing for them than any constitutional changes. 
But, again through McGee's influence, the Irish Catholic populationoof the 
new Dominion had been brought to a choice of loyalties very like that of 
the Irish Protestants of the early nineteenth, century.. Just as they had 
chosen to adopt British nationality in place of a Protestant nation in 
Ireland, so Irish Catholics were brought to accept McGee's role for them 
in the new nation. Although there was undoubtedly a great deal of sympathy 
for Fenianism among Irish. Catholics in Canada, that sympathy was never 
translated into active support as the Fenians had hoped.. Moylan was also 
instrumental in bringing this situation about, showing the Irish Catholics 
that loyalty to Canada was not only to be expected of the Irish in return 
for the favours bestowed by the freedoms they had there, it was also con- 
sistent with a.continued. ^.interest in Irish affairs. Al- 
though Canada was their new nation, and -the recipient.of their undivided 
allegiance* there was .nothing in that to, prevent Irish Catholics in Canada 
from using what influence they might have with the Imperial Government for 
Ireland's sake. McGee had done so in his letter.to.Lord Mayo and in con- 
versations with William Gladstone during trips to London. Moylan had writ- 
ten often about Ireland's wrongs in the pages of the Canadian Freeman; so 
there was an alternative to the narrow nationalism of Patrick Boyle and 
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the Irish Canadian. McGee's condemnation of the Fenians and the threats 
of invasion by Fenian hordes culminating in the battle of Ridgeway in 
July 1866, forced the Catholic Irish of Canada to face up to the question 
of nationality. Were they to be Irish, or Canadian? Many chose, like 
Boyle, to remain Irish; but the history of Irish Catholics after McGee's 
death shows that the vast majority were resigned, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, to accept new nationality that left room for their natural 
interest in Ireland's affairs. 
Irish Catholics were assimilated quickly and easily into the new 
nation after 1870. They experienced the normal pattern of immigrant assim- 
ilation after the first generation had settled down and the flow of immi- 
gration-had slowed. This was happening in the 1860's, but the Fenian 
experience both aggravated the process, and, ultimately, ensured it. For 
the Fenians made the Irish Catholics visible in a way they could not avoid. 
With McGee's decision to. attack the Fenians through publicity went the 
parallel that the entire Catholic community would also be in the limelight 
and compelled to declare their position on the issue of loyalty. They hedged 
on that.until McGee's own assassination forced the issue and laid the 
Fenian ghost to-rest in Canada. The Irish had.chosen sides by 1870 and 
the Fenians were a spent force; partly because of McGee's death, and also 
because of the formal condemnation of .the Fenians by the Vatican in 1870. 
In the end, their Catholicism overcame whatever vestiges.of radical Irish 
nationalism still existed in Irish Catholic thinking. This must, of course, 
be seen as a generalization, since there were bound to be those who held 
to old allegiances; men like Boyle, who continued-to have divided loyalties. 
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The response to McGee's vision of a new nationality among 
Irish Catholic journalists was varied and sometimes surprising. There 
were those like James Moylan who were immediately attracted to McGee 
and his ideas, though with unclear ideas of what a new nationality 
would mean for Canada or for the Irish Catholics. But the faith they 
placed in McGee, however often they may have disagreed with his blunt 
and sometimes insensitive way of educating them, was secure and almost 
independent of McGee as an individual. Moylan, for example, in the 
months when he was fighting with McGee over the alliance with Brown, 
did not turn away from the vision of a new nationality, only from the 
prophet. Others, like Timothy Anglin, rejected the vision outright as 
an invasion of their own nationality. Anglin, said to have been a 
Young Irelander, had obviously been free of the influence of Thomas 
Davis. He had no time for poetic dreamers and "new" nationalities. 
"The most determined isolationist" was not prepared either to see his 
adopted nation. New Brunswick, lost in the embrace of Confederation, 
or to see his position as leader of the Irish Catholics of the Province 
threatened by the rise of McGee. His was a very narrow and intolerant 
view of nationality and the future. Patrick Boyle raised an even more 
central question in response to McGee's theory of nationality: what 
was the fate of Irish nationalism to be in the new nationality? How 
much of what was Irish would survive the transformation? Boyle clearly 
saw Confederation as something merely political or constitutional. It 
was not, as it was for McGee, Moylan, and even Anglin, a step towards 
something larger and more comprehensive. For Boyle, such a step would 
itself have been unacceptable. 
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Moylan was essential to McGee’s success. For many years McGee’s 
echo, Moylan sooned reached a position of independent belief in a new 
nationality. He was the man who carried the moderate Irish Catholics 
along with McGee, and in 1858-9 had actually saved McGee from political 
death. Anglin, as an opponent, was perhaps not up to McGee’s standards, 
but he was astute enough to see through much of the Confederation 
rhetoric and define the main issue as loyalty. When he chose to try 
the new system, he was doing a great service to the new Dominion. His 
continued opposition to Confederation would have made the following 
years of consolidation very much more difficult, especially in his own 
Province of New Brunswick. By 1870, he was preaching toleration for the 
2 
people of Manitoba, and in 1885 he pleaded in Riel’s defense. He sought 
an end to sectarian animosities and recognized the growing importance 
of the Federal Government in the life of the new nation. As McGee’s 
successor to the leadership of the Irish Catholics in the Dominion of 
Canada, Anglin ironically found himself following McGee’s ways more 
closely than he could have expected. .It was an important aspect of the 
continuing assimilation of the Irish Catholics into a new nationality. 
The Irish Catholic journalists of British America were the 
means by which their coreligionists and countrymen were educated in the 
need for a re-evaluation of their sense of identity. The question of a 
new nationality was debated in the pages of the newspapers, and not on 
the streets. The process of assimilation of the Irish Catholics into a 
new nationality was their main achievement in the years 1857-1870. The 
catalyst was Thomas D'Arcy McGee: 
2 
Baker, William M., Timothy Warren Anglin, 1822-96, (Toronto, 1877), 
p. 242. 
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McGee had a vital role to play outside the confines of the 
Irish Catholic community also. Aside from McGee, most of the Fathers 
of Confederation promoted the scheme of union for very different 
reasons. These ranged from Galt's economic hopes for the future of the 
Canadian Provinces, to Brown's expansionist dreams in the west, to 
Macdonald's realization that something of the sort was essential to 
avoid a total breakdown in the political structures of the United Prov- 
inces. Although there were some who talked about forming a "new nation" 
in Confederation, in most cases such ideas were either temporary^ as 
when Brown advocated such an idea at the Reform Convention in 1859, 
then moved to belief in dissolution of the Union in the following year; 
or else the advocacy of a new nationality was used to "sell" the scheme 
of Confederation to the 'Maritimes. But Thomas D'Arcy McGee was the only 
man who consistently preached Union on the basis of nationality, and who 
saw Confederation, not as an end in itself, but as a step to furthering 
that sense of identity he defined as a new nationality. Thus, it was 
McGee who gave to the new Dominion an ideology and a catch-phrase for 
defining itself: it was a new northern nation. Without that call to 
unity, however poetic and vague it may have seemed to some, there was 
nothing to give clear expression to what bound British Americans together. 
The economic motives for Confederation left the Maritime Provinces cold 
to the idea. The question of defense alone would not have convinced men 
like Anglin. But when the Empire seemed reddy to leave British Americans 
to the fates, it was McGee's alternative of a new nationality that would 
be essential to the new nation. It was all they had to express their 
common identity. 
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For a brief period, the vision'of a new'^biationad-ity gave British 
Americans a higher sense of purpose in bringing about Confederation 
that they might otherwise have had. The extent to which it actually 
came to pass in the longer term is less certain. The uniquely Canadian 
literature and culture that McGee preached is still not developed, nor 
is that sense of common identity that differentiates Canadian from 
American. McGee's ideas were to be taken, after 1870, by a group of 
people calling themselves "Canada First", and changed from a vision 
of self-awareness and toleration into a xenophobic and intolerant form 
of nationalism that McGee might well have found repugnant. The one true 
success of the new nationality, however, was in the Irish Catholic 
assimilation. The new nationality was, indeed, a product of Ireland. 
Thomas Davis had enunciated its dogmas; Young Ireland had begun the 
process of education that would translate ideas into reality. That was 
destroyed in Ireland by revolutionary activity. In the United States, 
one Young Irelander tried to carry on that work on behalf of the Irish 
immigrants there; that was destroyed by Irish revolutionary radicals. 
In British North America he tried again, and no revolutionaries were 
going to stop him there. He made the new nationality the touch-stone of 
Irish Catholic loyalty, the context in which they were to find their 
identity in Canada. And yet today, Thomas D'Arcy McGee is almost unknown 
in Ireland. One writer has even claimed that, after the failure of the 
3 
1848 rising, "D'Arcy McGee turned venemously anti-Irish". Such is the 
level of ignorance concerning the man. 
3 
Brown, Malcolm, The Politics of Irish Literature, (London, 1972), p. 134. 
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In reality, it is to the credit of Thomas D’Arcy McGee, and 
also that of those other Irish Catholic journalists studied here, that 
a distinctive Irish-Canadian community did not evolve to parallel that 
of the Irish-Americans in the United States. Instead, there was a part 
of the Canadian population that considered themselves Irish by descent. 
There would be no "hyphenated" Irish Canadians, no Irish-Canadian pol- 
iticians, no specifically Irish organizations involved in the national 
political arena, other than the Protestant Orange Order. For Irish 
Catholics, at least, the new nationality was their way of becoming 
"Canadianize'd", as perhaps few other ethnic groups in Canada have been. 
For, aside from the Irish Catholics, McGee’s hopes of a new nationality 
for British North America are still largely unfulfilled. Many of his 
ideas are yet to become part of the fabric of Canadian life; and until 
there is a distinctive culture, with its own literature, traditions and 
customs common to all Canadians, then the new nationality of Thomas 
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